Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV35844, Date: 2024-12-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35844    Hearing Date: December 24, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $56,904.75 against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”).

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion IN PART.

The Court awards attorney’s fees in the amount of $33,936.50.

The Court awards costs in the amount of $1,316.95.

Defendant shall make these payments to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of this order.

Background

This is a Song-Beverly Act action relating to a 2019 Buick Encore (the “Vehicle”) that Plaintiff purchased from Defendant on January 16, 2019.

Plaintiff filed this action on November 14, 2022, raising claims for (1) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (d); (2) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (b); (3) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (a)(3); (4) violation of Civil Code, sections 1793.2, subd. (a) and 1794; and (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

On April 8, 2024, the parties reached a settlement agreement. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs.

Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney’s fees on October 24, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may recover their reasonable costs and expenses, attorney’s fees based on actual time expended. (Civ. Code, § 1794.)

The lodestar method for calculating attorney fees applies to any statutory attorney fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750-751.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Id. at p. 751.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, which may include, without limitation, “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Warren, supra, at p. 36 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Discussion

Defendant has agreed to pay Plaintiff’s attorney fees and expenses upon motion to the Court. (Wood Decl. ¶ 62.) Defendant disputes the amount of the fees.

Attorney’s Fees

Hourly Rate

Plaintiff requests the following hourly rates for his attorneys:

(1) Carey Wood ($525.00);

(2) Vanessa Oliva ($470.00);

(3) Lara Rogers ($350.00);

(4) Erik Whitman ($475.00);

(5) Laura Schwartz ($430.00); and

(6) Jessica Anvar ($515.00).

(Wood Decl. ¶¶ 67-73.)

            Plaintiff requests hourly rates of $210.00 for Elaine Astorga and $225.00 for Richard Ruiz, both of whom are paralegals. (Wood Decl. ¶¶ 74-76.)

            The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable based upon each person’s experience level. (See Wood Decl. ¶¶ 67-76.)          

Hours

The Court finds that most of the hours expended were reasonable. This case was litigated for two years, and the accrual of tens of thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees foreseeably resulted.

The Court notes Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s request for fees for the paralegals insofar as they performed work that can be classified as clerical. However, Courts have held that attorney fee provisions also include paralegal fees because “[a]n award of attorney fees which does not compensate for paralegal service time would not fully compensate the attorney.” (Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, 269.) The Court finds the paralegal fees incurred to be reasonable. The Court therefore does not strike any of the paralegal fees.

Plaintiff seeks $4,000.00 in attorney’s fees in connection with reviewing Defendant’s opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing, which Plaintiff predicts will take “well over ten hours”. (Motion at p. 1:8-10.) Plaintiff has not explained who performed this work or what hourly rate applies. Plaintiff already seeks roughly nine hours of attorney time in connection with the preparation of this motion. (Wood Decl., Ex. 14 at pp. 49-50.) The Court deems that 10.0 hours total regarding the motion is adequate in light of the routine nature of this motion and the limited nature of Defendant’s opposition.

The Court awards a lodestar of $33,936.50.

Lodestar Enhancement

There is nothing unusually complex or novel about this case warranting a lodestar enhancement. The Court has considered the factors relating to a multiplier but does not conclude that a multiplier is appropriate.  The Court therefore does not grant one.

Costs

            Plaintiff requests $1,319.95 in costs.

Defendant objects that Plaintiff has not attached a memorandum of costs and states that it will file a motion to strike costs.

Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs on October 3, 2024 and served it on Defendant’s counsel electronically.

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. …. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(4).” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

“Any period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

Even including the 2-day extension, Defendant’s time to file a motion to strike or tax costs has run.

In the memorandum of costs, Carey Wood avers that Plaintiff expended $1,316.95 in costs. The Court finds these costs to be reasonable and approves them.