Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV00841, Date: 2024-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV00841    Hearing Date: June 6, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Han Guo, Yun Zhou, and Maili Li (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) demur to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Dong Guo (“Plaintiff”). Moving Defendants also move to strike portions of the Complaint relating to punitive damages. Guo moves separately from Zhou and Li, who join together in their demurrer and motion to strike.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrers to Plaintiff’s first claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may amend his complaint within 20 days of the issuance of this order.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrers to Plaintiff’s second and third claims.

The Court DENIES the motions to strike.

Background

This is a defamation case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer.

Plaintiff was the CEO of 4PX Express USA (“4PX”). Plaintiff voluntarily left his employment with 4PX on June 2, 2022.

In the time leading up to Plaintiff’s resignation, Moving Defendants and Cainiao Supply Chain US (collectively, “Defendants”) were allegedly involved in a scheme to steal merchandise belonging to others that was stored in 4PX’s facilities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were concerned that Plaintiff would discover this conduct and fire them.

Plaintiff also made complaints regarding alleged financial improprieties which Plaintiff believed Guo committed. Plaintiff alleges that Guo sought the assistance of the other defendants to make false reports about Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LACSD”) on May 6, 2022 and made an incident report that Plaintiff had been fired and that Defendants feared for their lives that Plaintiff would return to work and kill them in a mass shooting. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants repeated these allegations to LACSD on multiple occasions over the next several months.

On October 2022, Plaintiff was hired to be the CEO of GCE Group, Inc. (“GCE”) and to be the general manager of New Era.

Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by LACSD on April 12, 2023 as a result of Defendants’ alleged report and subsequent statements to investigators. Plaintiff was detained in a jail cell against his will. The Los Angeles District Attorney did not file a case against Plaintiff.

As a result of the arrest, GCE and New Era terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on January 11, 2024, raising claims for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (2) defamation; and (3) false imprisonment.

On May 7, 2024, Guo filed his demurrer and motion to strike. On May 8, 2024, Zhou and Li filed their demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff filed a single opposition to both demurrers together and a single opposition to both motions to strike together. Guo filed replies in support of each of his motions, and Zhou and Li filed replies in support of each of their motions.

Legal Standard

Demurrer

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Discussion

Demurrer

            Moving Defendants argue that the Complaint omits key facts showing that Plaintiff sent threatening messages to Defendants over WeChat. Because these facts do not appear on the face of the Complaint or in judicially noticeable materials, the Court cannot consider them. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.)

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – First Claim

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)

            Moving Defendants argue that the Complaint does not allege extreme or outrageous conduct because their police reports were based on the threatening WeChat messages that Moving Defendants contend Plaintiff sent. This is a factual contest not appropriately resolved on demurrer. As alleged in the Complaint, Moving Defendants made repeated false statements to the police that they feared Plaintiff would commit a mass shooting in order to retaliate against Plaintiff and cover up their alleged misconduct. These allegations may or may not be true, but that is not a question for the pleading stage – the only question on demurrer is whether the facts, as alleged, state a cause of action. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Moving Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that go beyond the bounds of decency.

            Moving Defendants argue that their police reports were privileged under Civil Code, section 47. To the contrary, subdivision (b)(5) of section 47 explicitly excludes false police reports from its protection. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(5).)

            “Severe emotional distress means, then, emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 617 [citation and quotation marks omitted].) A plaintiff must “set forth … facts which indicate the nature or extent of any mental suffering incurred as a result of [the defendant’s] alleged outrageous conduct.” (Ibid.)

            Here, Plaintiff does not set forth such facts outside of the allegation that he suffered severe emotional distress. Although Plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts and not evidentiary facts, Plaintiff must provide more specific allegations than this legal conclusion.

            The Court therefore sustains the demurrers to this claim with leave to amend.

Defamation – Second Claim

“The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. The defamatory statement must specifically refer to, or be of and concerning, the plaintiff.” (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312 [quotation marks and citation omitted].)

Defendants argue that the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff’s defamation claim.

The statute of limitations for defamation is one year. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).) Defendants allegedly made the defamatory statements in question between May 6, 2022 and April 12, 2023, when Plaintiff was arrested.

There is good reason to apply the delayed discovery doctrine in this case. Plaintiff alleges that he did not learn of the alleged false police reports until he was arrested. (Complaint at p. 3:18-19.) “[Courts] have recognized that in some instances, the accrual of a cause of action in tort is delayed until the plaintiff discovered (or reasonably should have discovered or suspected) the factual basis for his or her claim.” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1248.) “[T]he discovery rule most frequently applies when it is particularly difficult for the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty, or when the injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary person could be expected to understand.” (Ibid.) A reasonable person could not be expected to discover a police report against them that they were not informed of. Thus, Plaintiff’s cause of action, at least as alleged, did not accrue until Plaintiff’s arrest on April 12, 2023. This action was filed well within one year of that date.

Defendants argue that their statements were privileged under Civil Code, section 47, subd. (b). As discussed above, subdivision (b)(5) of section 47 explicitly excludes false police reports from its protection. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(5).) Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ reports were false. (Complaint at pp. 2:28-3:9.) The alleged statements are therefore not privileged.

            Defendants argue that their allegedly defamatory statements must be specifically identified.

            Defamatory statements can be either libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) Libel is written communication that is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries. (Civ. Code §45.) Slander is a false unprivileged oral communication attributing to a person specific misdeeds or certain unfavorable characteristics or qualities or uttering certain other derogatory statements regarding a person, such as one which by natural consequence causes actual damage. (Civ. Code § 46.)

            “[W]ords constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 893 [emphasis omitted].) For slander, by comparison, “[l]ess particularity is required when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Ibid [citation and quotation marks omitted].) “[S]lander may be charged by alleging the substance of the defamatory statement” (Ibid [citation and quotation marks omitted].)

            Plaintiff has not alleged that the statements in question were libel. Plaintiff’s failure to allege the statements made verbatim is therefore not a defect that appears on the face of the Complaint.

            The Court therefore overrules the demurrers to this claim.

False Imprisonment – Third Claim

“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” (Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.)

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that the police reports causally led to his arrest. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that “as a result of [Defendants’] sheriff’s report and subsequent statements to investigators, plaintiff was arrested by the Los Angeles County Sheriff on or about April 12, 2023, and detained in a jail cell against his will.” (Complaint at p. 3:13-15.) Plaintiff cannot be reasonably expected to allege the internal workings of the LACSD that led from the alleged reports to his arrest.

            Courts “[recognize] the difference between the tort of false imprisonment, which is premised upon a violation of the personal liberty of another accomplished without lawful authority, and the tort of malicious prosecution, which constitutes procuring the arrest or prosecution of another under lawful process, but from a malicious motive and without probable cause.” (Asgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 753–754.)

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arrest was made with lawful privilege because Plaintiff has not alleged that the police arrested him without lawful authority or without due process.

            “[A]n intervening act of a third person … [is not] a superseding cause if a reasonable [person] knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person is done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person so acted or the act is a normal response to a situation created by the defendant's conduct and the manner in which the intervening act is done is not extraordinarily negligent.” (Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857, 864.)

            Here, the police’s arrest of Plaintiff was a normal response to a situation allegedly created by Defendants (the police reports). Defendants cite Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, which evaluated whether the police acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment by detaining a homeowner for whose home they had a search warrant. (Id. at p. 703.)

The fact that the police may have been privileged in their detention of Plaintiff is not the issue, because the arrest foreseeably flowed from Defendants’ allegedly culpable conduct.

            The Court therefore overrules the demurrer to this claim.

Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and supporting allegations.

            Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

Plaintiff has pled that Defendants made false police reports with the intent to retaliate against Plaintiff and prevent him from discovering their alleged misconduct. Plaintiff has therefore adequately alleged malice.

The Court denies the motions to strike.