Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV06070, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06070    Hearing Date: January 2, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant Charmain Campbell (Defendant) moves for relief from the Court’s August 1, 2024 entry of default against Defendant.  The Court GRANTS the motion.

Background

            On March 11, 2024, Yana G. Henriks and the law firm McMurray Henriks, LLP (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint alleging both (1) civil extortion and (2) libel per se against Defendant. The Complaint stems from a prior representation Plaintiffs provided to Defendant and her co-defendants in a prior case (hereafter, the “former lawsuit”).

            The former lawsuit regarding the wrongful death of Defendant’s mother was settled for $300,000.00. (Compl., ¶10.) Plaintiffs allege that upon sending the final accounting to Defendant, Defendant and her co-defendants in the former lawsuit responded with written accusations that Plaintiffs mishandled the case, misrepresented the terms of the retainer agreement, and racially discriminated against Defendant and her family during the representation. (Id. at ¶13.) Plaintiffs go on to allege Defendant made several threats to extort more money from Plaintiffs than the standard rate identified in the retainer agreement, which provides for 33.33% of the gross recovery to Plaintiff upon a pre-litigation resolution of the matter and 40% upon resolution after the commencement of litigation. (Id. at ¶¶8 and 13.)

            The motion now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Default Judgment (the Motion). On August 1, 2024 the Court granted a request for entry of default and entered default against Defendant. Defendant now moves to set aside that default entry contending that she was never properly served with the Summons and Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion.    

Discussion

            Compliance with statutory procedures for service of process establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  A default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served in the manner prescribed by statute is void. (Braugh v. Dow (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 76, 88; Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.)

            Defendant contends she was never personally served with the Summons and Complaint for the current action. (Declaration of Charmain Campbell, hereinafter Campbell Decl., ¶2.) Defendant supports this contention in her declaration by stating the initial attempts at service were executed at 18631 Burbank Blvd., Apt. 3, Tarzana , CA 91356, an address where Defendant’s son lives, but not where Defendant herself resides.

            The Court agrees that the summons and complaint were not properly served on Defendant in accordance with statutory requirements.  California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 415.10, 415.20, 415.30, and 415.50 describe four methods of service within California: (1) personal delivery of copy of summons and complaint to person to be served; (2) delivery of a copy of summons and complaint to someone else at defendant’s usual residence or place of business; (3) service by mail coupled with acknowledgment of receipt of summons; and (4) service by publication.

First, Plaintiffs attempted to effect personal service on thirteen separate occasions at 18694 Chase St., Northridge, CA 91324. According to the Campbell Decl., Defendant resides at this address, however never received service. (Campbell Decl., ¶2.) This is invalid service because Defendant was not served personally. Additionally, there is no indication by Plaintiffs that a copy of the Summons and Complaint was left there with someone over the age of 18.  

Second, Plaintiffs made fifteen separate attempts to serve Defendant at 11611 Blucher Ave., #146, Granada Hills, CA 91344, but to no avail. Defendant claims this was an address she resided at one and a half years ago, and that she no longer resides there. (Campbell Decl., ¶3.) Service here is again invalid for the same reasons noted above, in addition to it not being the Defendant’s usual mailing address or place of residence.  

Then on May 2, 2024, Plaintiffs conducted a third attempt at service by emailing Defendant with the Summons and Complaint. However, Code Civ. Proc. §1010.6 only permits electronic service if Defendant consents to receiving service electronically. The Court is in possession of no such consent. (See Code Civ. Proc. §1010.6(c)(3)(i)-(ii).)

Finally, Plaintiffs attempted to serve Defendants by mail to Defendant’s P.O. Box address at an unknown date. However, Plaintiffs do not claim that they received a notice of acknowledgement from Defendant, which is required to effectuate such service.  (Code Civ. Proc. §415.30, subd. (c).)  Accordingly, this was not effective either.

Defendants do not argue that any of their attempts at service were successful in complying with the statutory formalities.  Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit.  This is true, as evidenced by Defendant’s appearance at the August 23, 2024 case management conference, after default had already been entered.  However, actual notice without the statutory formalities is not sufficient for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over the Defendant.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion and sets aside the August 1, 2024 entry of default.