Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV08697, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV08697 Hearing Date: August 24, 2023 Dept: 72
#13
Date: August
24, 2023
Case
No: 23STCV08697
Case
Name: Daisy Marilynn Gonzalez v. Lan, L.P.
Defendants Lan, L.P. and
R.E.C. Development, Inc. (collectively,
“Defendants”) have demurred to the second and fourth causes of action in the
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Defendant’s
demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendants have moved to strike the allegations of the FAC
relating to punitive damages.
Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED as to paragraphs 33, 40,
45, 53, 73, and 79 in the FAC and paragraphs 4, 7, 10, and 13 in the prayer of
relief with 10 days leave to amend.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS:
On
September 19, 2018, Plaintiff Daisy M. Gonzalez entered into a lease agreement
with Defendant Lan, L.P., to rent Apartment 1 (“Apartment”) located in 12919
Cordary Ave., Hawthrone, CA. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), ¶ 18.) Plaintiff
occupied the apartment with her four minor children, Vincent Armijo, Amerie M.
Armijo, Benjamin Armijo, and Jaylin H. Salas (collectively as “Plaintiffs”). (Id.,
¶ 1.)
Plaintiffs believe that Lan, L.P. owns and R.E.C. Development, Inc. manages the Apartment. (Id.,
¶¶ 4-5.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
Lan, L.P. and R.EC. Development, Inc. (“Defendants”) failed to maintain the
habitability of the Apartment and apartment building. (Id., ¶10.) Plaintiffs allege that failure to maintain suitable
living conditions stems from Defendants failure to spend money to repair,
maintain, and control pests in the apartment. (Id., ¶ 11.) Examples of this failure are the persistent
cockroach infestations, water leaks that have caused mold, and failure to
repair damages in the Apartment. (Id., ¶ 11a.- 11c.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants chose to
ignore complaints made by Plaintiffs and other tenants as to condition of the
apartments. (Id., ¶ 12.)
ANALYSIS:
Demurrer
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding,
the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes
the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained,
leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of
successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court
that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.)
However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state
a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to
amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation
Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Second
Cause of Action – Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability
To establish a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1) “the existence
of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability,” (2)
“notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the
tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was given a reasonable
time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting damages.” (Erlach v.
Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
“[U]nder cotemporary conditions,
public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for
maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in our state.” (Green v.
Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 627.) “This implied warranty of
habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that leased premises are
in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean that ‘bare
living requirements' must be maintained. In most cases substantial
compliance with those applicable building and housing code standards which
materially affect health and safety will suffice to meet the landlord's
obligations under the common law implied warranty of habitability we now
recognize.” (Id. at 637.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
fail to adequately plead facts that demonstrate when Defendants were given notice
as to the defects in the Apartment. (Dem., pp. 6.) The FAC, however, alleges that “Plaintiffs
repeatedly informed Defendants and their agents of the defects outlines
above. Defendants were at all times
aware of the defective, illegal, non-complying and substandard conditions
plaguing the Apartment and the Property.”
(FAC, ¶27.) In context, this
allegation is sufficient. Defendants do
not cite law stating that the dates that Plaintiff informed them must be
alleged with specificity. Any ambiguity
on the issue can be clarified during discovery.
Accordingly,
the demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.
Fourth
Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“In order to state a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show:
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of
causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress;
(3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's
outrageous conduct.” (Trerice v. Blue
Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.) “While the outrageousness of a defendant's conduct
normally presents an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact
[citation], the court may determine in the first instance, whether the
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as
to permit recovery.” (Ibid.) Outrageous
conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
by a civilized community. [Citations]” (Faunce v. Cate (2013)
222¿Cal.App.4th¿166, 172.)
“[T]he availability of a remedy for
breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from
suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the
landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental
distress. Whether this is so under the present allegations, presents a
factual question -- it cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant has not
stated a cause of action.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 903, 922.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently plead facts that show Defendants alleged failure to
repair the Apartment was the result of intentional conduct or done with the
intent to cause emotional distress. (Dem. pp. 8.) Further, Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have failed to plead emotional distress. (Id., pp. 7.) Defendants’
argument fails as Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to state a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
Plaintiffs can plead IIED by
showing that Defendants recklessly disregarded the probability of causing
emotional distress. (Trerice, 209 Cal.App.3d at 883.) Plaintiffs plead that Defendants knew that
there was a severe cockroach infestation that invaded the entire apartment, and
that the Apartment was infested with mold due an unfixed water leak. (FAC, ¶
11a. – 11b.) Since the court assumes the truth of fact pleaded in the
Complaint, it can be inferred that a landlord knowing the existence of these
conditions coupled with failing to fix these issues causes a high probability
of the tenant suffering emotional distress. (See E-Fab, Inc., 153 Cal.App.4th at 1315.) Additionally, Plaintiff
properly pleads suffering emotional distress as Plaintiff allege suffering
“anxiety, freight, sleeplessness, depression, nausea, worry and fatigue.” (FAC,
¶ 44.)
The demurrer to the fourth cause of
action is OVERRULED.
Motion to Strike
The court may, upon a motion, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).)
The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false
or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)
Punitive Damages
Defendants seek to strike claims
for punitive damages in FAC, including paragraphs 33, 40, 45, 53, 73, and 79.
Additionally, Defendants move to strike claims for punitive damages in the
prayer of relief.
To survive a motion to strike,
claims for punitive damages in a non-contract action must be pleaded with facts
showing that the defendant acted maliciously, with the intention or willful and
conscious disregard of her likelihood to cause harm.¿ Hilliard v. A.H.
Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.¿ Conclusory allegations as
to findings of law (i.e., merely asserting that the defendant has been
malicious, fraudulent, and/or oppressive without stating a factual basis for
such assertions) will not suffice.¿ Smith v. Superior Court (1993) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042 (Smith).
The
allegations in the FAC relating to punitive damages remain conclusory. Plaintiffs have not cited any case with
allegations similar to this one that supported punitive damages. The one habitability case that they did cite,
Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990, is a case far different
than this one. It involved affirmative
lies told by the landlord to the Department of Housing. To the extent there is further briefing on
the punitive damage issue later in the case, it would be helpful to the Court
if Plaintiffs could bring to the Court’s attention more on-point
authorities.
Defendants also argue that punitive
damages cannot be imposed on Defendants as corporate entities for wrongful acts
done by their employees, unless the entity acted wrongfully or ratified the
acts of its employees. (Dem. pp. 12.)
The court in Cruz v. HomeBase held that,
“Corporations are
legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or
intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation
therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees.” (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.) The court interpreted Civil Code section 3294(b) to
require “proof of malice among corporate leaders” in order to impose punitive
damages. (Ibid.) The purpose of the statute is to “avoid[] punishing the
corporation for malice of low-level employees which does not reflect the
corporate “state of mind” or the intentions of corporate leaders. This assures
that punishment is imposed only if the corporation can be fairly be
viewed as guilty of the evil intent sought to be punished.” (Ibid.)
The FAC alleges that LAN and REC
“authorized and ratified the tortious and other wrongful conduct described
herein through one or more managing agents or employees as described herein.” (FAC ¶¶4-5, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs then allege that “the conduct
which resulted in the defects described above were directed or ratified by
Defendants and their respective employees, all of whom had substantial
independent authority and judgment over decisions that ultimately determined Defendants’
management and corporate policy.” (FAC ¶14, emphasis added.) This latter phrase is extremely unclear and
may mean that the persons who ratified the decisions were low-level employees
who had “substantial independent authority.”
Because the allegations are unclear and even self-contradictory about
how the corporation itself is allegedly liable for punitive damages, the Court
strikes the allegations about punitive damages with leave to amend.
Under these facts, Plaintiffs’ allegations
and prayer for punitive damages is improper and shall be stricken with leave to
amend.