Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV22001, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV22001    Hearing Date: December 12, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs Victor Walker (“Walker”), Amber Ferraro (“Ferraro”), Andrew Ashton (“Ashton”), Edward Brizio (“Brizio”), Jessica O’Connor (“O’Connor”), Princess Pancubit (“Pancubit”), and Jerard Evans (“Evans”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) demur to the Answer filed by Defendant E & S Ring Management Corp. (“Defendant”) to Plaintiffs’ complaint.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the first, twelfth, eighteenth, and twentieth affirmative defenses without leave to amend.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth affirmative defenses with leave to amend.  Defendant may amend these affirmative defenses within 10 days.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the remaining affirmative defenses.

Background

This is a consumer protection case under the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”), Civil Code, sections 1786-1786.60. The ICRAA sets forth certain requirements that must be fulfilled by a party procuring an investigative consumer report (“ICR”) in connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit.

Plaintiffs were prospective tenants or residents at various properties owned by Defendant within the time range from 2022 through 2024.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated ICRAA in procuring ICRs on Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs filed this case on August 28, 2024, raising claims for (1) violation of ICRAA; (2) failure to provide receipt for tenant screening; and (3) declaratory relief.

On October 17, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer.

On October 31, 2024, Plaintiffs demurred to the Answer. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

A demurrer to an answer may be brought on one of three grounds: (1) the answer does not include facts sufficient to constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; and (3) the facts, as pleaded, are insufficient to determine whether an alleged contract in the answer is written or oral. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20. 

“The answer to a complaint shall contain: (1) [t]he general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant … [and] (2) [a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense.” (Code Civ. Proc., 431.30, subd. (b).)

Defenses should be relevant to a plaintiff’s legal claims and averred carefully, and with as much detail as the facts constituting the corresponding causes of action in the complaint.  FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384 (FPI Development). They should not be proffered in the form of “terse legal conclusions.” (Ibid.) “The defenses shall be separately stated, and the several defenses shall refer to the causes of action which they are intended to answer, in a manner by which they may be intelligibly distinguished.” (Code Civ. Proc., 431.30, subd. (g).)

“The phrase ‘new matter’ refers to something relied on by a defendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff.” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725.) “A plea controverting the original cause of action and tendering no new issue is a mere traverse and cannot be properly described as a plea setting up new matter.” (Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 543.)

“However, [n]o error or defect in a pleading is to be regarded unless it affects substantial rights …. The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case …, and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

Discussion

Meet and Confer

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to meet and confer prior to filing the demurrer.

“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

“If, upon review of a declaration under section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3), a court learns no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort.” (Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355, fn. 3.)

The Court does not determine that further conferences are necessary here.

Ripeness

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ demurrer is premature. On the contrary, “[a] party who has filed a complaint or cross-complaint may, within 10 days after service of the answer to his pleading, demur to the answer.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.40, subd. (b) [emphasis added].)

Merits

            In addition to a general denial, the Answer raises twenty affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs demur to each affirmative defense on the grounds of insufficient facts and uncertainty.

            Some of the affirmative defenses in the Answer are not, in fact, affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense is simply “Failure to State a Cause of Action” and contends that Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient facts to establish a cause of action in the Complaint. While many defendants include this as an “affirmative defense,” this is not new matter; this is a denial. The twelfth affirmative defense is “Lack of Injury” and simply denies that Plaintiffs suffered damages. The eighteenth defense simply denies that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for attorney’s fees. The twentieth affirmative defense, “Reservation of Rights”, simply states that Defendant reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses if they are applicable.

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to these affirmative defenses without leave to amend.

Some of the affirmative defenses in the Answer do not state any facts whatsoever. For example, the third defense, labeled “Comparative Fault”, merely denies that any damages Plaintiffs suffers were caused by Defendant. The fourth defense only alleges that “some or all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of waiver.”

Likewise, the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth affirmative defenses are also “terse legal conclusions” devoid of facts.

As such, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth affirmative defenses with leave to amend.

The remaining affirmative defenses are adequately pleaded to give Plaintiffs notice of the issues in the case. The Court overrules the demurrer as to the remaining defenses.