Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV25631, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25631    Hearing Date: February 29, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Linda J. Maultsby (“Defendant”) demurs to the complaint filed by Plaintiff Mural Media, LLC 401K Plan (“Plaintiff”).

The Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer and STAYS this case pending the resolution of Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23STCV21442.

The Court sets a status conference for October 16, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. to discuss the status of Case No. 23STCV21442.

Background

This is an unlawful detainer case. The following facts are taken from the allegations and attached exhibits in Plaintiff’s Complaint, except where otherwise noted.

Plaintiff is the owner of real property that is legally described as “Lot 446 of Tract No. 1446, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per Map recorded in Book 20, Page 34 of Maps, in the office of the County recorder of said County” (the “Property”). The Property contains a multi-unit building which is comprised of four units with the following addresses: (1) 2757 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (2) 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016; (3) 5107 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016; and (4) 5109 Westhaven St., Los Angeles, CA 90016.

Defendant is a tenant at the Property pursuant to a lease agreement that pre-dates Plaintiff’s ownership of the Property. Defendant occupies 2759 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016 (the “Unit”).

Plaintiff entered an agreement to sell the Property to a third party. The third party wished to inspect the Property, including the Unit. On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff served on Defendant a notice requiring Defendant to permit an inspection of the Property and Unit. Plaintiff subsequently delivered a second letter requesting the same, on an unspecified date. Defendant did not allow Plaintiff to inspect the Property and the Unit.

Plaintiff alleges that on August 11, 2023 and August 24, 2023, Plaintiff served a written notice on Defendant to allow the inspections of the Property and Unit or quit and deliver possession of the Property and Unit to Plaintiff within three days. (Complaint, Ex. 2 (the “August 24 Notice”.) Plaintiff only attaches a copy of the August 24, 2023 notice, and not the August 11, 2023 notice. Exhibit 2 does not contain a request that Defendant permit inspection of the Property and Unit. Rather, Exhibit 2 states that Defendant’s right to occupy the Unit will be terminated because the Property was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale on May 9, 2023.

On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 78, Case No. 23STCV21442 (the “Department 78 Action”), raising a claim for unlawful detainer. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.) The complaint in the Department 78 Action seeks restitution and possession of the Property and Unit, damages, and costs of suit. The complaint in the Department 78 action attaches as Exhibit 2 a three-day notice to quit that was served on August 24, 2023 and is identical to the August 24 Notice attached as Exhibit 2 in this action.

On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action (the “Department 72 Action”), raising a claim against Plaintiff for unlawful detainer. The Complaint seeks restitution of the Unit, damages, and costs of suit.

Defendant demurred to the Complaint in this action on January 31, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Discussion

“Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two [California] superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) “[T]he pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action.” (Id. at 770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) “The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255 [internal citations omitted].)

The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and the statutory plea in abatement should be raised by demurrer where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where factual issues must be resolved. (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) “Where abatement is required [under the plea in abatement or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction], the second action should be stayed, not dismissed.” (Ibid.)

Furthermore, "[a] party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading on the grounds that “[t] is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (c).)

          Here, the Department 78 Action concerns the same Property and Unit, the same Plaintiff and Defendant, and the same three-day notice to quit. Thus, this action arises out of the same transaction and subject matter as the Department 78 Action. Plaintiff does not contest this in its opposition, but instead argues that the existence of the Department 78 action has no bearing on Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim for unlawful detainer. Plaintiff’s argument misses the point – abatement is a separate basis for demurrer from failure to state a claim, with a separate remedy (abatement – rather than dismissal).

Because the Department 78 Action was filed first in time, and Department 78 is therefore the first court to assume jurisdiction over this subject matter, this case must be stayed pending the resolution of the Department 78 action to avoid conflicting rulings.