Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV39241, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39241    Hearing Date: January 18, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Stewart Goldman (“Plaintiff”) requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,754.24 payable by Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”).

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED in the amount a total of $14,330.24, comprised of:

(1) $12,900 in attorney’s fees; and

(2) $1,430.24 in costs.

          The Court ORDERS Defendant to pay this amount to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of this order.

Background

Plaintiff purchased a vehicle from Defendant that he alleges was defective in violation of the Song-Beverly act. On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendant, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.

On February 3, 2023, Defendant offered to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle, but did not receive a response. Defendant followed up on the offer several times over the next few months.

On June 19, 2023, Defendant served on Plaintiff an offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 998. Defendant offered a settlement of $44,250.00 and $8,500.00 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff declined this offer.

The parties ultimately settled for $46,500.00 but could not reach an agreement on the amount of attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff now requests attorney’s fees in this action. Plaintiff requests a total of $20,754.24, comprised of:

(1) $19,324.00 in attorney’s fees; and

(2) $1,430.24 in costs.

Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Evidentiary Objections

Having considered Defendant’s evidentiary objections, the Court overrules the objections.

Legal Standard

In General

A buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may recover their reasonable costs and expenses, attorney’s fees based on actual time expended. (Civ. Code, § 1794.)

The lodestar method for calculating attorney fees applies to any statutory attorney fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750-751.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Id. at p. 751.) 

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Courts’ approach to determining fees under the Song-Beverly act ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, which may include, without limitation, “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Warren, supra, at p. 36 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) 

998 Offers

Code of Civil Procedure section 998 establishes a procedure to shift costs if a party fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer before trial. The purpose of the statute is to encourage pretrial settlements. Section 998 provides that if a plaintiff fails to accept a written offer to compromise by a defendant and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff cannot recover its postoffer costs and must pay the defendant's costs incurred after the offer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 998 subd. (c)(1).)

In reviewing a section 998 offer, courts interpret any ambiguity in the offer against its proponent. (Prince v. Invensure Ins. Brokers, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 614, 622.) “An offer to compromise under section 998 must be sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to evaluate the worth of the offer and make a reasoned decision whether to accept the offer.” (Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 764, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 375.) Where a defendant's settlement offer contains terms that make it “exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine the value of the offer to the plaintiff[. . . . a court should not undertake extraordinary efforts to attempt to determine whether the judgment is more favorable to the plaintiff. Instead, the court should conclude that the offer is not sufficiently specific or certain to determine its value and deny cost shifting under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.” (Id. at 766.)

Discussion

Repurchase Offer

Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not recover attorney’s fees past the date of Defendant’s repurchase offer, because the continued litigation beyond that point solely served to drive up costs. However, Defendant has not stated the amount of the original repurchase offer, which Plaintiff asserts is less than the final settlement. Furthermore, offer does not appear to have been a formal 998 offer. As such, the Court is not able to conclude that the repurchase offer cut off subsequent attorney’s fees.

Hourly Rates

Plaintiff requests hourly rates of $695.00 for Michael Saeedian, $525.00 for Christopher Urner, and $250.00 for Jorge Acosta. Saeedian has practiced law since 2009. Urner has practiced law for five years. Acosta is a law clerk who has worked in the legal industry for five years. The Court finds these rates to be reasonable.

Hours

The Court finds the hours requested to be excessive. For example, the requested hours include a large number of non-legal administrative tasks, the majority of which are billed at 0.1 hours. The Court therefore reduces the fees awarded to $12,900, approximately two thirds of the requested fees.

Costs

Plaintiff provides a memorandum of costs averred to by Saeedian. The Court finds these costs to be reasonable.