Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV08284, Date: 2024-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08284    Hearing Date: November 21, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Maribel Vargas (“Defendant”) moves an award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff Gonzalo Navarro (“Plaintiff”) in the amount of $31,150.00.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion IN PART and awards $23,850 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff shall pay this amount to Defendant’s counsel within 30 days of the issuance of this order.

Background

            This is an unlawful detainer case.

            Defendant is a tenant at the real property located at 1045 E 34th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90011 Los Angeles County (the “Property”).

            On or around January 1, 1993, Plaintiff and Defendant entered a residential lease agreement regarding the Property (the “Lease”), whereby Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $1,200.00 in monthly rent (later increased to $1,700.00).

            On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff issued Defendant a three-day notice to pay rent or quit.

            Plaintiff filed this action on April 2, 2024, raising one claim for unlawful detainer. Plaintiff sought possession of the premises and payment of unpaid rent.

            A non-jury trial was held on July 30, 2024 and August 16, 2024.

            On August 20, 2024, the Court entered judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.

            Defendant filed this motion for attorney’s fees on September 30, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Discussion

Entitlement to Fees

“A landlord who institutes an unlawful detainer proceeding based upon a tenant's nonpayment of rent, and who is liable for a violation of Section 1942.4 of the Civil Code, shall be liable to the tenant or lessee for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the suit, in an amount to be fixed by the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.21.)

“A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord's demand or notice:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord's agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”

(Civ. Code, § 1942.4.)

            At trial the Court found that Defendant had factually established a violation of Civil Code, section 1942.4. (Minute Order dated August 16, 2024 at pp. 1-2.) The Court found that section 1942.4 barred the issuance of a three-day notice in this case. (Minute Order dated August 16, 2024 at p. 1.)

Thus, Defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 1174.21.

Hourly Rates and Hours

Defendant requests 16 hours for Thomas and 47.9 hours for Hermansen.

In her motion, Defendant requests 16 hours for Rikisha Thomas at an hourly rate of $425.00. In her reply brief, Defendant notes that the motion contains a typo whereby the name of Angela Chavez is stated instead of Thomas. (Compare Reply at p. 3:24-26 with Motion at p. 7:26-27.) However, Defendant’s evidence of hourly rates and time spent on this case is for Thomas. (See generally Declaration of Rikisha Thomas.) Although Thomas declares that her hourly rate is $450.00 (Thomas Decl. ¶ 4), Defendant’s attorney fee request in her notice of motion appears to be based on an hourly rate of $425.00.

The Court finds that Thomas’s rate is reasonable based on her experience. (See Thomas Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)

However, the Court does not find that Defendant has met her burden of showing that the time expended by Thomas was reasonable.  Defendant does not adequately explain why she is requesting the hours of two different attorneys.  It appears that Hermansen took over the trial for Thomas and is already charging for time conferring with Thomas and familiarizing himself with the record.  There is no indication of how Thomas’s work was used or was useful. Moreover, and fundamentally, Thomas’s very general descriptions of work, such as “review documents” and “prepare for jury trial” do not let the Court assess whether the work was reasonable.  For these reasons, the Court does not award the requested fees for Thomas.

Defendant requests an hourly rate of $500.00 for Kevin Hermansen. The Court finds that these rates are reasonable based on Hermansen’s experience. (See Hermansen Decl. ¶¶ 3-9.)

Plaintiff objects to .1 hours for Hermansen on July 26, 2024 for “[a]dvise Thomas re form to Request court reporter”. (See Hermansen Decl. ¶ 23, p. 17:10-11.) The Court finds that this de minimis time expenditure was reasonable.

Plaintiff objects to .3 hours for Hermansen on July 26, 2024 for “[t]elecon with Plaintiff’s counsel Marinaccio re status of trial, exhibits, witnesses (.1)” (See Hermansen Decl. ¶ 23, p. 17:13-14.) Plaintiff points out that the work column states a lower time amount than the time billed. The Court agrees and reduces Hermansen’s hours by .2.

The Court awards 47.7 hours for Hermansen. The Court thus awards a total of $23,850.