Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV07473, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07473    Hearing Date: November 19, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant T.D. Trauth (“Defendant”) moves an award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff Linda Greif, Trustee of the Greif Family Trust (“Plaintiff”) in the amount of $10,570.00.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion and awards $10,570.00 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff shall pay this amount to Defendant’s counsel within 30 days of the issuance of this order.

Background

            This is an unlawful detainer case. The following facts are taken from the Complaint and supporting documents.

            Defendant is a tenant at the residential property located at 725 N. Sweetzer Avenue, Unit 102, Los Angeles, California 90069 (the “Property”). Plaintiff is the landlord and owner of the Property. Plaintiff agreed to rent the property month-to-month and pay rent of $2,100.00 per month.

            On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit (the “Notice”) by posting it on the premises. The Notice stated that Defendant owed $29,400.00 in unpaid rent for the period of February 15, 2022 through April 14, 2023.

            Plaintiff filed this action on March 22, 2022, seeking past-due rent of $29,400.00, attorney’s fees, forfeiture of the agreement, and damages.

            On June 20, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On July 18, 2024, judgment was entered in Defendant’s favor and against Plaintiff.

            On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney’s fees. Defendant did not file an opposition.          

Legal Standard

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (a).)

“The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except [where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case], the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (b).)

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Discussion

Entitlement to Fees

The lease agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant (the “Lease”) provides as follows:

“23. ATTORNEY'S FEES. If any legal action or proceeding be brought by either party to this agreement, the prevailing party shall be reimbursed for all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in addition to other damages awarded. Due to the ever increasing fees that can be charged by attorneys, it is agreed by the parties that both sides will waive their right in a jury trial.”

(Fisher Decl., Ex. A (“Lease”) at p. 2, ¶ 23)

“ ‘[T]he primary purpose of an unlawful detainer action is to obtain the possession of real property in the cases specified by statute.’ [Citation.] ” (Strickland v. Becks (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 21.) “The judgment, if any, for damages and the rent found due pursuant to section 1174 is a mere incident to the main object—the recovery of possession.” (Ibid.) Where “[t]he defendant … prevailed by defeating the plaintiff's claim to possession …. the defendant, and not the plaintiff, was the prevailing party[.]” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff did not bring a claim for possession, and Defendant defeated Plaintiff’s claim for nonpayment of rent. Defendant is therefore the prevailing party and is thus entitled to attorney’s fees under the Lease.

Hourly Rates and Hours

Defendant requests an hourly rate of $350.00 for Zakary Fisher. (Fisher Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court finds this rate to be reasonable based on Fisher’s experience. (See Fisher Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.)

Fisher provides a chart of his hours billed for this matter. (Fisher Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant requests a total of 30.2 hours for Fisher. The Court finds that this time expenditure is reasonable.

The Court therefore grants the motion and awards $10,570.00 in attorney’s fees.