Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV02460, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02460    Hearing Date: May 15, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff James Hernandez (“Plaintiff”) moves for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses against Defendant Kia America, Inc. (“Defendant”) consisting of $67,472.50 in attorney’s fees and $4,242.93 in costs.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in full.

Background

This is a Song-Beverly Act action relating to a new 2022 Kia Telluride (the “Vehicle”), manufactured by Defendant, which Plaintiff leased from Kia of Alhambra in Alhambra, California on February 5, 2022. Plaintiff alleges certain defects in the Vehicle and presented it to Kia repair facilities for repair. The repair facilities in question were allegedly unable to repair the defects in the Vehicle.

Plaintiff filed this action on February 3, 2023, raising claims for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty; (3) breach of the Song-Beverly Act, section 1793.2(b); (4) negligent repair.

On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion, as well as a memorandum of costs. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may recover their reasonable costs and expenses, attorney’s fees based on actual time expended. (Civ. Code, § 1794.)

The lodestar method for calculating attorney fees applies to any statutory attorney fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750-751.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Id. at p. 751.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, which may include, without limitation, “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Warren, supra, at p. 36 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Discussion

Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees

Here, Plaintiff received a net monetary recovery in the settlement and is thus the prevailing party. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

Amount of Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff requests a lodestar amount of $67,472.50. Plaintiff does not request a lodestar multiplier.

The Court has reviewed the hourly rates requested for Plaintiffs’ attorneys and finds them to be reasonable.

Plaintiff has provided the billing records in this case. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 11-13, Ex. A.)  The Court has reviewed the records and the time expended appears reasonable to the Court.

            Defendant does not object to specific items of billing. Rather, Defendant makes general references to certain categories of billing items and requests reductions to them. This is not sufficient to allow the Court to analyze the entries objected to. At its most clear, Defendant’s opposition raises the issue of certain time billed for a series of discovery motions which Defendant contends were filed without an adequate meet and confer process. Defendant’s only evidentiary support for this is an “Exhibit 11” to the Proudfoot Declaration, which exhibit has not been provided. And even here, Defendant does not identify the time entries in question. Defendant has therefore not objected to Plaintiff’s time requests in a way that casts doubt on the reasonableness of any time entries.

            The Court therefore determines that Plaintiff’s time requests are reasonable.

The Court awards the lodestar amount of $67,472.50.

Costs and Expenses

Plaintiffs request $4,242.93 in costs and expenses. Defendant does not object to the amount of costs. The Court deems these costs reasonable.