Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV13669, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13669    Hearing Date: February 13, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Nancy R. Stone (“Nancy”), Bruce Stone (“Bruce”), and Nancy R. Stone, Surviving Trustee of the J. Lawrence & Nancy R. Stone Family Trust Dated May 9, 1994 (“Trustee”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs Gloria Torres Imperial (“Imperial”) and Josephine Ortiz Igao (“Igao”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). (The Court uses the parties’ first names for the purpose of clarity only, and means no disrespect.)

The Court GRANTS the motion. Defendants shall within five court days file the proposed cross-complaint attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Laura S. Withrow.

Plaintiffs shall file a response within 20 days of the filing of the Cross-Complaint.

Background

This is an employment action. Plaintiffs began working for Nancy beginning around 2017.

Plaintiffs were employed as caregivers for Mr. J. Lawrence Stone until he passed away in the year 2020, and then provided caregiving services for Nancy. Plaintiffs’ employment was terminated on April 30, 2024.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants withheld portions of their wages and required them to work for longer than permissible.

Plaintiffs filed this action on May 31, 2024, raising claims for (1) wage theft in violation of the Domestic Worker Bill of Rights; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) violation of Labor Code, section 1194.2; and (4) waiting time penalties.

On November 20, 2024, Defendants moved for leave to file a cross-complaint.

Evidentiary Objections

The Court overrules Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections.

Legal Standard

Where a defendant wishes to bring a cross-complaint against a plaintiff who already filed a complaint against said defendant, the defendant should file said cross-complaint before or at the same time as it files the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50 (a).) Otherwise, the defendant shall apply for leave to file a permissive cross-complaint, which the court may grant “in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 426.50, 428.50.)

If such a cross-complaint is compulsory rather than permissive, the court must grant the motion for leave, unless it is determined that the defendant/cross-complainant seeking to file the compulsory cross-complaint is operating in bad faith. (Ibid.; see also Silver Orgs. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99 [section 426.50 must be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action].)

Any cause of action which is related to a complaint that a plaintiff already filed and served against the defendant qualifies as a compulsory cross-complaint so long as it existed at the time the defendant/cross-complainant served its answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 426.30, 426.10.) Causes of action that qualify as compulsory cross-complaints are waived if not asserted. (Ibid.)

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that Cavalry’s motion should be stricken because Cavalry filed the Cross-Complaint before filing the motion. Plaintiff cites no authority indicating that the Court must strike the motion on this basis. Because Cavalry subsequently filed an otherwise procedurally proper motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, the Court will treat the filed Cross-Complaint as a proposed cross-complaint.

Defendants seek to allege in the Cross-Complaint that Plaintiffs neglected to properly care for Nancy during their employment.

Because the claims in the Cross-Complaint existed at the time that Defendants served their answer, they are compulsory, and the Court must grant leave to amend unless it finds that Defendants are operating in bad faith. Without bad faith, delay alone is not a basis to deny the motion.

“ ‘ “Bad faith” is defined as “[t]he opposite of ‘good faith,’ generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake ..., but by some interested or sinister motive[,] ... not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather ... the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; ... it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ ” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 100, quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 743, 764.)

Courts hesitate to make a finding of bad faith where the sole basis is delay. In Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank, the Court of Appeal found that a mere delay of less than six months between the filing of the complaint and the hearing on the motion for leave to file a cross complaint did not suggest dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, sinister motive, furtive design, or ill will. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs argues that Defendants’ motion is made in bad faith because they did not seek leave to file the Cross-Complaint until roughly seven months after the filing of the Complaint. The Court is not prepared to make such a finding solely on the basis of delay. There are circumstances where delay can lead to an inference of bad faith. (Innovest, Inc. v. Bruckner (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 594 [inference that cross-complaint was not diligently pursued to delay the entry of a stipulated judgment]; Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852 [unexplained delay of several years].) Here, however, the delay was only several months long, and there was no disposition on the horizon for this action.

The Court does not find that Defendants to file a cross-complaint in bad faith.

The Court therefore grants the motion.