Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV20746, Date: 2025-03-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20746    Hearing Date: March 11, 2025    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 

 

DEPARTMENT 72 

 

TENTATIVE RULING 

 

KIMBERLY BARRAZA,  

 

                                  Plaintiff, 

   

         v. 

 

 

KPG HEALTHCARE, LLC, et al., 

 

                                  Defendants. 

  

 Case No:  23STCV20746

 

 

 

  

 

 Hearing Date:  March 11, 2025

 Calendar Number:  4

 

 

 

Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) moves for terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Kimberly Barraza (“Plaintiff”). Defendant KPG Healthcare, LLC filed a Joinder.

 

Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED.  However, the Court will discuss the case management issues raised by this motion at the Final Status Conference.

 

Background 

 

This is an employment case. On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant County and KPG Healthcare, LLC, alleging causes of action for (1) discrimination, (2) retaliation, (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (5) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, (6) declaratory judgment, and (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

 

Plaintiff alleges that she worked for Defendants as a medical case worker. She alleges that after she slipped on milk and injured her back and shoulders, the pain limited her ability to work, and she became disabled. She further claims that she went on medical leave, and upon her return, she was informed that her work contract had been cancelled, and she was thereby terminated.

 

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved was granted.

 

Defendant filed the motion for terminating sanctions on January 28, 2025. No opposition has been filed. 

 

Legal Standard 

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 empowers the Court to impose terminating, issue, and evidentiary sanctions in the event an individual engages in conduct which constitutes a “misuse of the discovery process”.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (b), (c), (d).)  A “misuse of the discovery process” includes failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or disobeying a court order to provide discovery.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d), (g).)   

 

“The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination . . . [i]f a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992, internal citation omitted.) 

 

The court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful, the determent to the propounding party, and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain discovery.  (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.)  If a lesser sanction fails to curb abuse, a greater sanction is warranted.  (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.)  However, “the unsuccessful imposition of a lesser sanction is not an absolute prerequisite to the utilization of the ultimate sanction.”  (Deyo v. Killbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.)  Terminating sanctions should not be ordered lightly, but are justified where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and there is evidence that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules.  (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) 

 

 

Discussion 

           

Defendant moves for terminating sanctions by way of dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to appear for her deposition, has not responded to Defendant's repeated attempts to communicate, and has effectively abandoned the case since her counsel was relieved in June 2024. Defendant argues Plaintiff's deliberate inaction, coupled with her disregard for her legal obligations, has severely prejudiced Defendant and disrupted the litigation process.

However, Defendant has not explained why it is not filed a motion to compel Plaintiff’s appearance at deposition before requesting the ultimate sanction of dismissal. The Court must take an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, and cannot turn to the drastic measure of dismissal at this stage. As such, the motion is premature at this time. (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793 [“The sanction of dismissal or the rendition of a default judgment against the disobedient party is ordinarily a drastic measure which should be employed with caution. However, there is no question that a court is empowered to apply the ultimate sanction against a litigant who persists in the outright refusal to comply with his discovery obligations. The refusal to reveal material evidence is deemed to be an admission that the claim or defense is without merit.” (citations omitted)].) 

 There has been no court order that Plaintiff has violated. On this record, therefore, the Court denies the motion.