Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV16124, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV16124    Hearing Date: December 10, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

On September 30, 2024, Defendant Vista Del Pacifico Properties, LLC (“Defendant”) filed a motion to strike the request for exemplary (punitive) damages in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Jennifer Kleinschmidt (“Plaintiff”). 

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion.

Background

            Plaintiff’s complaint, filed June 27, 2024, alleges causes of action for (1) premises liability, (2) negligence, (3) breach of contract, and (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

            Plaintiff alleges that she was at home, recovering from surgery for a brain tumor, when her ceiling crashed without warning in on top of her.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6.)  Plaintiff alleges that she suffered physical and emotional injuries, and that she had to get rid of most of her belongings as they were broken or rendered useless by being coated with dust and detritus.  (Id. at ¶ 7.)  Plaintiff was forced from her home for more than a week for repairs.  (Id. at ¶ 8.)

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .”  (Civ. Code § 3294(a), emphasis added.) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) 

Here, Plaintiff requests “Exemplary damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, sufficient to punish Defendants and deter Defendants and other members of the public from engaging in such conduct in the future.”  (Complaint, p. 7.)  Defendant moves to strike this request.

Discussion

In order to state a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege facts that establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant has engaged in oppression, fraud or malice that constitutes despicable conduct. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 468, 482). Conclusory allegations that seek punitive damages are improper; rather a plaintiff must allege specific facts that meet the clear and convincing standard as set forth in California Civil Code section 3294. A plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, for example, that the defendant had the intent to inflict injury or destroy reputation. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042; G.D. Searle v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 28-29 (G.D. Searle).) 

General pleadings are not sufficient, but rather specific facts are required in order to support a claim for punitive damages. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-42). “When the plaintiff alleges an intentional wrong, a prayer for exemplary damage may be supported by pleading that the wrong was committed willfully or with a design to injure.” (G.D. Searle, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 29). 

“In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. [Citation omitted.]” (Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962-963, citing Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to state that defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences.  Specifically, she alleges that “even though the collapse came without immediate warning, it was absolutely foreseeable that its collapse could and would happen.  Months prior, Ms. Kleinschmidt brought to the building manager’s attention a crack that had been formed in the ceiling, and she expressed her concerns that the celling might be unsafe.  However, nothing at all was done in response to those concerns.”  (Complaint ¶ 9.)  These allegations makes the case similar enough to Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858 to allow the punitive damages claim to stand, at least at the pleading stage.

In Penner, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court order striking the punitive damages where the “pleadings sufficiently allege facts setting forth long existing physical conditions of the premises which portend dangers for the tenants.  The pleadings also set out that respondents knew of those conditions for up to two years, had power to make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures.”  (Id. at p. 867.) Defendants’ attempted distinctions of Penner are not persuasive in the context of this case.

For these reasons, the Court denies the motion.