Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV31858, Date: 2024-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31858    Hearing Date: May 9, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant FPI Management, Inc. (“FPI”) demurs to the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Nasser Eshraghi, Khashayar Eshraghi, and Thomas Franklin (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). FPI additionally moves to strike portions of the Complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  Plaintiffs must amend within 20 days.

Background

            This is a landlord-tenant case. The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Complaint.

            On April 9, 2021, Plaintiffs Nasser Eshraghi and Khashayar Eshragi (collectively, the “Eshraghis”) leased an apartment located at 600 S. Spring Street (the “Property”), Unit 703, Los Angeles, California, 90014 (“Unit 703”). The original term of the lease was for one year. It is unclear whether Plaintiff Franklin was ever a tenant at the Property.

            Plumbing problems arose shortly after the Eshraghis moved in. On April 21, 2021, they agreed to move to Unit PH13 as a result of the plumbing issues. The Eshragis allege a number of other defects that existed at Unit PH13 during their tenancy there.

            Until April 1, 2022, the Property was owned by Berry Shy, who is not a party to this action. On April 1, 2022, Defendant Laguna Point Properties, LLC (“Laguna Point”) purchased the Property from Berry Shy.

            From April 1, 2022 to November 15, 2022, the Property was managed by Greystar Management Services, LP (“Greystar”). Plaintiffs allege that Greystar took a number of harassing and retaliatory actions toward them while it was the property manager.

            On November 14, 2022, Plaintiffs submitted a 30-day notice of intent to vacate Unit PH13.

            On November 28, 2022, Defendant FPI replaced Greystar in the management of the Property. Greystar’s alleged malfeasance toward Plaintiffs ended at this point.

            The Eshragis vacated PH13 on December 31, 2022.

            Plaintiffs filed this case against Defendants on December 29, 2023, raising claims for (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2)-(5) breaches of implied warranty of habitability; (6) negligent maintenance of the premises; (7) creation and maintenance of nuisance; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (9) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (11) negligence per se – violation of Civil Code, section 1941.3; (12) violation of the Housing Act – refusal to rent; (13)-(14) violations of the Anti-Harassment Ordinance, LA Municipal Code Tenant Section 45.35.

            FPI demurred to the Complaint on April 11, 2024 and concurrently filed its motion to strike. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to either motion.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Discussion

A demurrer may attack the pleadings on grounds that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible, or in a contract case, for failure to allege whether a contract is oral or written.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).

A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.) 

The Complaint does not identify any wrongful acts taken by FPI. In fact, the Complaint does not allege any acts specifically taken by FPI at all, except that FPI took over management of the Property from Greystar, to which much of the malfeasance in the Complaint is attributed. While the Complaint makes a number of general allegations as to wrongful conduct by “defendants,” much of that conduct could not have been undertaken by FPI because it is undercut by Plaintiffs’ allegation that FPI did not take over management of the Property until November 28, 2022 – two weeks after Plaintiffs submitted their notice to vacate, and just over a month before Plaintiffs vacated.

Insofar as Plaintiffs intend some of these allegations against “defendants” to apply to FPI, they are too vague for FPI to respond to when it managed the Property for approximately one month out of a nineteen-month tenancy. Insofar as Plaintiffs do not intend as such, the Complaint is simply devoid of allegations that FPI did anything wrong.

The Court therefore sustains the demurrer with respect to FPI with leave to amend.