Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV03722, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03722    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Sergio Garcia (“Plaintiff”) seeks an order for $73,915.06 in attorney’s fees and costs.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion in full and awards the requested $73,915.06. 

The Court vacates as moot the hearing on the motion to tax costs which is currently on calendar for July 24, 2025. 

Background

This is a Song-Beverly Act action.

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle (the “Subject Vehicle”) manufactured by General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”).

According to Plaintiff  number of defects arose in the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff presented the vehicle to Defendant for repair under the warranty but alleges that a reasonable number of repair attempts were not able to bring the Subject vehicle into conformity with the warranty.

Plaintiff filed this action on February 21, 2023, alleging breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act.

Legal Standard

Relevancy in Song-Beverly Act Actions

The Song—Beverly Act “is a remedial measure intended for protection of consumers and should be given a construction consistent with that purpose.” (Id.) To succeed on a claim brought under the Act, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, several elements, including nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value or safety; presentation of vehicle to manufacturer or authorized representative for repair; and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable number of attempts. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 886-887.) A buyer may also be entitled to a civil penalty of up to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code, §1794, subd. (c).)

Discussion

A.    Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), provides, “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”  

“A party may not recover attorney fees unless expressly authorized by statute or contract.” Code Civ. Proc., § 1021. Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.” The moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to attorney fees. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.   

B.    Analysis

a.      Whether Plaintiff is the Prevailing Party 

The Act does not define the term “prevailing party.” Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d). Most courts take a “pragmatic” approach to assessing whether a buyer has prevailed under the Act. See e.g., Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc.¿(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264 (Wohlgemuth); MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1047. Under this analysis, the trial court determines which party succeeded on a practical level, by considering the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. Wohlgemuth, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.  

Here, Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle for a purchase price of $49,738.83. (Barry Decl., Exh. 1.)  The parties agreed to settle the case in an agreement, providing that Defendant GM would repurchase the vehicle for $120,000.00. (Barry Decl., Exh. 3.)  Defendant GM conceded in the §998 offer of compromise that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case. (Id.)

b.      Whether Plaintiffs Requested Attorney Fees are Reasonable 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.’” Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132). The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award). 

Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of attorneys’ fees based on a lodestar amount of $59,702.50. (Barry Decl., Ex. 4.) Plaintiff also argues that, due to Defendant’s  delay in payment of attorneys' fees and costs, and given the contingent nature of TBLF' s representation in this case, among other factors.  Plaintiffs request a 0.15 multiplier in the amount of $8,955.37. Plaintiffs also incurred costs and expenses totaling $5,257.19. (Id., Ex. 6.)  In total, Plaintiffs request an award of fees and costs in the amount of $73,915.06.

Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration showing that their attorneys incurred a total of 138.3 billable hours.  The requested hours break down as follows: 

David N. Barry, Esq.: 15.7 hours at $675/hour for a total of $10,597.50

Elizabeth Quinn, Esq.: 17.6 hours at $600/hour – total 10,560

Andrew P. Matera, Esq.: 3.7 hours at $500/hour – total 1,850

Otis R. Hayes III, Esq.: 1.7 hours at $500/hour—total 850

Debora Rabieian, Esq.: 5.0 hours at $500/hour – total 2,500

Logan G. Pascal, Esq.: 4.7 hours at $400/hour – total 1,880

C. Richard Lara, Esq.: 89.9 hours at $350/hour – total 31,465

TOTAL LODESTAR: 138.3 hours

$52,702.50 total before multiplier.

The Court finds the rates charged by these attorneys reasonable.

The Court has reviewed the invoices submitted by Plaintiff and finds that the amount of time expended on each task, as well as the total amount of the lodestar, is eminently reasonable.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s work on this case spanned over two years from 2023 to 2025.  The total number of timekeepers—seven professionals—while somewhat high, is not unreasonable given the amount of time the case proceeded.  Moreover, Plaintiff had to participate in trial preparation because the case settled so late.  As required by the Court’s orders, Plaintiff’s counsel personally appeared at the Final Status Conference while Defendant’s counsel did not.  Plaintiff voluntarily deducted several time entries of new lawyers that could be argued to be duplicative, a deduction the Court appreciates.

The Court also finds that the requested .15 multiplier is modest and reasonable.  Plaintiff achieved an excellent result through the settlement.  They kept their billing relatively low in doing so.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s payment is contingent on the results, and there was the possibility that Plaintiff’s counsel would not be paid at all. They have also had to wait several years for their payment.  For these reasons, and based on all other relevant factors, the Court finds the multiplier reasonable.

Defendant argues that this Court should substantially reduce Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request.  Defendant GM challenges Counsel’s alleged hours, arguing that counsel’s time records and actual work product, does not support that the time billed was either actually or reasonably incurred. Defendant also accuses Plaintiff’s counsel of padding their hours. The Court finds these arguments to be without merit.  They are for the most part highly general, as opposed to challenging particular entries.  The Court does not find them persuasive.

The court has reviewed the requested costs and finds them reasonable. 

Given that the parties have submitted their substantive arguments about costs, and the Court has rendered its decision, the Court vacates the hearing on the motion to tax costs which is currently on calendar for July 24, 2025.