Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV06924, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06924    Hearing Date: June 18, 2024    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

 

DEPARTMENT 72

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

GIRMAI ENGIDA ABRAHA,

 

                                  Plaintiff,

 

         v.

 

 

WILSHIRE MARQUIS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al.,

 

                                  Defendants.

 

 Case No:  24STCV06924

 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  June 18, 2024

 Calendar Number:  8

 

 

 

Defendants Wilshire Marquis Homeowners Association (the “Association”) and Wilshire Marquis (“Marquis”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike portions of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Girmai Engida Abraha.

 

The Court DENIES the motion to strike.

 

Background

 

This is an employment action. Plaintiff was employed by the Association as a security guard since around January 1, 2000. Around March 4, 2022, Plaintiff developed a severe infection that required medical treatment and substantially impeded major life activities.

 

Plaintiff remained hospitalized for eleven days and was then placed on medical leave. Plaintiff requested accommodation for his medical leave of absence and kept the Association apprised of updates.

 

Plaintiff alleges that the association assured him that his job would be there when he was medically ready to return to work. Plaintiff alleges that when he attempted to return to work on April 28, 2022, he discovered that a younger person had replaced him. Despite attempting to return to work twice, Plaintiff was not reinstated. On April 29, 2022, Defendants instructed Plaintiff to apply for unemployment benefits, allegedly terminating him. Plaintiff was 79 years old at the time of his termination.

 

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on March 20, 2024, raising claims for (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) retaliation in violation of Government Code, sections 12940, et seq.; (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; (4) retaliation in violation of Government Code, sections 12945.2, et seq.; (6) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process; (7) declaratory judgment; and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

 

Defendants filed this motion to strike on May 14, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Complaint in this case. The Court denies the request as moot because the Complaint is already in the record.

 

Legal Standard

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

 

Discussion

 

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and supporting allegations.

 

            Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

 

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

 

“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s representations that he would be able to return to work and subsequent decision to terminate him, allegedly based on his age and disability, constituted fraud and malice, respectively. Plaintiff alleges that the acts were undertaken by Defendant’s officers, directors, or managing agents.

 

 Plaintiff has alleged that the conduct was intended to cause injury, establishing malice for pleading purposes.

 

The Court denies the motion to strike.