Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV12529, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12529    Hearing Date: January 28, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Super Center Concepts, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Laura Moyado (“Plaintiff”). Specifically, Defendant seeks abatement of this action as to Plaintiff’s representative claims under the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”).

Defendant additionally moves to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims against Defendant.

The Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings and stays Plaintiff’s representative claims pending the termination of Rosa Umana Peraza v. Super Center Concepts, Inc., et al., Case No. CIVSB2302012 in the San Bernardino County Superior Court.

The Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration and stays this action pending the outcome of arbitration.

The Court sets a status conference re San Bernardino case and arbitration for June 29, 2026 at 8:30 a.m.

Background

This is a PAGA employment case.

Plaintiff was employed at Defendant’s Superior Grocers grocery store located at 3600 E. Cesar Chavez Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90063 from approximately October 14, 2021 until April 7, 2023.

Plaintiff filed this action on May 17, 2024. The Complaint raises one claim for violation of Labor Code, section 1198 and PAGA. The basis for Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant denied suitable seating to Plaintiff and other employees during their employment in violation of IWC Wage Order 7-2001, section 14. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and other similarly aggrieved employees.

On November 1, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the arbitration motion and Defendant filed a reply.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grant’s Defendant’s request for judicial notice and takes notice of the submitted public records.

Discussion

Defendant moves for abatement of this action on the basis that this action is subsumed by an earlier-filed lawsuit pending in the San Bernardino County Superior Court, Rosa Umana Peraza v. Super Center Concepts, Inc., et al., Case No. CIVSB2302012 (the “Prior Case”). (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B.)

“Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, when two [California] superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769-770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) “[T]he pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action.” (Id. at 770 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) “The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255 [internal citations omitted].)

The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and the statutory plea in abatement should be raised by demurrer where the issue appears on the face of the complaint and by answer where factual issues must be resolved. (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) “Where abatement is required [under the plea in abatement or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction], the second action should be stayed, not dismissed.” (Ibid.)

Furthermore, a party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading on the grounds that “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c).)

The Prior Case was filed against Defendant on January 9, 2023, before this case and is also a PAGA case. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B.) The Complaint in the prior case raises claims for, inter alia, PAGA violations denial of proper seating for employees. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B at ¶¶ 37, 54(k), 114-120.) The Prior Case seeks civil PAGA penalties for “[o]ther non-party Aggrieved Employees” pursuant to this claim. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B, ¶ 120.)

Here, the Prior Case involves the same cause of action (representative claims for violation of PAGA for failure to provide adequate seating) and the same parties (the Aggrieved Employees of Defendant). Because the San Bernadino County Superior Court has assumed jurisdiction over the representative claims in this matter, Plaintiff’s representative claims here are subject to abatement.

The Court therefore grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings and stays Plaintiff’s representative claims pending the termination of the Prior Case.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

Legal Standard

Under both the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)

The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)

“A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “With respect to the moving party's burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court. Once such a document is presented to the court, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to compel, who may present any challenges to the enforcement of the agreement and evidence in support of those challenges.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160 [internal citations omitted].)

Discussion

Defendant presents an agreement electronically signed by Plaintiff whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the employment relationship between the parties. (Montes Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Defendant submits the arbitration agreement in both the English and Spanish versions that were presented to Plaintiff. (Montes Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Defendant does not provide certification of the translation. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has therefore failed to prove the existence of the agreement. “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(g).) Here, however, it is not clear that the Spanish version of the agreement is necessary to prove formation. Here, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration in English, and it therefore appears that Plaintiff speaks English. Thus, the English version of the agreement with Plaintiff’s signature appears adequate to prove that the parties entered the arbitration agreement.

Plaintiff argues that the agreement is illusory because the agreement provides Defendant with the right to amend the agreement at its discretion, provided that it gives notice to the employee and the opportunity to reject any such change by written notice within 30 days. (See Montes Decl. Ex. A at § 4.) Plaintiff argues that this clause impermissibly permits Defendant to retroactively alter the agreement as to former employees, because former employees are not explicitly provided the right to notice as employees are.

Under California law, an arbitration agreement may not permit retroactive changes to an employee’s right to arbitrate – i.e., changes that would affect a claim that has already accrued. (Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1466.) Importantly, “a court may imply such a restriction if an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue.” (Ibid.)

            Here, the agreement does not explicitly state that changes will apply retroactively to accrued claims. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s reading that the agreement may be freely changed as to former employees without notice is a forced reading that would likely run afoul of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were Defendant to try to enforce it in such a manner. In any event, Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant has actually modified the agreement or done so as to a former employee.

Pursuant to Peleg, the Court reads into the agreement the term that the agreement may not be modified with respect to accrued claims.

The Court therefore grants the motion to compel arbitration and stays this action pending the outcome of arbitration.