Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV14992, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV14992    Hearing Date: March 27, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Stage 29 Productions, LLC (“Defendant”) moves to compel Plaintiff Morgan Kaylor (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate her claims and stay the proceedings pending arbitration, filed on February 14, 2025 and set for hearing on March 27, 2025.

Defendants  motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is GRANTED. This action is stayed pending completion of arbitration.

Background

            On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant and DOES 1 through 60, inclusive for: (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA; (3) Failure to Accommodate Disability in Violation of FEHA; (4) Failure to Take All Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation; (5) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; and (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

            The Complaint alleges that on or about December 10, 2021, Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff because of her thyroid cancer and need for reasonable accommodations. (Compl., ¶13.) Defendant replaced Plaintiff with the temporary non-disabled employee, Patty Duffy-Brown, who was initially hired to cover for Plaintiff during medical leave from June 9 to July 5, 2021. (Id. at ¶¶11-13.)

            On August 6, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer to Complaint.

            On February 14, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration. On March 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. On March 20, 2025, Defendant filed a Reply.

Discussion

Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of a valid arbitration agreement that covers her claim.  Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has waived the right to arbitration by failing to timely pay the arbitration fees.

           Valid Arbitration Agreement

“[T]he petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence . . . .”  (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 (Giuliano).) “In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration [citation]. The court should attempt to give effect to the parties’ intentions, in light of the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances under which the agreement was made.” (Weeks v. Crow (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353.)

“To determine whether a contractual arbitration clause requires arbitration of a particular controversy, the controversy is first identified, and the issue is whether that controversy is within the scope of the contractual arbitration clause.” (Titolo v. Cano (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 310, 316.) “Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration.  The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.” (California Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.)

[A] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  [Citation.] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Giuliano, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.)

Here, these issues are not controversial.  Defendant has provided a copy of the employment contract between Defendant and Plaintiff, which contains the Arbitration Clause at issue and that is signed by Plaintiff. (Satenberg Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.) The Arbitration Clause states in pertinent part, the following:

[Stage 29 Productions, LLC and CBS Studios, Inc.] and [Morgan Kaylor] mutually agree to arbitrate before a neutral arbitrator any and all disputes or claims by and between [Morgan Kaylor], on the one hand, and either or both [Stage 29 Productions, LLC and CBS Studios, Inc.] and their present and former officers, managers, members, agents, and employees (the “Company Parties”) on the other hand, that relate in any way to the services provided or the relationship between the [Morgan Kaylor] and either “[Stage 29 Productions, LLC or CBS Studios, Inc.] to which the services are provided. This includes, but is not limited to, any and all claims arising from or relating to [Morgan Kaylor’s] recruitment, hiring, retention, provision of services, scope of work, the termination of the working relationship with either or both “[Stage 29 Productions, LLC and CBS Studios, Inc.] and any claims arising after [Morgan Kaylor’s] provision of services ends, including claims by or against either or both “[Stage 29 Productions, LLC and CBS Studios, Inc.], whether such disputes or claims arise in tort, in contract, or under a statute, regulation, or ordinance now in existence or that may in the future be enacted or recognized, including, but not limited to, the following claims:

…

1.1.2 Claims for wrongful termination, violation of public policy, constructive discharge, infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation, interference with contract or prospective economic advantage, defamation, unfair business practices, and any other tort or tort-like causes of action relating to or arising from the working relationship or the formation or termination thereof, including any claims under state, federal, or local law or regulations;

1.1.3 Claims for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and failure to prevent the same, under any and all federal, state, or local laws, regulations, or ordinances that prohibit discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, as well as claims for violations of any other federal, state, or local law, regulation, or ordinance, except as set forth herein.”

(Satenberg Decl., ¶2, Ex. A at ¶1 – Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Certain Claims and Disputes.)

            As noted, Plaintiff does not dispute a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties. In fact, Plaintiff admits that she initiated arbitration with JAMS against Defend on March 6, 2024. (Akhaveissy Decl., ¶3.)

Waiver of Arbitration

Plaintiff contends that Defendant waived its right to arbitration when it failed to pay its filing fee in a timely manner in violation of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97. (Id. at ¶¶9-11.) Although both parties appear acknowledge that Defendant’s initial payment to JAMS was returned (Mot. at 2:9-14; Opp. at 3:9-11), Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s second payment on May 31, 2024 was late because it was 37 days after the JAMS had initially issued an invoice for Defendant’s initial filing fee.  

The Court does not agree that Defendant waived its right to arbitration. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97, “In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (a)(1).) “If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may do either of the following: [¶](1) Withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.97, subd. (b).)

“Importantly, the ‘due date’ that triggers the 30-day grace period is set by an invoice from the arbitration provider.” (Anoke v. Twitter, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 153, 158.) “In sum, a default occurs when the arbitration fees go unpaid for 31 days after ‘the due date’ [Citation] set by an arbitration provider’s ‘invoice.’ [Citation].” (Id. at 159.) As a result, when a second invoice is issued following an administrative error, the 30-day grace period is reset. (Ibid.)

Here, JAMS issued the first invoice on April 25, 2024, indicating the file would remain open until May 25, 2024; thus Defendant originally had until May 25, 2024 to pay the non-refundable $2,000 filing fee. (Satenberg Decl., ¶4, Ex. C.) On May 20, 2024, Defendant paid the invoice amount and received a payment receipt. (Id. at ¶5, Ex. E) Defendant thus timely paid the first invoice within the 30-day period.

JAMS, however, did not cash the payment.  Instead, on May 31, 2024, JAMS notified the parties of the returned payment, explaining that the billing department “received a returned payment notice of Respondents Filing Fee—the payment was marked ‘no account/unable to locate account.”  (Id. at ¶ 5, Ex. F.)  JAMS issued a new invoice dated May 28, 2024. (Id. at ¶5, Ex. G.)  Defendant again paid the invoice on May 31, 2024, just three days after the second invoice issued.) (Id., ¶6, Ex. H.)

In short, there was no untimeliness and thus no waiver.  Defendant timely paid the first invoice but because of an administrative error JAMS returned it.  JAMS also reset the time to pay by issuing its second invoice after the administrative error. Defendant paid that immediately.  The record here does not show any late payments.

Moreover, Plaintiff cites to no legal authority that suggests a returned payment constitutes a late-payment under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97. The Court concludes that Defendant did not waive its right to arbitration.