Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 23STCV31858, Date: 2024-11-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV31858 Hearing Date: November 26, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
NASSER ESHRAGHI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAGUNA POINT PROPERTIES, LLC, et
al., Defendant. |
Case No:
23STCV31858 Hearing Date: November 26, 2024 Calendar Number: 3 |
Defendant FPI Management, Inc. (“FPI”) demurs to the first
through tenth claims in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) filed by Plaintiffs
Nasser Eshraghi, Khashayar Eshraghi, and Thomas Franklin (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”). FPI additionally moves to strike portions of the TAC related to
Plaintiffs’ demand for punitive damages.
Defendant 600 S. Spring Owner, LLC (“600 S. Spring”)
separately demurs to the TAC.
The Court therefore SUSTAINS 600 S. Spring’s demurrer
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
The Court OVERRULES FPI’s demurrer as to the fifth and sixth
claims.
The Court SUSTAINS FPI’s demurrer as to the first, second,
third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
The Court GRANTS FPI’s motion to strike the punitive damages
claim.
This
is a landlord-tenant case. The following facts are taken from the allegations
in the TAC, except where otherwise noted.
On
April 9, 2021, Plaintiffs Nasser Eshraghi and Khashayar Eshragi (collectively,
the “Eshraghis”) leased an apartment located at 600 S. Spring Street (the
“Property”), Unit 703, Los Angeles, California, 90014 (“Unit 703”). The original
term of the lease was for one year. It is unclear whether Plaintiff Franklin
was ever a tenant at the Property.
Plumbing
problems arose shortly after the Eshraghis moved in. On April 21, 2021, they
agreed to move to Unit PH13 as a result of the plumbing issues. The Eshragis
allege a number of other defects that existed at Unit PH13 during their tenancy
there.
Until
April 1, 2022, the Property was owned by Berry Shy, who is not a party to this
action. On April 1, 2022, Defendant Laguna Point Properties, LLC (“Laguna
Point”) purchased the Property from Berry Shy.
From
April 1, 2022 to November 15, 2022, the Property was managed by Greystar
Management Services, LP (“Greystar”). Plaintiffs allege that Greystar took a
number of harassing and retaliatory actions toward them while it was the
property manager.
On
November 14, 2022, Plaintiffs submitted a 30-day notice of intent to vacate
Unit PH13.
On
November 28, 2022, Defendant FPI replaced Greystar in the management of the
Property. Greystar’s alleged malfeasance toward Plaintiffs ended at this point.
The
Eshragis vacated PH13 on December 31, 2022.
On
April 1, 2023, Defendant 600 S. Spring purchased the Property. (Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 35.)
Plaintiffs
filed this case against Defendants on December 29, 2023.
FPI
demurred to the Complaint. The demurrer was fully briefed by FPI and Plaintiffs.
On
May 8, 2024, the day before the hearing on the demurrer to the Complaint,
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).
On
May 9, 2024, the Court sustained FPI’s demurrer to the Complaint and granted
Plaintiffs leave to amend within 20 days. The Court stated that Plaintiffs
could rest on the previously-filed FAC, or file a second amended complaint.
On
July 1, 2024, outside of the 20-day window prescribed by the Court’s order on
the demurrer, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiffs
apparently asked FPI to stipulate to the filing of a third amended complaint,
but FPI did not so stipulate. (Eaton Decl. dated July 12, 2024, ¶ 11.)
In
any event, Plaintiffs then filed the TAC, without leave of court, on August 20,
2024. The TAC raises claims for
raising claims for (1)-(4) breaches of implied warranty of habitability; (5)
negligent maintenance of the premises; (6) creation and maintenance of
nuisance; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (8)
constructive eviction; (9) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (10)
negligence per se – violation of Civil Code, section 1941.3; (11) violation of
the Housing Act – refusal to rent; (12)-(13) violations of the Anti-Harassment
Ordinance, LA Municipal Code Tenant Section 45.35.
On
September 19, 2024, 600 S. Spring demurred to the TAC.
On
September 23, 2024, FPI demurred to the TAC and filed its motion to strike.
On
November 5, 2024, the Court issued a notice of rejection of the TAC on the
basis that Plaintiffs had not obtained leave to amend.
On
November 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to FPI’s demurrer and FPI’s
motion to strike. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to 600 S. Spring’s
demurrer.
On
November 19, 2024, FPI filed replies in support of each of its motions.
The Court grants 600 S. Spring’s request for judicial notice
and takes notice of the submitted public records.
FPI
requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Twelve Month Agreement
dated April 5, 2021 between Plaintiffs Khashayar Eshraghi and Nasser Eshraghi
and 600 Tower, LLC; and (2) the Twelve Month Agreement dated June 10, 2021
between Plaintiffs Khashayar Eshraghi & Nasser Eshraghi and 600 Tower, LLC.
(FPI Request for Judicial Notice Ex. A, B.)
“The existence and contents of a written agreement may be
the proper subject of judicial notice if there is no factual dispute that the
document is genuine and accurate.” (Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 565, 572.)
Plaintiffs
object that FPI has not authenticated the contracts. Authentication is not
required for judicial notice because judicial notice is available when
the matter submitted for notice cannot reasonably be disputed. Plaintiffs do
not raise a dispute as to the contents of the submitted documents. Judicial
notice is therefore appropriate. If Plaintiffs believe that they can dispute
the contents of the documents, the Court requests that Plaintiff provide such
argument at the hearing on this motion.
In
the absence of a dispute as to the agreements’ contents, the Court grants FPI’s
request for judicial notice.
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has
been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to
the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
(a) The court has
no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the
legal capacity to sue.
(c) There is
another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
(f) The pleading is
uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and
unintelligible.
(g) In an action
founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the
contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be
allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the
pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
In spite of the procedural issues with the TAC, the parties
appear to have briefed the motions as to the TAC as though the TAC is the
operative complaint. No party has objected to the consideration of the TAC or
the demurrers and motion to strike raised against the TAC on this basis. In the
interest of judicial economy, the Court orders that the TAC is deemed to be
validly filed. The Court therefore reaches the issues raised in the parties’
papers.
“[I]f an amended pleading attempts to avoid an earlier
defect, courts evaluate the prior pleading to determine if the amendment is a
sham. [Citation.] Relevant facts which make a pleading defective cannot simply
be omitted. [Citation.] This is particularly so when the original pleading is
verified. [Citation.] The general rule is ‘material factual allegations in a
verified pleading that are omitted in a subsequent amended pleading without
adequate explanation will be considered by the court in ruling on a demurrer to
the later pleading.’ ” (Webb v. City of Riverside (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
244, 256.)
Plaintiffs alleged in the SAC that 600 S. Spring did not
take ownership of the Property until after Plaintiffs’ tenancies ended.
Plaintiff does not oppose 600 S. Spring’s demurrer and has not provided an
explanation for the omission of this fact in the TAC. The Court will therefore
consider Plaintiffs’ allegation in the SAC that 600 S. Spring took ownership
after Plaintiffs’ tenancies.
Plaintiffs do not assert any claims that arose after their
tenancy. Thus, 600 S. Spring was not Plaintiffs’ landlord when Plaintiffs’
claims arose. Further, Plaintiffs do not state any factual allegations of
wrongful conduct by 600 S. Spring.
Plaintiffs state in the TAC that they join 600 S. Spring as
a defendant under the doctrine of successor liability. However, successor
liability does not apply here.
“[S]uccessor liability is an equitable doctrine that applies
when a purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation or the asset sale was fraudulently entered to escape debts and
liabilities.” (Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 809,
822.) “It has been generally stated that ‘where one corporation sells or
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable
for the debts and liabilities of the former unless (1) the purchaser expressly
or impliedly agrees to such assumption, (2) the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the two corporations, (3) the purchasing corporation
is merely a continuation of the selling corporation, or (4) the transaction is
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for debts.’ [Citation.] ” (Franklin
v. USX Corp. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 615, 621.)
The doctrine of successor liability was thus intended to
apply to corporate acquisitions of other entities. Here, Plaintiff does not
allege that 600 S. Spring acquired the full assets of any of the prior owners
of the Property. Plaintiff alleges that 600 S. Spring bought the Property, not
that 600 S. Spring acquired another corporate entity. What Plaintiff has
alleged is a real estate transaction, not a corporate acquisition.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs do not oppose 600 S. Spring’s
demurrer. Based on the argument provided in 600 S. Spring’s demurrer, as well
as the text of the TAC and SAC (where cited), the Court finds that Plaintiffs
cannot state a claim against 600 S. Spring. Because Plaintiffs never lived at
the Property while it was owned by 600 S. Spring and have not articulated any
theory under which it could be held liable, amendment would be futile
The Court therefore sustains 600 S. Spring’s demurrer
without leave to amend.
A demurrer may attack the pleadings on grounds that the
pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible, or in a contract case,
for failure to allege whether a contract is oral or written. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).
A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label
the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell
what he or she is supposed to respond to. (Williams v. Beechnut
Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a]
demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (¿Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616¿.)
In sustaining the demurrer to the original Complaint, the
Court found that the Complaint did not identify any wrongful acts taken by FPI.
The only specific acts alleged as to FPI were that FPI took over management of
the Property from Greystar, to which much of the malfeasance in the Complaint
is attributed. While the Complaint made a number of general allegations as to
wrongful conduct by “defendants,” much of that conduct could not have been
undertaken by FPI because it was undercut by Plaintiffs’ allegation that FPI
did not take over management of the Property until November 28, 2022 – two
weeks after Plaintiffs submitted their notice to vacate, and just over a month
before Plaintiffs vacated. The Court explained that FPI had not adequately
stated what conduct was attributable to FPI’s one-month overlap with Plaintiffs
at the property, and therefore sustained the demurrer.
The only new conduct that Plaintiff has alleged by TAC is (1)
FPI’s failure to provide an on-site caretaker for the Property, as required by
California Code of Regulations, Title 25, section 42 (TAC ¶¶ 46-47); (2) FPI’s
failure to provide a means for tenants to communicate with it (TAC ¶ 47); (3)
FPI’s December 27, 2022 service of notices to pay or quit on every tenant (TAC
¶ 48); and (4) FPI’s failure to repair the problems with the premises while it
was the manager (TAC ¶63). The Court therefore analyzes the demurrer in light
of these allegations.
To establish a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs must establish (1)
“the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’
habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable
time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the landlord was
given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting
damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset
Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
The duty to maintain leased residential premises in a
habitable condition falls on the landlord. (Ibid; see also Civ. Code, §
1941.) Thus, claims for breach of that duty are properly brought against the
landlord – not against a management company contracted by the landlord.
Plaintiffs have not pled that FPI was their landlord.
Rather, they have pled that FPI was the property manager. These claims are
therefore not properly stated against FPI.
Plaintiffs have now amended the complaint three times – once
following the Court’s order sustaining the previous demurrer, and twice of
their own accord. Plaintiffs still have not stated a claim against FPI here.
The Court therefore determines that further amendment would be futile.
The Court sustains FPI’s demurrer to this claim without
leave to amend.
In order to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must
allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach
of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
FPI argues that Plaintiffs cannot allege a duty because they
had already served a notice of intent to vacate by the time FPI took over
management of the Property. However, Plaintiffs had not yet vacated the
Property. FPI cites no authority indicating why the notice of intent to vacate
cut off Plaintiffs’ right to raise claims for negligence during the time
between the notice and their actual move-out.
The Court therefore overrules FPI’s demurrer to this claim.
FPI argues that this claim is duplicative of Plaintiffs’
negligence claim because it concerns the same conduct. However, because a
nuisance claim does not require a showing of negligence, it is substantively
different.
The Court overrules FPI’s demurrer to this claim.
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and
ellipses omitted.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be
outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court;
if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the
conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)
The only conduct that Plaintiff alleges FPI engaged in is
the failure to provide an on-site caretaker and the service of notices to pay
rent or quit. None of this conduct can be reasonably found to be outrageous or
beyond the bounds of decency.
The Court therefore overrules FPI’s demurrer to this claim.
“A constructive eviction occurs when the acts or omissions
to act of a landlord, or any disturbance or interference with the tenant's
possession by the landlord, renders the premises, or a substantial portion
thereof, unfit for the purposes for which they were leased, or has the effect
of depriving the tenant for a substantial period of time of the beneficial
enjoyment or use of the premises.” (Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc.
(1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 611, 614.) “While a claim for breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment is similar to a constructive eviction claim, the critical
difference is that the latter claim may not be brought until the tenant has
vacated the property.” (Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 1141, 1153, citing Friedman et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Landlord–Tenant (The Rutter Group 2001) ¶ 7:298, p. 7–61 [“to invoke a
constructive eviction defense or remedy, the aggrieved tenants must surrender
or vacate within a reasonable time after the landlord’s material
interference with the lease”].)
Here, again, liability for constructive eviction falls on
the landlord. Interference by a third party with a tenant’s right to use and
enjoy the premises is cognizable as a negligence or nuisance claim, as
discussed above, but not as a constructive eviction. Because Plaintiffs have
not alleged that FPI was their landlord, they have not stated a claim for
constructive eviction.
Plaintiffs have amended the complaint three times.
Plaintiffs still allege that FPI was hired to manage the Property and have not
alleged that FPI was their landlord. The Court therefore determines that
further amendment would be futile.
The Court sustains FPI’s demurrer to this claim without
leave to amend.
The elements of a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement between plaintiff and defendant; (2)
absence of language contrary to the implied covenant that tenant shall have
quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act or omission of the landlord, or anyone
claiming under the landlord, which “substantially interfere[s] with a
tenant[’]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by
the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578,
588-591.)
Plaintiffs have not alleged a lease agreement between
Plaintiffs and FPI. Plaintiffs have alleged that FPI was hired to manage the
Property. Plaintiffs have not alleged that FPI was their landlord. Plaintiffs
therefore have not stated a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment. Based on the fact that Plaintiffs have still failed to state a claim
after three amendments, the Court determines that further amendment would be
futile.
The Court therefore sustains FPI’s demurrer to this claim
without leave to amend.
“The negligence per se doctrine, as codified in Evidence
Code section 669, creates a presumption of negligence if four elements are
established: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of
a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person
or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature
of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4)
the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one
of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or
regulation was adopted.” (Spates v.
Dameron Hospital Association (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 218, quotation
marks omitted.)
“[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate
cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the
standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Millard v.
Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1353, fn. 2.)
This claim is thus duplicative of Plaintiffs’ negligence
claim.
The Court therefore sustains FPI’s demurrer to this claim
without leave to amend.
Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is
defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of
others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent.
Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable
conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious
disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.)
“Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property,
rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of
punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must
be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion
to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike
as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.)
“In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”
(Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are
insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud
or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
As discussed above, the only factual conduct that Plaintiff
has alleged by TAC is (1) FPI’s failure to provide an on-site caretaker for the
Property, as required by California Code of Regulations, Title 25, section 42
(TAC ¶¶ 46-47); (2) FPI’s failure to provide a means for tenants to communicate
with it during its first few weeks as manager (TAC ¶ 47); (3) FPI’s December
27, 2022 service of notices to pay or quit on every tenant (TAC ¶ 48); and (4)
FPI’s failure to repair the problems with the premises while it was the manager
(TAC ¶63). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that FPI acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud.
FPI argues that Plaintiff has not alleged knowledge of
unfitness or conscious disregard in order to establish respondeat superior. The
Court acknowledges that this is an adequate alternate basis to grant the motion
to strike.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged malice, oppression, or
fraud by FPI, the Court grants FPI’s motion to strike.