Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV06924, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV06924 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
GIRMAI ENGIDA ABRAHA, Plaintiff, v. WILSHIRE MARQUIS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
24STCV06924 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Calendar Number: 8 |
Defendants Wilshire Marquis Homeowners Association (the “Association”)
and Wilshire Marquis (“Marquis”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike
portions of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Girmai Engida Abraha.
The Court DENIES the motion to strike.
This is an employment action. Plaintiff was employed by the
Association as a security guard since around January 1, 2000. Around March 4,
2022, Plaintiff developed a severe infection that required medical treatment
and substantially impeded major life activities.
Plaintiff remained hospitalized for eleven days and was then
placed on medical leave. Plaintiff requested accommodation for his medical
leave of absence and kept the Association apprised of updates.
Plaintiff alleges that the association assured him that his
job would be there when he was medically ready to return to work. Plaintiff
alleges that when he attempted to return to work on April 28, 2022, he
discovered that a younger person had replaced him. Despite attempting to return
to work twice, Plaintiff was not reinstated. On April 29, 2022, Defendants
instructed Plaintiff to apply for unemployment benefits, allegedly terminating
him. Plaintiff was 79 years old at the time of his termination.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on March 20,
2024, raising claims for (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2)
retaliation in violation of Government Code, sections 12940, et seq.; (3)
failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; (4) retaliation in violation
of Government Code, sections 12945.2, et seq.; (6) failure to engage in a good
faith interactive process; (7) declaratory judgment; and (8) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
Defendants filed this motion to strike on May 14, 2024.
Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply.
Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of
the Complaint in this case. The Court denies the request as moot because the
Complaint is already in the record.
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the
pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving
to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive
damages and supporting allegations.
Punitive
damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or
fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended
to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and
conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th
53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and
unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by
defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise
cause injury. (Ibid.)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of
punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must
be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion
to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike
as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.)
“In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”
(Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are
insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud
or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to
subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a
corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard,
authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on
the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s representations that he
would be able to return to work and subsequent decision to terminate him,
allegedly based on his age and disability, constituted fraud and malice,
respectively. Plaintiff alleges that the acts were undertaken by Defendant’s
officers, directors, or managing agents.
Plaintiff has alleged
that the conduct was intended to cause injury, establishing malice for pleading
purposes.
The Court denies the motion to strike.