Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV20182, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV20182 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
EVERETT LEE, Plaintiff, v. RESIDENCE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Case No:
23STCV20182 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Calendar Number: 2 |
Defendant Residence Mutual Insurance Company (“Defendant”)
moves for summary adjudication as to the second claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the claim for punitive damages in
the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Everett Lee (“Plaintiff”).
The Court tentatively GRANTS the motion for summary
adjudication.
However, the Court requests argument on the following
question. The “genuine dispute” between Plaintiff
and Defendant on which Defendant relies appears to be one of fact, not of law,
notwithstanding Defendant’s assumption in the reply brief that it is one of
law. Assuming the Court characterizes
the dispute as one of fact, does Plaintiff’s claim of “failure to investigate”
render the genuine dispute doctrine inapplicable?
This is an insurance dispute. The following facts are taken
from the parties’ separate statements. The Court resolves disputes of fact in
favor of the nonmoving party.
This insurance dispute arises out of the death of
Plaintiff’s nephew, who was living in Plaintiff’s house at the time. Plaintiff
owns and lives in a two-story residence in Lancaster (the “Property”). The
Property was covered by an insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by Defendant,
with Plaintiff named as the insured.
In 2018, Plaintiff allowed his nephew, David Collins
(“David”) to move into the Property. (The Court uses first names for clarity
only, and means no disrespect.) David occupied the master suite, which includes
a bedroom and bathroom and is located on the second story of the house.
Plaintiff occupied one of the other bedrooms in the house. David spent a great
deal of time alone in the master suite, and Plaintiff sometimes would not see
David for several days at a time.
For a few days prior to Friday, April 21, 2023, Plaintiff
did not see David. During that time period, Plaintiff began to notice a foul
odor in the house, which gradually became stronger.
On Friday, April 21, 2023, Plaintiff discovered that David
had passed away when he discovered David’s body in the master bathroom tub.
Plaintiff called the Sheriff’s Department upon discovering David’s body, and
personnel from the Coroner’s Division removed David’s body from the tub and
then the house.
When Plaintiff found David’s body, the liquid in the bathtub
was dark brown and had substances floating in it. When the Coroner’s personnel
removed David’s body, some of the brown liquid spilled onto various surfaces
inside the bathroom, including portions of the carpet.
The Sheriff’s Department gave Plaintiff contact information
for Sterile Pros, LLC (“Sterile Pros”), which provides clean-up services. Plaintiff
also called David’s brother, Marvin Collins (“Marvin”), who arrived after the
Sheriff’s Department left. Plaintiff’s nephew Marvin contacted Sterile Pros and
made arrangements for Sterile Pros to send personnel to Plaintiff’s home the
morning of April 22, 2023.
On Saturday, April 2022, 2023, personnel from Sterile Pros
arrived at the Property. Plaintiff signed an agreement which provided, among
other things, that Sterile Pros would remove and dispose of bio-hazardous
waste, including tissue, blood, or other bodily fluids, as well as any property
contaminated with any bio-hazardous waste. (Undisputed Fact (“UF”) 20.) It is
undisputed that Sterile Pros’ work included removal of the brown liquid in the
bathtub, removal of the bathtub, removal of some drywall and insulation,
removal of the bathroom’s carpet and padding, removal of some of the plywood
sheathing from the subfloor, and cleaning of other building components that
remained in place. (UF 25.)
Marvin called Defendant in the morning on April 22, 2023 and
left a voicemail explaining what had happened at the Property. Michael Spagon
(“Spagon”), an adjuster for Defendant, called Plaintiff and Marvin around 10:00
a.m. on April 22, 2023, while the clean-up work was underway. Spagon did not
state that he or another employee of Defendant intended to go to the Property
to assess the property damage. Spagon did not tell Plaintiff or Marvin to
direct Sterile Pro’s employees to stop or pause the clean-up work. (Additional
Fact (“AF”) 5.) Although Plaintiff alleges that Spagon confirmed that the
clean-up would be covered, Spagon disputes this fact. (UF 24.)
After completing the work, Sterile Pros emailed Defendant an
invoice for $16,185.95. (UF 26.) This invoice did not include the cost of
replacing removed components. Sterile Pros provided Defendant with various
photographs that Sterile Pros personnel had taken before starting the work. (UF
28.) Some of the photos showed dark brown liquid floating in the bathtub, as
well as some substances floating in the liquid in the tub. (UF 29.)
Initially, Defendant denied coverage for (1) the cost of the
cleanup and demolition work conducted by Sterile Pros, and (2) the cost of
replacing the building components of which Sterile Pros had disposed. (UF 30.)
The Policy covers accidental direct physical loss to the
Property, but excludes, inter alia, “microbial contamination or pathogenic
organism.” (UF 31, 32.) The Policy provides that “ ‘[m]icrobial contamination’
means any contamination, either airborne or surface, which arises out of or is
related to the presence of mold, fungus, spores or any other pathogenic
organism.” (UF 33.) The Policy provides that “ ‘pathogenic organism’ means any
bacteria, yeast, mildew, virus, fungi, mold or other spores, mycotoxins or
other metabolic products.” (UF 34.)
After Defendant denied coverage, Sterile Pros recorded a
mechanic’s lien based on its invoice.
After Defendant denied coverage, Plaintiff filed this case.
After Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant issued three checks
totaling $41,351.45. (UF 40.) When Defendant issued the checks, it stated in
writing that it did not believe that the Policy actually covered the claimed
damage. (UF 41-42.) Defendant issued a
check for the full amount of Sterile Pros’ invoice. (UF 42.) Defendant
requested that a licensed general contractor inspect the master bedroom suite.
The contractor inspected the suite at a time when no repairs had been made. The
contractor prepared a written estimate that the repairs would cost $25,665.50.
(UF 47.) Defendant issued two checks totaling $25,165.50 after applying the
Policy’s $500.00 deductible. (UF 48.) Plaintiff submitted various repair
estimates, but Defendant did not believe that those estimates accurately
represented the cost of returning the Property to its pre-loss condition. (UF
53.) Those estimates included the cost of installing tile flooring in the
master bathroom and bedroom (those rooms had previously had carpet flooring)
and included costs of replacing carpet and padding well in excess of the square
footage of the area. (UF 54-57.)
Plaintiff filed this action on August 23, 2023, raising
claims for (1) breach of contract; and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Defendant moved for summary adjudication on January 10,
2025. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.
The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice and
takes notice of the submitted public records.
The Court overrules Defendant’s objection.
The purpose of a motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism
to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to
grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“In ruling on the motion,
the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom [citation] and must view such evidence [citations]
and such inferences [citations] in the light most favorable to the opposing
party.” (Aguilar, supra, at pp. 844-845 [quotation marks
omitted].)
“On a motion for summary
judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima
facie
showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B.
Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving
for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2).)
“Once the defendant . . .
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or
a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) “If the plaintiff cannot do
so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente
Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
In the insurance context, “there are at least two separate
requirements to establish breach of the implied covenant: (1) benefits due
under the policy must have been withheld; and (2) the reason for withholding
benefits must have been unreasonable or without proper cause.” (Love v. Fire
Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151.)
“It is now settled law in California that an insurer denying
or delaying the payment of policy benefits due to the existence of a genuine
dispute with its insured as to the existence of coverage liability or the
amount of the insured's coverage claim is not liable in bad faith even though
it might be liable for breach of contract.” (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners
Ass'n v. Associated Intern. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 347.) “While
many, if not most, of the cases finding a genuine dispute over an insurer's
coverage liability have involved legal rather than factual disputes,
[courts] see no reason why the genuine dispute doctrine should be limited to
legal issues.” (Id. at p. 348.) “That does not mean, however, that the
genuine dispute doctrine may properly be applied in every case involving purely
a factual dispute between an insurer and its insured. This is an issue which
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.” (Ibid.) “It is only
necessary for [courts] to determine that, in light of the record as a whole,
[the insurer’s] position with respect to the disputed points was reasonable or
that [the insurer] had proper cause to assert the positions that it did.” (Id.
at p. 350.)
“[A]n insurer cannot reasonably and in good faith deny
payments to its insured without fully investigating the grounds for its
denial.” (Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208,
214.)
Defendant has met its initial burden on summary adjudication
of demonstrating a reasonable investigation and a genuine dispute with its
insured. After receiving the evidence in
the record, Defendant declined insurance
coverage based on the policy exclusions for damage caused by any “microbial
contamination,” “pathogenic organism” or “waste.” (UF 36.)
The undisputed facts presented to Defendant before it made this
determination established that facts giving rise to these exclusions were
present because there was bio-hazardous waste being removed. (UF 13, 14, 17, 20, 25, 28, 29.) These establish a reasonable investigation
and, at a minimum, a genuine dispute between Defendant and its insured.
The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to show issues of
disputed fact. Plaintiff has not done
so. Plaintiff does not, in his opposition, deny that, if there was human material
being removed, the insurance exclusions would apply. The only factual argument made is that the
insurer “failed to go to Mr. Lee’s home. . . on April 22, 2023 or at any point
between April 22, 2023 and May 4, 2023 to assess the situation and perform any
and all testing and sampling necessary to see if there was ‘microbial
contamination’ or a ‘pathogenic organism’ in Mr. Lee’s home or ‘waste.’” (Opp. at 5:7-11.) But Plaintiff provides no facts as to why such
a visit was required or further testing was required. Defendant had a basis to conclude that the
materials involved microbial contamination and pathogenic organisms because
Marvin informed Defendant of the nature of the events requiring the clean-up
and Sterile Pros provided Defendant with photographs of the bathtub from before
it began the work. A reasonable fact finder could not find that Defendant was
not reasonable in concluding that the brown liquid in the bathtub
involved microbial contamination, based on the presence of David’s body, the
photographs provided to Defendant, and the nature of the work that it is
undisputed that Sterile Pros conducted. Plaintiff has not shown any facts in
opposition to the summary adjudication that further investigation was required
or that Defendant’s position was not reasonable.
Although Plaintiff states that he disputes a number of facts
in the separate statements, he provides no citations to the record. His
argument that Defendant did not act in good faith is predicated on the lack of
an investigation.
The Court therefore grants summary adjudication as to this
claim.
Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is
defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of
others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent.
Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable
conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious
disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.)
“Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property,
rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
A claim for punitive damages must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. (Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.) Thus, for a punitive damages
claim to survive summary judgment, a reasonable fact finder must be able to
find that clear and convincing evidence supports punitive damages.
Here, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Defendant
acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. At most, Defendant failed to
investigate the claim as completely as it could have, and then issued checks
for the entirety of the cleanup costs and almost the entirety of
(Defendant’s estimate of) the repair
costs. The Court does not determine that Defendant did not breach the Policy.
However, a jury could not reasonably find malice, oppression, or fraud based on
this conduct.
The Court grants summary adjudication as to the claim for
punitive damages.