Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV21033, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21033 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
RLESIA WHITE, Plaintiff, v. CHRIST-CENTERED MINISTRIES, et al., Defendant. |
Case No:
23STCV21033 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Calendar Number: 7 |
Defendants Troy Francis Vaughn, William David Williams,
James O. Phillips (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), and
Christ-Centered Ministries (“CCM”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the
First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Rlesia White (“Plaintiff”).
Defendants additionally move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the first, second, third,
and fourth causes of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the Individual Defendants
only. Plaintiff shall have twenty days to amend.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fifth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, and fourteenth causes of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND as to CCM only.
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer as to the remaining causes
of action.
The Court DENIES the motion to strike.
This is an employment case. The following facts are taken
from the allegations in the FAC, except where otherwise noted.
Plaintiff was hired to work as a night monitor for Defendant
CCM in January 2019. Plaintiff’s job duties included assisting clients with
serving meals, retrieving house supplies, room checks, distributing medication,
and checking clients in and out of the facility, among other things.
Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants are CCM’s
owners, directors, officers, or managing agents.
In late 2019, one of CCM’s clients became disruptive, accused
Plaintiff of having a romantic relationship with a co-worker, threatened
Plaintiff, and tried to physically fight Plaintiff, after which Plaintiff told
the client to “get out of her face” and de-escalated the situation. (FAC, ¶¶ 27-28.)
When the client approached Plaintiff again, her CCM coworkers assisted in
de-escalating the situation. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff reported the incident to her supervisor, James
Troupman and HR Representative, Jennifer (the Court uses Jennifer’s first name
because a full name is not identified, and means no disrespect). Jennifer
informed Plaintiff that because of the incident, Plaintiff would have to move
to another house to perform work on behalf of CCM (although it is unclear, this
allegation appears to refer to houses maintained by CCM for its clients, and
not to Plaintiff’s domicile). Plaintiff said that she did nothing wrong, to
which Jennifer agreed, but stated that it would nevertheless be necessary that
Plaintiff relocate to a different house.
Following the move, Plaintiff began experiencing excessive
stress due to her work environment and was placed on leave by her doctor from
March 6, 2020 until December 2020 due to her immunocompromised status and high
level of stress. Plaintiff alleges that CCM approved her leave.
On December 7, 2020, CCM sent Plaintiff an email stating
that her leave was approved until January 1, 2021, but her employment would
thereafter be terminated. Plaintiff then received a termination letter in the
mail on the same day stating that Plaintiff’s leave request was denied and that
her employment would be terminated because she had been away from work for
approximately six months.
Plaintiff filed this action on August 31, 2023. The
operative complaint is now the FAC, which raises claims for (1) failure to
provide rest breaks; (2) failure to provide meal breaks; (3) waiting time
penalties; (4) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (5)
disability discrimination; (6) CFRA discrimination; (7) work environment
harassment; (8) failure to prevent harassment by nonemployee; (9) retaliation
under FEHA; (10) CFRA retaliation; (11) failure to prevent harassment,
discrimination, and retaliation; (12) retaliation; (13) failure to provide
reasonable accommodation; (14) failure to engage in good faith interactive
process; (15) unfair and unlawful business practices; and (16) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. The fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth,
tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth
claims are pled only against CCM. First, second, third, fourth, and eighth
claims are pled against all Defendants.
Defendants demurred and filed a motion to strike on February
8, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition to each and Defendants filed a reply in
support of each.
The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice and
takes notice of the proffered materials, but does not take notice of the truth
of the matters contained therein.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be
allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the
pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
“(a) Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an
employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating
minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare
Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7,
1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘other person
acting on behalf of an employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an
owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer, and the term ‘managing
agent’ has the same meaning as in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil
Code.”
(Lab. Code, § 558.1.)
“[T]o hold an owner, director, officer, or managing agent
liable under section 558.1, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the
individual defendant was personally involved in the alleged violations.” (Usher
v. White (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 883, 895 [quotation marks and citation
omitted].)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot allege personal
involvement by the Individual Defendants. Plaintiff does not respond to this
argument, but rather argues that she has sufficiently alleged that the
violations in question for each cause of action occurred.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to the first,
second, third, and fourth causes of action with respect to the Individual
Defendants with leave to amend.
“‘Employer’ [under FEHA] includes any person regularly
employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, the state or any political or civil
subdivision of the state, and cities, except as follows: ‘Employer’ does not
include a religious association or corporation not organized for private
profit.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).)
CCM argues that it is not subject to FEHA because it is a
religious nonprofit organization.
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have waived and/or are
estopped from asserting the FEHA religious exemption. Defendants affirmatively
represented in Plaintiff’s employee file and onboarding documentation that they
would abide by FEHA. In multiple documents given to Plaintiff to sign,
Defendant stated that “In addition to federal law requirements, CMM
[Christ-Centered Ministries] complies with applicable state and local laws
governing nondiscrimination in employment in every location in which the company
has facilities. This policy applies to all terms and conditions of employment,
including recruiting, hiring, placement, promotion, termination, layoff,
recall, and transfer, leaves of absence, compensation and training.”
Furthermore, a pamphlet was given to all new hires (DFEH-188), which describes
the employees’ rights under California Family Rights Act, along with a Sexual
Harassment pamphlet (DFEH-185).” (FAC ¶ 35.)
CCM submits for judicial notice its 2023 Statement of
Information filed with the California Secretary of State and a screenshot of
the Secretary of State’s website’s entry for CCM, entity no. 2095404,
indicating that CCM is a religious nonprofit organization.
Although CCM provides authority for the judicial notice of
the Secretary of State’s corporate records (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286), “judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be
dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual
dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.” (Cruz v.
County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134.)
Here, however, there does not appear to be a genuine dispute
as to CCM’s religious nature. Plaintiff argues that CCM waived its ability to
assert the religious exemption by stating in its hiring materials that it
abides by all “applicable” laws (FAC ¶ 35), but such a statement would not
speak to laws that did not apply in the first place. CCM did, provide pamphlets
on CFRA and sexual harassment, creating a triable issue as to those causes of
action. However, Plaintiff alleges nothing about those pamphlets that would
indicate that CCM agreed to be bound by FEHA.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to the fifth, seventh,
eighth, ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, and fourteenth causes of action as to CCM.
The Court does so without leave to amend
because Plaintiff has not asserted that she can allege any facts which can
overcome CCM’s exemption from FEHA as a religious nonprofit organization.
Because the Court overrules the demurrer as to Plaintiff’s
CFRA claim below, Plaintiff’s sixteenth cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy also survives, however.
A cause of action for retaliation for taking CFRA medical
leave is brought pursuant to Government Code section 12945.2, subdivision (l),
which provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to . . . discharge . . . or discriminate against, any individual
because of . . . [¶] (1) An individual’s exercise of the right to family care
and medical leave provided by” the CFRA. (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd.
(l).)
“The elements of a cause of action for retaliation in
violation of CFRA are: ‘ “(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA;
(2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA [leave]; (3) the
plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and
(4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination,
fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of her right to CFRA [leave].” ’
[Citation.] Similar to causes of action under FEHA, the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis applies to retaliation claims under CFRA.” (Moore
v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216,
248.)
CCM argues that Plaintiff cannot argue that her termination
resulted from her use of CFRA leave because she took significantly more time
off than CFRA protects. CCM misapprehends the standard. “[E]mployers cannot use
the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.” (Xin
Liu v. Amway Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 1125, 1133; see also Dudley
v. Department of Transp. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 261 [California courts
analyze CFRA claims together with FMLA claims].) Thus, the fact that CCM could
have terminated Plaintiff solely for taking leave in excess of CFRA’s base
requirements is insufficient. CCM’s letter stated that Plaintiff’s leave of
absence was the reason for her termination. Further, the fact that CCM
initially improved the full term of Plaintiff’s leave, but later terminated her
for taking that same leave, is a strong indicator that something was amiss. Plaintiff
may thus be able to show that the protected CFRA leave was considered as a
negative factor.
The Court overrules the demurrer to the sixth of action.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that
her CFRA leave was a negative factor in her termination. The Court therefore
overrules the demurrer to the tenth cause of action.
Labor Code sections 98.6, 1102.5 and 6310 require employers
to refrain from retaliating against any employee as a result of an employee
reporting a work-related injury or illness, the employee’s opposition to
practices by statute or federal statute, or practices that violate or do not
comply with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.
These statutes are separate from FEHA. Thus, Plaintiff’s
complaints regarding the client’s altercation with her, and the subsequent
decision to move her to a different house, state a claim for retaliation.
Plaintiff’s allegations that CCM retaliated against her for
taking CFRA leave are duplicative of her tenth cause of action. However, a
demurrer is not a proper vehicle to split claims.
The Court overrules the demurrer to the twelfth cause of
action.
Defendants argue that this claim fails because it is
derivative of Plaintiff’s other Plaintiff claims. Because Plaintiff’s CFRA
claims survive, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fifteenth cause of
action.
Defendants argue that this claim fails because it is
derivative of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. However, Plaintiff also alleges that she
was wrongfully terminated for making good-faith complaints. Because Plaintiff’s
non-FEHA retaliation cause of action survives, this cause of action survives as
well.
The Court overrules the demurrer to the sixteenth cause of
action.
Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is
defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of
others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent.
Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable
conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious
disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.)
“Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property,
rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of
punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must
be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion
to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike
as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.)
“In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”
(Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are
insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud
or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
The allegation that CCM initially improved the full term of
Plaintiff’s leave, but later terminated her for taking that same leave, is an
indicator that CCM acted maliciously and was not merely engaged in personnel
management.
The Court therefore denies the motion to strike.