Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV08068, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08068    Hearing Date: May 8, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Golden Emeka Agoh (“Agoh”) moves for leave to file a cross-complaint against Defendant Jorge Enrique Gonzalez Cortes (“Cortes”).

            The Court GRANTS the motion.

Background

This case relates to a two-vehicle collision that occurred on July 1, 2022 at the intersection of Beverly Boulevard and Norton Avenue in Los Angeles, California.

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by Agoh, who was employed as a driver by Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”). Plaintiff and Agoh were traveling westbound on Beverly Boulevard while Cortes was traveling eastbound. Agoh made a left turn. The cars driven by Agoh and Cortes collided, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Uber, Agoh, and Cortes (collectively, “Defendants”) on March 29, 2024, raising claims for (1) “motor vehicle”, and (2) general negligence.

Agoh filed this motion on March 21, 2025. Cortes filed an opposition and Agoh filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Where a defendant wishes to bring a cross-complaint against a plaintiff who already filed a complaint against said defendant, the defendant should file said cross-complaint before or at the same time as it files the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. March Proc., § 428.50 (a).) Otherwise, the defendant shall apply for leave to file a permissive cross-complaint, which the court may grant “in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 426.50, 428.50.)

Any cause of action which is related to a complaint that a plaintiff already filed and served against the defendant qualifies as a compulsory cross-complaint so long as it existed at the time the defendant/cross-complainant served its answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 426.30, 426.10.) Causes of action that qualify as compulsory cross-complaints are waived if not asserted. (Ibid.)

If such a cross-complaint is compulsory rather than permissive, the court must grant the motion for leave, unless it is determined that the defendant/cross-complainant seeking to file the compulsory cross-complaint is operating in bad faith. (Ibid.; see also Silver Orgs. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99 [section 426.50 must be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action].) “[W]hat constitutes ‘good faith’—or lack of it—under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.50 must be determined in light of and in conformity with the liberality conferred upon the trial courts by the section and by prior law …. [T]his principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint[.]” (Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 901.)

Discussion

Agoh seeks to raise claims against Cortes for (1) total indemnity; (2) equitable indemnity; (3) contribution; and (4) declaratory relief. Agoh alleges that Plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the conduct of Cortes.

Here, the cross-claims to the same facts as those alleged in the Complaint, and is therefore mandatory. Thus, leave to file can only be denied on a showing of bad faith.  Cortes’s argument that Section 426.50 requires some heightened showing by Agoh is not consistent with applicable law or the statutory language.

Cortes does not contend that Agoh has acted in bad faith. Cortes only argues that he will suffer prejudice if leave to file is granted. This is not a basis for denial of leave to file the cross-complaint. Further, trial is set for March 2, 2026. Cortes has plenty of time to seek discovery or to seek a trial continuance if it becomes necessary as a result of the delay.   Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for leave to file a cross-complaint.