Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV20244, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV20244 Hearing Date: January 30, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
KEYTH STONE, Plaintiff, v. ANTELOPE VALLEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COUNCIL, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
23STCV20244 Hearing Date: January 30, 2024 Calendar Number: 8 |
Defendants Antelope Valley Domestic Violence Council
(“Antelope”) and Joy Applin (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the Complaint
filed by Plaintiff Keyth Stone (“Plaintiff”). Defendants additionally move to
strike portions of the Complaint.
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer.
The Court GRANTS the motion to strike Plaintiff’s alter-ego,
joint venture, integrated enterprise, or successor liability allegations WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may amend the
complaint within 20 days.
The Court DENIES the motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive
damages allegations.
This action concerns Plaintiff’s employment with Antelope.
The following are the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint at issue on the demurrer and motion to strike.
Plaintiff was employed with Antelope as a full-time
non-exempt Crisis Interventions specialist from around April 16, 2018 to August
23, 2021.
Plaintiff alleges that Applin frequently engaged in
discriminatory behavior against him based on his race over the course of
roughly two years. Applin presented hypothetical scenarios to Plaintiff, who is
black, with racial undertones. For example, she asked questions such as “how
would Black guys respond in [various situations]?” Applin also frequently made
comments implying that black fathers are frequently absent from their
children’s lives. For example, Applin routinely asked questions such as “why do
you guys (allegedly referring to black men) not take care of your kids?” Applin
also would wear a shirt bearing the phrase “Red Neck,” which disturbed
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff reported Applin’s behavior to his supervisors, but
Antelope did not take any corrective measures to stop her behavior.
Plaintiff alleges that he was not properly paid overtime
compensation for periods of his employment. In June 2019, Plaintiff met with
Mia Tunmore and Lisa Dawson to discuss the lack of overtime compensation.
Tunmore and Dawson allegedly responded by questioning Plaintiff’s manhood and
mocking him. Dawson said “I made someone cry earlier today. I have tissues in
my office, I will go get them.” (Complaint at p. 10:24-24.)
In around June or July 2019, Dawson began shouting at
Plaintiff at work and withholding information form him that he needed to
perform his job duties. Plaintiff complained about this to Michelle Sandoval, a
human resources manager.
Around August or September 2019, Plaintiff applied for a
vacant position that would have been a promotion. Defendants denied his
application.
In around December 2019, Plaintiff underwent corrective foot
surgery and was placed on leaves for six weeks. The surgery was necessary due
to an ongoing bone condition from which Plaintiff suffers that required
repeated surgery. Upon returning in January 2020, Plaintiff was effectively
demoted because he was assigned the work of a Case Manager and instructed to
start taking directives from one of his former subordinates.
Plaintiff underwent a second corrective foot surgery in
March 2020 and was placed on medical leave for six months. Plaintiff returned
to work in April 2020.
In May 2020, Plaintiff complained about another employee not
performing their duties. Plaintiff was called into a meeting and presented with
a document to sign that was represented to him to be a verbal warning about him
being rude to another employee. Plaintiff refused to sign the document and
complained to Human Resources.
On July 28, 2020, Plaintiff took medical leave to seek
treatment for anxiety which was allegedly exacerbated by Applin’s behavior and
Antelope’s actions toward him.
On May 28, 2021, Sandoval informed Plaintiff that his
medical leave was expiring and instructed him to appear at his job site on June
1, 2021, but Plaintiff was being transferred to a different position with
reduced pay.
On June 7, 2021, Plaintiff underwent another corrective foot
surgery and was placed on medical leave until August 21, 2021.
On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff contacted Sandoval to request
that he be reinstated to his previous position. The following day, Sandoval
informed Plaintiff that Antelope would not reinstate him to his previous position
but would demote him to another position with less pay if he chose.
On August 23, 2021, Plaintiff met with the Director of the
Adult Singles Program Sheri Gorman, the Director of Programs Sarah Perry, and
Sandoval. Sandoval stated that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated because he
declined the only available position of COVID Recover Re-Housing Case Manager.
Plaintiff alleges that this statement was untrue because there were other
positions listed on Antelope’s website. Plaintiff alleges that he was
effectively compelled to resign.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on August 23,
2023, raising claims for (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2)
harassment; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation; (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodations; (6) failure
to engage in a good faith interactive process; (7) violation of the California
Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (8) declaratory judgment; (9) wrongful constructive
termination in violation of public policy; (10) retaliation in violation of
Labor Code, section 98.6; (11) denial of and discrimination based on use of
sick leave; (12) failure to pay wages; (13) failure to pay overtime
compensation; (14) failure to provide meal and rest periods; (15) failure to
provide itemized wage statements; (16) waiting time penalties; and (17) unfair
competition in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 17200, et
seq. Only the second cause of action for harassment is alleged against
Defendant Applin.
Defendants filed this demurrer and motion to strike on
November 22, 2023. Plaintiff filed oppositions to each, and Defendants filed
replies in support of each.
The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice.
The Court takes notice of the existence of the requested public records but
does not take notice of the truth of the facts contained within them.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be
allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the
pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
A plaintiff alleging discrimination must allege “that (1) [the
plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) [the plaintiff] was qualified
for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position [they]
held, (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action, such as
termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)
Plaintiff’s complaint may lack allegations causally
connecting Applin’s racial harassment to any adverse employment actions.
However, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he was terminated because of his
medical leave due to the bone condition in his foot. The Court therefore
overrules the demurrer as to this cause of action.
To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work
environment, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a
protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on [plaintiff’s] protected status; (4) the harassment
unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff’s] work performance by creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are
liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital
Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.)
“[T]he adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on
whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, ‘the plaintiff need
not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the
harassment.’ It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the
discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so
altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’ ” (Harris
v. Forklift Sys. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 25, conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.; see
Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (a) [endorsing this language as reflective of
California law].) A single incident of harassment may be enough to constitute a
hostile work environment if it “unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s
work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.”¿ (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (b).)¿ The court shall use the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether there exists a hostile work
environment.¿ (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)¿
Defendants contend that Applin only made isolated comments
to Plaintiff on three separate occasions over two years and that the harassment
was therefore not severe and pervasive. This assertion is at odds with the
allegations of the Complaint, which state that Applin’s behavior was frequent
and ongoing. These allegations are adequate to establish severe and pervasive
harassment at the pleading stage.
The Court overrules the demurrer to this cause of action.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the
[Fair Employment and Housing Act] FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she
engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to
an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 878-879,
brackets omitted.) “An ‘adverse employment action,’ which is a critical
component of a retaliation claim, requires a substantial adverse change in the
terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.” (Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1047, 1063, quotation marks omitted.)
Plaintiff engaged in the protected activities of complaining
about wage and hour violations, complaining about racial harassment, and taking
medical leave due to his disability and medical problems. As discussed above,
Plaintiff may not allege facts connecting his reports of racial harassment to
the adverse actions taken against him. However, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
a causal linkage between his medical leave and his demotions, pay cuts, and
eventual termination.
The Court therefore overrules the demurrer as to this cause
of action.
“[A] demurrer does not lie to a part of a cause of
action[.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163–164.)
Plaintiff does not allege a separate cause of action for alter-ego, joint
venture, integrated enterprise, or successor liability – nor would such an
allegation state a claim under California law. Thus, Defendants’ attack on
these allegations is only a basis for a demurrer if it leads to the
elimination of a cause of action against a party.
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment against Applin
are based on conduct she allegedly engaged in personally. Plaintiff’s claims
against Antelope are based on actual commitment or supervisory knowledge and
approval of the wrongful acts in question. These claims do not stand or fall
based on the alter-ego, joint venture, integrated enterprise, or successor
liability allegations. Thus, the proper vehicle in which to challenge them is a
motion to strike. The Court therefore overrules the demurrer as to these
allegations, and instead analyzes them under the motion to strike.
“In California, two conditions must be met before the alter
ego doctrine will be invoked. First, there must be such a unity of interest and
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist.
Second, there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated
as those of the corporation alone.” (Sonora
Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538.) When these
conditions are met, courts disregard the corporate structure and impute the
actions of a corporation onto its owner or parent. (McLaughlin v. L. Bloom
Sons Co. (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 848, 851-852.)
In determining whether to apply the doctrine, California
courts consider a number of factors which include but are not limited to (1)
inadequate capitalization, (2) commingling of funds, records, and other assets,
(3) disregard of corporate formalities (e.g., stock issuance, holding board
meetings, keeping of minutes, election of officers and directors, segregation
of corporate records), (4) the same equitable ownership in the two entities,
(5) the same directors and officers, (6) confusion about corporate identity,
(7) use of the same offices and employees, (8) use of subsidiary as a mere
shell or conduit for the affairs of the parent, and (9) lack of segregation of
corporate records. (Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v.
Superior Court (Parsons Corp.) (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 248, 258.)
There is not a heightened pleading standard for alter ego
theory; it is adequate for a plaintiff to allege “ultimate rather than
evidentiary facts.” (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 221, 236 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) Moreover,
“less particularity [of pleading] is required where the defendant may be
assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to
that possessed by the plaintiff, which certainly is the case” when analyzing
alter ego theory at the pleading stage. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff argues that he did not allege that Applin and
Antelope are alter-egos. Plaintiff’s complaint does allege that “there exists
such a unity of interest and ownership between Defendants and DOES 1 through 20
that the individuality and separateness of Defendants have ceased to exist.”
(Complaint at p. 4:14-16.) Applin is a defendant, and Plaintiff does not define
“Defendants” so as not to include Applin. Thus, Plaintiff appears to have
alleged that Applin and Antelope are alter-egos. The Court will grant the
motion to strike as to the alter-ego, joint venture, integrated enterprise, or
successor liability allegations with leave to amend so that Plaintiff can
clearly allege what, if anything, his allegations do and do not cover.
Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “In order to
survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate
facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the
correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a
pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context,
and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike,
courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts showing that
Applin’s behavior could be malicious. Plaintiff has also adequately alleged
facts showing malice by Tunmore and Dawson, who mocked and made fun of him when
he reported the insufficient overtime compensation. Plaintiff has alleged that
he reported this conduct. Thus, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim for
punitive damages.
The Court denies the motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive
damages allegations.