Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV38704, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV38704 Hearing Date: June 17, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
INGRAM WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL LOGISTICS WAREHOUSING,
INC., Defendant. |
Case No:
22STCV38704 Hearing Date: June 17, 2023 Calendar Number: 2 |
Plaintiff Ingram Washingotn (“Plaintiff”) seeks default
judgment against Defendant Capital Logistics Warehousing, Inc. (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff requests:
(1) money judgment in the amount of $547,584.00, consisting
of:
(a) damages in the amount of $514,780.00;
(b) interest in the amount of $2,260.00;
(c) costs in the amount of $544.00;
(d) attorney’s fees in the amount
of $30,000.00 (or $32,900 in Plaintiff’s proposed judgment);
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for default judgment.
Plaintiff has not adequately pled his fraud claims. Plaintiff must correct his
damages request or provide adequate evidence for his damages. Plaintiff must
correct his interest and attorney fee requests.
This is an employment case.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant hired her as an employee
with a salary of $80,000.00, but then informed her on her first day that she
would be an independent contractor with a salary of $75,000.00.
Plaintiff alleges that she reported several unlawful
activities, including Labor Code violations, fire safety issues, theft, operation
of heavy machinery after drinking, and a fraudulent client invoice scheme.
Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for
reporting these violations.
Plaintiff filed this action on December 13, 2022. The
operative complaint is now the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which raises
claims for (1) retaliation in violation of Labor Code, section 1102.5; (2)
wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code, section 1102.5; (3) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy; (4) breach of contract; (5)
promissory fraud (deceit); (6) promissory fraud (negligent misrepresentation);
and (7) earned but unpaid wages.
Default was entered against Defendant on March 25, 2024.
CCP § 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant has
failed to timely answer after being properly served. A party seeking judgment on the default by
the Court must file a Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and:
(1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons;
(2) A dismissal of
all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or
an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of
grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7));
(3) A declaration
of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100)
(CRC 3.1800(a)(5));
(4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1));
(5) Admissible
evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief
requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362);
(6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3));
(7) A memorandum of
costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4));
(8) A request for
attorney’s fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC
3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were
calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214. Where a request for attorney fees is based on
a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule
3.207); and
(9) A proposed form
of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6));
(10) Where an
application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay
money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC
3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the
original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the
copy instead (Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
1118, 1124);
(11) Where the
plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve
a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code
Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)).
(California Rules
of Court rule 3.1800.)
Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are
allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are “filing, motion, and jury
fees.”
A party who defaults only admits facts that are well-pleaded
in the complaint or cross-complaint. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the
requested relief.
According
to the proof of service filed on March 22, 2024, Defendant was served on January
11, 2024 at 525 W Manville St, Compton, CA 90220 via substitute service on Candice
Doe, the person in charge of Defendant’s office.
Nichelle D. Jordan avers to Defendant’s non-military status.
Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in his declaration.
Plaintiff has not adequately pled his claim for fraud by intentional
misrepresentation.
The facts
constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to
every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the
pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege
fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons
allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom
they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)
Plaintiff has not pled that Defendant intended to induce his
reliance or that Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s representations.
“California courts
have recognized a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, i.e., a duty
to communicate accurate information, in two circumstances. The first situation
arises where providing false information poses a risk of and results in physical
harm to person or property. The second situation arises where information is
conveyed in a commercial setting for a business purpose.” (Friedman v. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 477.)
Plaintiff has not pled intent to reduce reliance or that
Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s representations.
If Plaintiff wishes to state a claim for these causes of
action, Plaintiff must amend his complaint.
“Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of
a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.” (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, “a statement of damages cannot be relied
upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal
injury or wrongful death.” (Ibid.) “In all other cases, when recovering
damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages
specified in the complaint.” (Ibid.) Moreover, a plaintiff must submit admissible
evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief
requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.)
There
are several problems with Plaintiff’s damages prove-up.
First,
although Plaintiff requests $514,780.00 in damages on default judgment,
Plaintiff’s declaration only purports to support $326,589.00 in damages.
Plaintiff cannot obtain damages in excess of proof.
Second,
Plaintiff requests two years in front pay, but does not provide evidence as to
how long he would have been employed but for his alleged wrongful termination.
Third,
Plaintiff provides only minimal, conclusory statements as to the emotional
distress he suffered as a result of his termination. This is inadequate to
support his request for $100,000.00 in pain and suffering damages.
Plaintiff
must resolve these inconsistencies in his damages requests.
Plaintiff requests $2,260.00 in interest.
A plaintiff may only recover pre-judgment interest interest
when the damages are “certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation[.]”
(Civ. Code, section 3287.)
Plaintiff’s damages are not certain or capable of being made
certain because they include speculative front-pay damages and emotional
distress damages– damages which lack adequate evidentiary support, at that.
Plaintiff therefore has not shown an entitlement to pre-judgment interest.
Nichelle D. Jordan avers that Plaintiff expended $544.00 in
costs.
Plaintiff
requests $30,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
A
plaintiff in a retaliation action can recover their reasonable attorney’s fees.
(Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (j).)
Because the judgment is in excess of $100,000.00, the
maximum recovery of attorney’s fees is equal to $2,890 plus 1% of the excess
over $100,000. (Local Rule 3.214.)
Taking as granted Plaintiff’s damages request of $514,780.00,
the excess over $100,000 here is $414,780.00. 1% of that amount is $4,147.80.
Thus, the maximum amount of attorney’s fees, even accepting Plaintiff’s
unsupported damages claim, is $7,037.80. Plaintiff’s request far exceeds this
amount.
After correcting his damages and interest request, Plaintiff
must also correct his attorney fee request to be consistent with Local Rule
3.214.
Plaintiff
has submitted a proposed form of judgment. Plaintiff’s proposed judgment
includes inconsistent attorney’s fees, which are excessive in any event.