Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV00569, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV00569    Hearing Date: June 12, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Local Initiative Health Authority For Los Angeles County, dba L.A. Care Health Plan, demurs to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Robert Guan (“Plaintiff”).

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the second and fourth claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  Plaintiff shall amend within 30 days.

The Court SUSTAINS demurrer to the fifth claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the first and third claims.

Background

This is an employment case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the FAC, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer.

Defendant is a public agency that provides health insurance for low-income individuals in Los Angeles County.

Plaintiff is an Asian-American talent acquisition professional.

In May 2019, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Senior Recruiter/Talent Advisor. Plaintiff’s job duties included recruiting potential employees to work at Defendant or recruiting existing employees for promotions.

Plaintiff alleges that, while he worked with Defendant, Defendant had a racially discriminatory practice of manipulating the promotion process to ensure that qualified African-American candidates did not get the jobs and promotions that they deserved.

In February 2021, Defendant had an opening for the position of Senior Director of Human Resources Business Systems. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant historically had the practice of only considering employees who had been employees for at least one year for promotions. Plaintiff alleges that Director Jason Pacely, an African-American man who had been employed by Defendant for over one year, was passed over in favor of Jyl Russell (“Russell”), a white woman who had been employed with Defendant for less than one year.

Plaintiff alleges that Russell refused to promote non-white employees to positions for which they were well-qualified and highly recommended. Plaintiff alleges that Russell showed hostility toward African-American and Asian employees.

Plaintiff alleges that, in September 2021, Marilyn Dyson (“Dyson”), an African-American woman, applied for a promotion to the position of Director of Human Resources, a position for which she was well-qualified. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant chose to leave the position of Director of Human Resources open for many months rather than give it to Dyson. Plaintiff alleges that, approximately, 10 months later, Defendant filled the position with a less-qualified Caucasian male. Plaintiff alleges that Dyson complained to Defendant about its practices, but that Defendant did not conduct an adequate investigation into her complaints. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conducted a sham investigation designed as a cover-up.

Plaintiff alleges that, in early 2022, Ebony Jones (“Jones”), a highly qualified African-American female employee applied for a promotion that she was qualified for and was allegedly told by Defendant’s Chief Human Resources Officer, Terry Brown (“Brown”) that he wanted a Latino person in that position rather than Jones. Plaintiff alleges that Jones then complained to Defendant’s CEO, but Defendant failed to take any action or investigate Brown’s actions.

In January 2022, Defendant was hiring a Director of Talent Acquisition. In front of Plaintiff, Brown allegedly stated that “the person [he] was looking for was not African-American or Asian, [rather he was] looking for a Latino.” (Complaint ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that Brown then stated that “if this ever comes back at me, I’ll take it to the grave.” (Complaint ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that he desired promotion within Defendant’s organization, but realized that he would never be promoted due to his race. Plaintiff alleges that he was required to work in a racist and toxic work environment. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to resign from employment in order to avoid working in a racist work environment. Plaintiff alleges that he was constructively discharged in March 2022.

Plaintiff filed this action on January 9, 2024. The operative complaint is now the FAC, which raises claims for (1) race discrimination – disparate treatment; (2) race discrimination – disparate impact; (3) failure to prevent discrimination; (4) harassment and hostile work environment; and (5) declaratory relief.

On April 23, 2024, Defendant demurred to the FAC. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

Discussion

(1)  Race Discrimination – Disparate Treatment

To establish a claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must show “that (1) [the plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) [the plaintiff] was qualified for the position [they] sought or was performing competently in the position [they] held, (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

“In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove . . . that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251.) As a general matter, there must be a “continuous pattern” of “unusually aggravated” “adverse working conditions,” as “isolated acts of misconduct are insufficient to support a constructive discharge claim.” (Id. at p. 1247, brackets and quotation marks omitted.)

Although Plaintiff has not alleged that any other Asian employees were denied promotions (and Plaintiff does not allege that he applied for a promotion himself), Plaintiff has alleged that he saw numerous qualified African-American employees denied promotions and was told that by Chief Human Resources Officer Terry Brown that Brown was not looking for African-American or Asian hires for the Director of Talent Acquisition position. Plaintiff’s career path was in talent acquisition and he worked within the HR department which was headed by Brown. Even if Plaintiff did not apply for that particular position, the message would still be sent that Plaintiff’s path to promotion would be difficult or impossible. Combined with the alleged pattern of discrimination against African-American employees that Plaintiff saw, this would be enough to create a pattern of discrimination that would reasonably cause Plaintiff to believe that he would not be able to obtain promotions. An employee in such a position who wanted to advance their career would have little choice but to seek employment elsewhere.

Defendant makes certain arguments that the claim is insufficient, including an assertion that Plaintiff failed to comply with a legal obligation to apply for promotion before bringing such a claim and that the circumstances were not so intolerable as to constitute constructive discharge. The Court views these arguments in the context of this case as too fact specific for the Court to decide at the pleading stage. Defendant may assert them at an appropriate point in the litigation.

The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.

(2)  Race Discrimination – Disparate Impact

“ ‘To establish a prima facie case of discrimination [under Title VII], a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that 'any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question,' in order to avoid a finding of discrimination. [Citation.] Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimination.’ ” (City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 984.) “[T]he standards established by FEHC for evaluating a facially neutral selection criterion which has a discriminatory impact on a protected group are identical to federal standards under title VII.” (Id. at p. 986.)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a facially neutral policy. Plaintiff has rather alleged facially discriminatory policies.

The Court sustains the demurer to this claim with leave to amend.

(3)  Failure to Prevent Discrimination

The elements of a cause of action for failure to prevent harassment or retaliation are: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by employees or nonemployees; (2) defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff (i.e., defendant is the plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of that duty (i.e., failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff. (Trujillo v. North County Transit District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289; Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1630; Gov. Code, § 12940.)

Defendant argues that this claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged discrimination.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for discrimination, the Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.

(4)  Harassment

To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [plaintiff’s] protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff’s] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.) 

Defendant argues that this claim is time-barred. In order to exhaust administrative remedies, claims must be filed with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) within three years from the date of the unlawful practice. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (d)(5).)

The only harassing conduct that Plaintiff alleges is Terry Brown’s statement in January 2022 that he did not want to hire an African-American or Asian employee. Based on this conduct, Plaintiff’s deadline was in January 2025. Plaintiff does not allege that he filed a claim with the CRD until February 21, 2025. (See FAC, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff argues that the continuing violation doctrine applies.

Under the continuing violations doctrine, a court analyzes whether “the employer's actions were (1) sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing, as this case illustrates, that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms [Citation]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence.” (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1059.) 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged an ongoing pattern of harassing conduct, so it does not appear that the doctrine applies.

Plaintiff argues that racial harassment leading to his constructive discharge occurred between February and March 2022. However, Plaintiff does not allege these events.

The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend.

(5)  Declaratory Relief

“To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.)

A cause of action for declaratory relief should not be used as a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues raised in another cause of action. (General of America Insurance Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.) “The availability of another form of relief that is adequate will usually justify refusal to grant declaratory relief” (California Insurance Guarantee Association v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624), and a duplicative cause of action is subject to demurrer (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290).

Further, “there is no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved.” (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366, quotation marks omitted.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that Defendant’s past conduct was discriminatory. This is not a viable claim.

The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim without leave to amend.