Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV09392, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV09392    Hearing Date: October 1, 2024    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

 

DEPARTMENT 72

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

GEORGE HANDY,

 

                                  Plaintiff,

 

         v.

 

 

AIDS HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION,

 

                                  Defendant.

 

 Case No:  24STCV09392

 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  October 1, 2024

 Calendar Number:  8

 

            Defendant Aids Healthcare Foundation moves to strike certain allegations and prayers from relief from Plaintiff’s complaint.

 

            The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike.

 

Background

 

            Plaintiff George Handy sued defendant Aids Healthcare Foundation (“AHF”) on April 15, 2024. He filed his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on July 24, 2024. In his FAC, Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action arising from Plaintiff’s tenancy at the residential property located at 501 S. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, CA 90013 (“the Property”).

 

            As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for purposes of Defendant’s motion to strike (paragraph citations to the FAC): Plaintiff lived in two different units on the Property pursuant to residential leases executed in 2019 and 2023, respectively. (¶ 9.) Defendant owned, managed, or leased the Property at all relevant times. (¶ 2.)

 

            Defendant maintained both of Plaintiff’s units in untenantable condition. The conditions Plaintiff endured during his tenancy include, but are not limited to, (1) leaking so severe that it caused holes in Plaintiff’s ceiling (¶ 14); (2) bedbug infestation so severe that the insects “infested the entire unit, including the carpet, and their carcasses could be found lying around” (¶ 17); and (3) numerous code violations, including fire safety violations, that went unaddressed despite citations from City agencies (¶ 20).

 

            Plaintiff alleges, in short, “that Defendants are slum lords whose goal is to maximize their income by preying on persons who do not have the power or ability to protect their rights.” (¶ 66.)

 

            On August 23, 2024, Defendant moved to strike two paragraphs from Plaintiff’s complaint and a portion of his prayer for relief. Plaintiff filed his opposition on September 17, 2024. On September 23, 2024, Defendant replied.

           

Legal Standard

 

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (Id. § 436 (a).)

 

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Id. § 436 (a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (Id., § 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Id. § 436 (b).)

 

Discussion

 

            Meeting and Conference

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5 requires the party filing a motion to strike to meet and confer with its opponent before filing. Defendant’s counsel filed a declaration that satisfied section 435.5. (Dahl Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)

 

            Punitive Damages

           

Defendant’s motion is directed to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant’s liability for punitive damages (¶¶ 48, 62) and to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages (Compl., 21:17).

 

A motion to strike is the proper procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) A complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

 

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where … the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice … .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)

 

For a corporate defendant, the oppression, fraud or malice “must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)  That requirement can be satisfied “ ‘if the evidence permits a clear and convincing inference that within the corporate hierarchy authorized persons acted despicably in “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1090.) 

 

Plaintiffs’ FAC contains allegations sufficient to ascribe oppression to Defendant’s officers. Oppression requires no evil motive to inflict a specific harm; it requires only a knowledge that the victim’s rights are being violated, and continuation of the violative behavior. (Cf. Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286-1287 [“[p]unitive damages are appropriate if the defendant’s acts are … in blatant violation of law or policy].) A landlord that abuses its power over a residential tenant may be liable for punitive damages. (See Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055-1056; cf. Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1129 [power disparity contributes to oppression in employment context] Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946-947 [same].)

 

Here, the FAC characterizes the substandard conditions at the Property as part of an intentional business practice that Defendant uses to maximize its profits at the expense of vulnerable tenants. (¶ 66.) Although Plaintiff does not identify a specific managing agent and ascribe them a specific state of mind, Plaintiff alleges enough facts which, if true, support that Defendant engaged in a widespread practice known to its corporate decisionmakers. This is sufficient, for pleading purposes, to allege Defendant’s officers’ conscious disregard for its tenants’ rights.

 

            The motion is denied. Defendant to give notice.