Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV02210, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02210    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Michael Ferrera (“Ferrera”) moves for a protective order.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for a protective order.

The Court DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions.

Background

            On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff John Doe filed this action against Defendants Los Angeles LGBT Center, and Michael Ferrera, alleging 8 causes of action for: (1) sexual harassment; (2) sexual assault; (3) sexual battery (Civil Code section 1708.5); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligence; (6) negligent supervision; (7) negligent hiring/retention; (8) negligent failure to warn, train or educate.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was a high school intern at Defendant Los Angeles LGBT Center (the “LGBT Center”) when Ferrera sexually assaulted Plaintiff approximately 25-30 times, about half of which occurred in the LGBT Center. The complaint further alleges that prior to Ferrera’s employment or agency at the LGBT Center, he was an employee or agent at Breathe Life Healing Center, a drug and alcohol addiction treatment center in Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff alleges that at least two young men at Breathe Life Healing Center made allegations of sexual misconduct against Ferrera. Thus, the complaint alleges that the LGBT Center knew or should have known of these allegations against Ferrera prior to hiring Ferrera.

On January 10, 2025, Defendant filed this motion for a protective order. On February 28, 2205, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 6, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  The court may make this determination pursuant to¿a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.  This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040.  (Code Civ. Proc.,¿§ 2017.020(a).)  “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each¿issue presented by the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc.,¿§ 2016.040.)¿¿ 

The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method provided in if it determines either of the following:¿ 

1.      The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.¿ 

2.      The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.¿ 

¿ 

(Code Civ. Proc.,¿§ 2019.030(a).)¿ 

Code of Civil Procedure sections¿2030.090(a) and 2031.060(a) provide that a party upon whom interrogatories or inspection demands have been propounded may “promptly” move for a protective order. 

The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:

(1)   That all or some of the items or categories of items in the demand need not be produced or made available at all.

(Code Civ. Proc.,¿§§ 2030.090(b), 2031.060(b).)

The burden of proof is generally on the party seeking the protective order to show¿good cause¿for whatever order is sought.¿¿(Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)¿¿The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, etc., and justifying the relief sought.¿(See¿Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co.¿(1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.¿¿The facts are normally established in declarations by counsel for the party seeking the protective order.¿¿The declaration must contain competent evidence - i.e., first-hand knowledge of the facts.¿¿Hearsay allegations¿on information and belief¿and conclusory statements that particular relief is¿necessary¿are not enough.¿¿(Id.)

“In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts have been broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court¿(1970) 2 Cal.3d 161,¿172;¿Pettie v. Superior Court¿(1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680,¿687.) As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial. Therefore, the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,¿supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172.) Furthermore, California’s liberal approach to permissible discovery generally has led the courts to resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id.¿at p. 173.) In doing so, the courts have taken the view if an error is made in ruling on a discovery motion, it is better that it be made in favor of granting discovery of the¿nondiscoverable¿rather than denying discovery of information vital to preparation or presentation of the party's case or to efficacious settlement of the dispute.”¿(Norton v. Superior Court¿(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1761.)¿ 

Discussion

Ferrera moves for a protective order narrowing or disallowing certain discovery responses that Plaintiff served on Defendant LGBT Center: Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 2, 4, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 39, 45, and Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 7, 14, 19, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36. Ferrera contends that the discovery requests propounded by Plaintiff seek confidential and private information about Ferrera for which Plaintiff cannot show direct relevance or that the information cannot be obtained from a less intrusive source and for abuse of the discovery process.

Ferrera has not shown good cause to narrow or disallow the discovery responses. First, the statutes cited by Ferrera involve situations in which the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Ferrera does not argue that the discovery is burdensome, or expensive. Rather, Ferrera seeks a protective order on the basis of privacy. Further, Ferrera has not made a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden and the like.

Ferrera’s motion centers largely on privacy concerns. A party asserting a right to privacy must establish three elements: (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and (3) a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-40).) If these three elements are met, the court must balance the parties’ competing considerations for and against disclosure of the privacy-protected information. (Id. at 552.) Under this balancing test, a compelling interest is required to justify an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy. (Id. at 556.) However, whenever lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Ibid.)

“If there is reasonable expectation of privacy and the invasion of privacy is serious, then the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against other competing or countervailing interests, which include the interest of the requesting party, fairness to the litigants in conducting the litigation, and the consequences of granting or restricting access to the information.” (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App4th 1242, 1251.)

There is no egregious invasion of privacy every time there is a request for private information and courts must “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion.”  (Williams, supra 3 Cal.5th at 557.) 

Encompassed within the zone of privacy is a person's personal, confidential information. (See Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 35; Bd. of Trustees v. Super. Ct., 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528 (1981) ("It is manifest that the subject documents and communications of [the plaintiff's] personnel, tenure, and promotion files ... were communicated to the [employer] in confidence, and were thus covered by the communicators' constitutional right of privacy."), disapproved on other grounds in Williams, 3 Cal.5th at 557, fn. 8.)

As a general matter, Defendant has a privacy interest in his personnel files. Assuming that in the context of this case this is a serious privacy interest, the Court has weighed this interest against Plaintiff’s rights.  Plaintiff’s need for the discovery substantially outweighs the general privacy concerns that Defendant has identified.  At stake is the "general public interest in ‘facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings' [citation] and in obtaining just results in litigation [citation].” (Puerto, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 1256.) The documents requested are centrally and directly relevant to the issues in the case. Indeed, Plaintiff could hardly effectively litigate the case without receiving this discovery. The Court finds that the balancing of interests tilts decisively in favor of Plaintiff.

The cases cited by Ferrera are inapposite.  El Dorado Savings & Loan v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342 involved the personnel file of a non-party.  Saddleback Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 206—cited by Ferrera as part of a block quote in El Dorado—was a malpractice action in which plaintiff sought the personnel files of 37 employees who treated plaintiff.  These cases are a far cry from the present one, where the personnel file is that of a named defendant and the file relates directly and critically to the key disputed issues under consideration.  Moreover, the California Supreme Court disapproved of the privacy analysis set forth in El Dorado Savings & Loan.  (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557 & n. 8.)

In addition, Plaintiff has offered to enter into a stipulated order to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive materials. (Opp., pg. 8:19-20.) Thus, any potential infringement on Defendant’s privacy interest would be ameliorated by that confidentiality order. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has a strong interest in ascertaining the truth in connection with these proceedings. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 38 [“Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest].)

            Sanctions

The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.020(b), 2025.420(h), 2030.090(d), 2031.060(h), 2033.080(d).) 

As the Court denies the motion, the Court DENIES Ferrera’s request for sanctions against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Ferrera.  The Court denies the request on the basis that Ferrera acted with substantial justification and that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.  Ferrera sought to vindicate a legitimate privacy concern.  Moreover, Ferrera asked not simply to deny the discovery outright but to limit it.  These facts militate against an award of sanctions.