Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV06204, Date: 2024-07-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV06204 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 72
ASUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
RALPH BIASE, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPHINA PEREZ-INIGO MORALES, et
al., Defendants. |
Case No:
24STCV06204 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Calendar Number: 6 |
Defendant Igor Pasternak (“Pasternak”) demurs to the
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Ralph Biase (“Plaintiff”).
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to Plaintiff’s first claim.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiff’s second claim
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
This case relates to an automobile collision between
Defendant Josefina Perez-Inigo Morales (“Perez-Inigo”) and Plaintiff. The
following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the
Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer.
On My 19, 2023, Plaintiff was driving northbound on
Robertson Boulevard in the number one furthest left-hand turn lane. Plaintiff
had stopped behind another vehicle at a red arrow for between 30 and 60
seconds. At that time, Perez-Inigo was driving a vehicle behind Plaintiff in
the same direction and struck Plaintiff’s vehicle from behind while the arrow
was still red.
At the time of the collision, Perez-Inigo was driving a
vehicle owned by Defendant Ean Holdings, LLC (“Ean Holdings”).
Defendant Worldwide Aeros Corp. (“Worldwide”) was Perez
Inigo’s employer at the time of the collision. Pasternak was the founder and
CEO of Worldwide at the time of the collision.
Plaintiff filed this action against Perez-Inigo, Ean
Holdings, Worldwide, and Pasternak on March 13, 2024, raising claims for (1)
negligence; and (2) negligent entrustment.
Pasternak demurred to the Complaint on July 3, 2024.
Plaintiff filed an opposition and Pasternak filed a reply.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be
allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
In order to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must
allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach
of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
“Under Respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously
liable for the torts of his employees committed within the scope of the
employment.” (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608,
617.)
Plaintiff alleges that Perez-Inigo was acting within the
scope of her employment with Worldwide and Pasternak. Pasternak argues that
Plaintiff does not plead any facts with specificity in support of this
allegation. However, “an allegation is one of ultimate fact and good against a
general demurrer[.]” (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226
Cal.App.2d 725, 737.) Plaintiff is generally not required to plead evidentiary
facts. Plaintiff’s allegation that Perez-Inigo acted within the scope of her
employment is sufficient to put Pasternak on notice of the claim against him.
The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.
The elements of negligent entrustment of a vehicle are as
follows: (1) that the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) that
the defendant owner owned the vehicle operated by the driver or had possession
of that vehicle with the owner’s permission; (3) that the defendant owner knew,
or should have known, the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle;
(4) that defendant owner permitted the driver to operate the vehicle
regardless; and (5) that the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a
substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (McKenna v. Beesley
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-66.)
Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle driven by Perez-Inigo at
the time of the collision was owned by Ean Holdings – not by Pasternak.
Plaintiff does not allege that Pasternak owned the vehicle or had possession of
the vehicle. Plaintiff also does not allege that Pasternak entrusted the
vehicle to Perez-Inigo. Plaintiff therefore has not alleged the second element.
Plaintiff has stated that he can amend the Complaint to
provide additional details about Pasternak’s role as an employer and
Pasternak’s knowledge of Perez-Inigo’s driving capabilities. These details
would not cure the failure to allege ownership and entrustment. Amendment would
therefore be futile as to Pasternak.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim without leave
to amend.