Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV13611, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13611    Hearing Date: April 3, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Giorgio Baldi, Inc. (“GBI”) and Elena Baldi (collectively, “Defendants”) move to reclassify this case, filed by Plaintiff Emanuele Giacometti (“Plaintiff”), as a civil limited case.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.

Background

This action arises out of Plaintiff’s employment with GBI.

GBI terminated Plaintiff from his job as a waiter on March 16, 2020. (Complaint ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on June 13, 2023, raising claims for (1) failure to provide rest periods; (2) failure to provide meal periods; (3) failure to pay wages due upon termination; (4) conversion; (5) retaliation; and (6) unfair competition.

On June 20, 2024, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s first five claims on the basis that the claims were time-barred. The Court denied Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s sixth claim.

On January 7, 2025, Defendant filed this motion for reclassification. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

            “The plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading. The court, on its own motion, may reclassify a case at any time …. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subd. (a).)

            “If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party's initial pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The case is incorrectly classified.

(2) The moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subd. (b).)

In Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, the California Supreme Court held that a matter may be reclassified from unlimited to limited only if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be less than the statutory minimum. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257.) If there is a possibility that the damages will exceed the minimum, the case cannot be transferred to limited. (Ibid.) This high standard is appropriate in light of “the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129¿Cal.App.4th 266, 278.)

“Notwithstanding any law, including, but not limited to, a law that classified an action or special proceeding as a limited civil case, an action or special proceeding shall be treated as a limited civil case only if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) The amount in controversy does not exceed thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000). As used in this section, ‘amount in controversy’ means the amount of the demand, or the recovery sought, or the value of the property, or the amount of the lien, that is in controversy in the action, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs.

(b) The relief sought is a type that may be granted in a limited civil case.

(c) The relief sought, whether in the complaint, a cross-complaint, or otherwise, is exclusively of a type described in one or more laws that classify an action or special proceeding as a limited civil case or that provide that an action or special proceeding is within the original jurisdiction of the superior court….”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 85.)

Discussion

To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”), Plaintiff must establish Defendant was engaged in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)

The Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) “bars ‘unfair competition’ and defines the term as a ‘business act or practice’ that is (1) ‘fraudulent,’ (2) ‘unlawful,’ or (3) ‘unfair.’ … Each is its own independent ground for liability under the [UCL], but their underlying purpose ‘is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services’ … .” (Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1135, citations omitted.) “[T]he UCL is a chameleon. … Depending on which prong is involved, a UCL claim may most closely resemble, in terms of the right asserted, an action for misrepresentation …, misappropriation …, price fixing …, interference with prospective economic advantage …, or any of countless other common law and statutory claims. ” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1196.)

“In any action under this chapter, it is not necessary to allege or prove actual damages or the threat thereof, or actual injury or the threat thereof, to the plaintiff. But, in addition to injunctive relief, any plaintiff in any such action shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, as well as three times the actual damages, if any, sustained by any person who has assigned to the plaintiff his claim for damages resulting from a violation of this chapter.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17082.)

The Court does not believe that Defendants have proven, to a legal certainty, that Plaintiff’s claims cannot exceed the statutory minimum. Defendants’ arguments are largely based on paper napkin math to estimate an upper bound to Plaintiff’s potential recovery. While Defendants emphasize that they believe the estimated numbers to be well in excess of what Plaintiff could possibly prove, they do not provide the Court with facts that allow it to determine whether that is true.

In any event, the numbers that Defendants provide would not warrant reclassification even if credited. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s recovery here could not exceed $12,834.64, based on premium wages for missed meal and rest breaks and the alleged conversion of gratuities. But this amount represents the theoretical actual damage to Plaintiff. After applying the multiplier under section 17082, this number exceeds $35,000.00. The Court does not say this to posit that Defendants’ projection is either reasonable or unreasonable. However, this number is the only projection that Defendants provide, and the evidence submitted is not particularly intensive. The Court thus cannot conclude that there is a legal certainty that Plaintiff’s recovery will not exceed $35,000.00.

The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion.