Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV20098, Date: 2024-12-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV20098    Hearing Date: December 26, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant 111 W 7 Owner LLC moves for an order striking punitive damages from the Complaint filed on October 25, 2024 and set for hearing on December 26, 2024.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike. Defendant 111 W 7 owner LLC shall file its Answer to Complaint within 20 days of this order.

Background

            On  August 9, 2024, Plaintiffs Nina Gardner (“Gardner”) and Renee Bixby (“Bixby”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendant 111 W 7 Owner LLC (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (2) Negligence; (3) Nuisance; (4) Breach of Quiet Enjoyment; (5) Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code § 51; (6) Violations of the California Anti-Harassment Statute, cal. Civ. Code § 1940.2; and (7) Violations of the Los Angeles Anti-Harassment Statute, LAMC § 8.52.130 et seq.

            The Complaint alleges Plaintiffs entered into a rental agreement with Defendant to reside at the property located at 111 W 7^th Street, Apt 817, Los Angeles, CA, 90014 (“Subject Property”). (Compl., ¶1.) Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer from defective water pipes, plumbing issues, rats, roaches, and other insect infestation, mold, etc. at the Subject Property due to Defendant’s neglect. (Id. at ¶7.) Plaintiffs made complaints of these conditions to Defendant through its managers on several occasions, who failed to abate them. (Id. at ¶¶22-24.)

            On October 25, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike without demurrer. On December 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. On the same day, Defendant filed a Reply.

Legal Standard

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)¿¿

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)¿

Preliminary Issues

Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ opposition is untimely. This motion was initially noticed for hearing on December 19, 2024, thus Plaintiffs’ opposition was due on December 6, 2024. Plaintiffs’ did not file their opposition until December 12, 2024, the day the reply brief was due. As such, Plaintiffs’ opposition was untimely. Nevertheless, Defendant was able to reply to the substantive arguments of the opposition.

Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and rule on the merits below.

Discussion

            Meet and Confer

Prior to filing a motion to strike, moving party is required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video-conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5.)¿¿¿

Here, Defendant’s counsel attests to being unable to meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel prior to the filing of this motion due to lack of response from Plaintiffs’ counsel to her efforts. (Issagholi Decl., ¶2.) Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and rule on the merits below.

            Merits of Motion

Defendant moves for an order striking paragraphs 139, 151, 153, 163, and the prayer for punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead specific facts sufficient to support such claim. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the¿defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. Id. A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.¿)

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)¿¿“Fraud” is defined in section 3294(c)(3) as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”¿¿

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)

Here, the Complaint alleges Plaintiffs suffered from roach and rat bites, contamination of food and clothing, destruction of property, and damaged walls and flooring due to mold. (Compl., ¶¶59-62.) The Complaint also alleges Plaintiffs complained to Defendant’s property managers Summer Smith (“Ms. Smith”) and Michelle Langobardo (“Langobardo”) about the roach and rat infestation, wall and flooring mold damages, plumbing issues, electrical issues, etc. from February 2024 to the filing of the Complaint via texts, phone calls, in-person communication, voicemails, and emails. (Id. at ¶¶9, 10, 22-24.) The Complaint further alleges Defendant failed to abate these unhabitable conditions and continued to retain rent from Plaintiff despite notices from Housing Authority to correct these conditions. (Id. at ¶¶66-69.)

Based on these allegations, a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Smith and Ms. Langobardo are managing agents of Defendant because they are the property managers of the Subject Property owned by Defendant. Moreover, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted with willful and conscious disregard to the right and safety of Plaintiffs.  The Court considers this case close enough to Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858 to withstand a motion to strike punitive damages at the pleading stage.Therefore, the Court concludes that the Complaint alleges specific facts sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.