Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV11374, Date: 2024-07-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV11374 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
JOHN B. SCHRIMPF, Plaintiff, v. PANAVISION INTERNATIONAL, L.P., et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
24STCV11374 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Calendar Number: 7 |
Defendants Panavision International, L.P. (“Panavision”),
Panavision GP Inc. (“GP Inc.”), and Panavision GP LLC (“GP LLC”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) demur to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,
twelfth, and thirteenth claims in the Complaint filed by Plaintiff John B.
Schrimpf (“Plaintiff”). Defendants additionally move to strike portions of the
Complaint regarding Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiff’s third,
fourth, and thirteenth claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the remaining claims.
The Court GRANTS the motion to strike WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
This is an employment case. The following facts are taken
from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the
purposes of the demurrer.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for 39 years. Plaintiff
was terminated on May 5, 2023, at the age of 71. At the time of his
termination, Plaintiff held the title of “VP US Regional Operations Manager.”
Over the course of several years prior to 2022, Plaintiff
developed medical problems with his hip, but delayed treatment so that he could
continue working for Defendants. In 2022, Plaintiff was finally forced to deal
with his medical issues, which required various surgeries and leaves of
absence.
Plaintiff planned to undergo hip surgery in August 2022, but
underwent an emergency surgery prior to August 2022 which delayed this plan.
Plaintiff informed his executive team and provided medical records regarding
his condition and treatment.
A September 27, 2022 note submitted to Defendants from
Plaintiff’s medical care provider indicated he may return to work “once he is
sitting over 4 hours twice daily on 10-3-22 and may return to full time work
when he is sitting at least 8 hours twice daily on 10-10-22.” (Complaint ¶ 32.)
After recovering from the emergency surgery, Plaintiff returned to work.
Plaintiff underwent the hip surgery on February 28, 2023.
Approximately one week later, he suffered severe complications including
intestinal Covid-19 and Ketoacidosis. As a result of the complications,
Plaintiff nearly died and was in a coma for several days. During this period,
James Fin, Defendants’ Marketing/Sales Executive, regularly visited Plaintiff’s
bedside and kept Defendants up to date regarding Plaintiff’s condition.
On March 27, 2023, Plaintiff was authorized by his medical
provider to work light duty, working from home for up to 4 hours daily
beginning March 28, 2023. These restrictions remained in place through the date
of Plaintiff’s termination.
On May 1, 2023, Defendants scheduled a meeting with
Plaintiff where Plaintiff was informed that his employment would be terminated
due to “reorganization.” (Complaint ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that the
termination decision was made in California. (Complaint ¶ 37.) Defendants
terminated Plaintiff’s employment effective May 5, 2023.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on May 6,
2024, raising claims for (1) disability discrimination under FEHA; (2) age
discrimination under FEHA; (3) failure to accommodate under FEHA; (4) failure
to engage in a timely and good-faith interactive process under FEHA; (5)
retaliation under FEHA; (6) failure to prevent/remedy discrimination,
harassment, or retaliation under FEHA; (7) wrongful discharge under FEHA; (8)
age discrimination under ADEA; (9) retaliation under ADEA; (10) disability
discrimination under ADA; (11) retaliation in violation of ADA; (12) wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy; and (13) intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”).
Defendants filed the demurrer and motion to strike on July
3, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition to each, and Defendants filed a reply to
each.
The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice and
takes notice of the requested materials as public records.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be
allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
“[T]he
Fair Employment and Housing Act was not intended to apply to nonresidents
where, as here, the tortious conduct took place out of this state's territorial
boundaries.” (Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1850,
1852.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege standing to
assert his FEHA claims. Plaintiff does not allege that he lives in California.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff worked outside of California.
Plaintiff
alleges that he worked for Defendants at their Woodland Hills, California
headquarter office, their Dallas, Texas office, and various regions across the
United States. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that his job duties regularly
required him to work at the California headquarters. (Complaint ¶ 23.) Plaintiff
alleges that the decision to terminate his employment took place in California.
(Complaint ¶ 37.)
Defendants
argue that these allegations do not provide adequately specific facts. However,
“an allegation is one of ultimate fact and good against a general demurrer[.]”
(South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 737.)
The
Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged standing under
FEHA.
The
Court therefore overrules the demurrer as to the first, second, fifth, sixth,
and seventh claims.
Under Government Code, section 12940, it is an unlawful employment
practice “to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or
mental disability of an applicant or employee” unless the employer demonstrates
doing so would impose an undue hardship. “The essential elements of a failure
to accommodate claim are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the
FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform
the essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” (Wilson v. County of
Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1192.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged denial of
accommodations and has not alleged his ability to perform his job with
accommodations.
Plaintiff has alleged that he was able to perform his job
with accommodations. (Complaint ¶ 57.) Plaintiff alleges that he needed to be
accommodated by being permitted at various times to work from home and engage
in light work only. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to accommodate his
job restrictions, but does not allege what accommodations he was denied.
(Complaint ¶ 78.)
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim with
leave to amend.
“FEHA requires an informal process with the employee to
attempt to identify reasonable accommodations, not necessarily ritualized
discussions.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359,
379.)
Once initiated, the employer has a continuous obligation to
engage in the interactive process in good faith. “Both employer and employee
have the obligation ‘to keep communications open’ and neither has ‘a right to
obstruct the process.’” [Citation.] Each party must participate in good faith,
undertake reasonable efforts to communicate its concerns, and make available to
the other information which is available, or more accessible, to one party.
Liability hinges on the objective circumstances surrounding the parties’
breakdown in communication, and responsibility for the breakdown lies with the
party who fails to participate in good faith. [Citation.] (Swanson v.
Morongo Uni¿ed School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 971–972.)
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants failed to continue
engaging in a timely, good faith interactive process with Plaintiff at all
required times. If Defendants subsequently decided that the then-existing
accommodations were not working, it should have, but failed to, engage in a
further interactive process to find reasonable accommodations allowing
Plaintiff to continue performing his essential job functions. Instead, it
terminated [Plaintiff].” (Complaint ¶ 85.)
These allegations do not properly support Plaintiff’s
interactive process claim or give Defendants notice of the nature of the claim.
Plaintiff only needs to plead ultimate facts, but must in fact plead those
facts stating when Defendants did or did not engage in a good faith interactive
process to accommodate Plaintiff’s medical conditions and disabilities.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim with
leave to amend.
“The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer
terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially
motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the
plaintiff harm. It is well established that a termination premised on an
employee’s refusal to violate either a statute or an administrative regulation
may support a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” (Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical
Center (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1234, citation omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges that his
termination violated the public policy embodied in FEHA.
Defendants argue that this claim fails because Plaintiff
lacks standing under FEHA and because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case for violations of FEHA in the absence of standing. Because the Court finds
that Plaintiff has alleged adequate facts to establish standing under FEHA, the
Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson
v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)
Plaintiff’s basis for alleging extreme and outrageous
conduct by Defendants is that Defendants terminated Plaintiff based on his age
and disability. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants did not even have the
decency to have Chief Human Resources Officer, Sandy Ferguson, conduct the
termination meeting, and instead had a new VP Plaintiff did not even know
participate.” (Opposition at p. 10:7-9.)
“Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the
bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and
prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel management activity is
insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management
decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer
for discrimination.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 55, 80.) Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous
conduct.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim with
leave to amend.
Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with
malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is
defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of
others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent.
Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable
conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious
disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.)
“Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property,
rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of
punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must
be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion
to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike
as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.)
“In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”
(Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are
insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud
or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to
subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a
corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization,
ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an
officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (b).)
Plaintiff alleges at various points in the Complaint that
Defendants acted with malice, fraud, oppression, recklessness, and conscious
disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and safety. Plaintiff does not need to provide
evidentiary facts, but must at least plead ultimate facts showing these
conclusions to be accurate. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plead actions by
Defendants that go above and beyond the commission of a tort.
The Court therefore grants the motion to strike with leave
to amend.