Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV24826, Date: 2025-01-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24826    Hearing Date: January 14, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs Glenda Anderson (“Anderson”) and Ranita Nichole Jackson (“Jackson”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for an order enjoining Defendants Deborah Elaine Holman (“Deborah”) and Jerrhonda Shewayn Holman (“Jerrhonda”) (collectively, “Defendants”) from harassing, evicting, assigning, transferring, disposing of, managing, or interfering with the management of the property located at 15413 S. Pannes Avenue, Compton, California 90221. (The Court uses the parties’ first names for the purposes of clarity only, and means no disrespect.)

The Court will discuss the following issues with the parties:

1.      What is the evidentiary significance of the rent check from Anderson to Deborah attached as Exhibit 2 to the Deborah Holman Declaration?

2.      As a matter of case management, should the Court rule on this motion today or at another appropriate time? Or should the issues raised in this motion be tried along with the other issues in the unlawful detainer action?

Background

This is a property dispute involving the property located at 15413 S. Pannes Avenue, Compton, California 90221 (the “Property”), where Anderson currently resides.

In 2007, Plaintiff Anderson acquired ownership of the Property. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 4.) In June, July, August, and September of 2023, Anderson fell behind on her mortgage payments, resulting in the mortgage company filing for foreclosure. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 4, see Complaint ¶ 9.)

At the time of the foreclosure notice, Anderson testifies that she was medically unwell and not of her correct senses, and her family persuaded her to give her daughter, Plaintiff Jackson, a power of attorney to handle her affairs as a result. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 5.) Anderson suffers from a number of medical disabilities and recently suffered a stroke. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 3.) Anderson also references attached medical records showing her disabilities, but these records do not appear to be attached to her declaration or the moving papers. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 3.)

On November 7, 2023, Anderson and Defendants attempted to enter into a number of agreements regarding the Property. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 6, see Complaint ¶ 10.) Anderson declares that Defendants promised to give her a loan of $9,036.06 to help stop the foreclosure and agreed to charge Anderson $600.00 per month to pay off the loan. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 6.) Anderson declares that she agreed to this arrangement. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants presented Anderson with two documents to sign, which Defendants represented to be short-term loan documents to take care of the mortgage, including a deed of trust. (Complaint ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that the document that Defendants represented to be a deed of trust was actually a grant deed transferring ownership of the Property to Defendants. (Complaint ¶ 11.)

Anderson declares that Defendants then recorded a quitclaim deed in their favor as to the Property, claiming that Plaintiff had transferred or sold the Property to them. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 7.) Anderson declares that this was not what she agreed to. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 8.) Anderson declares that the property had an equity value of about $300,000.00, and she would not have agreed to sell it for just $9,036.06. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 8.)

Defendants present a different version of the events on November 7, 2023. Deborah declares that Anderson stated that she wanted to be free of the Property and move to a senior citizen community and was not interested in a loan modification even though the lender had reached out to help her. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 3.) Deborah declares that she and Anderson agreed that Deborah would catch up the arrears of $9,036.06 and, in exchange, Anderson would deed the Property to Deborah and her daughter, Jerrhonda. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 3.) Deborah declares that Anderson knew that the documents that she signed were conveyance documents. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 4.) Deborah declares that Anderson drove herself to the escrow office where the transaction occurred and that an escrow officer explained the nature of the documents to Anderson. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 4.) Deborah declares that they had the documents notarized by two separate notaries. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 5.)

Deborah declares that she and Anderson were long-time friends and that Deborah had stayed with Anderson at the Property in the past. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 3.) Deborah declares that the plan was for her to move into the Property, and that she and Anderson agreed that Anderson would stay at the Property and pay $600.00 for rent. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 3.) Deborah declares that she and Anderson signed a lease agreement, but that she is unable to find it at this time. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 14.) Exhibit 2 to her declaration is a check made out to Deborah Hoffman for $600.00 with the memo stating “rent”. (Deborah Hoffman Decl., Ex. 2.) Deborah declares that on December 1, 2023, when Anderson started paying Deboah $600.00 monthly, Deborah started making the mortgage payments on the Property. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 7.) Deborah declares that she has spent roughly $20,000.00 renovating the Property. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 11.)

Anderson declares that she discovered the quitclaim deed while attempting to obtain a reverse mortgage on the Property. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 9.) Prior to this time, Anderson had consistently paid Defendants $600.00 per month. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 10.) Anderson declares that, as a result of this discovery, she stopped paying the monthly $600.00 to Defendants and resumed paying her mortgage payments directly to the mortgage company. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 11.) Anderson declares that two mortgage payments were received by the mortgage company in November, though she does not state the year. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 11.)

Deborah declares that she is not aware of any interest Jackson has in the Property and that Jackson was not on the title. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 13.) Deborah declares that Jackson threatened her when she learned of the agreement between Deborah and Anderson. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 13.) Deborah declares that she has not moved into the Property and has been homeless since November 2023. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 15.) Deborah declares that she has been paying approximately $750.00 per month to others who have allowed her to stay with them. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 15.) Deborah declares that there are other people who have moved into the Property without her consent. (Deborah Hoffman Decl. ¶ 15.)

Jerrhonda provides declaratory evidence that is substantially similar in content to that of Deborah. (See generally Jerrhonda Shewayne Holman Decl.)

Plaintiffs filed this action on September 25, 2024, raising claims for (1) fraud; (2) cancellation of instrument; (3) rescission; (4) unfair competition; (5) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); (6) violation of Civil Code, section 1632; (70 negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (8) financial elder abuse.

The Court takes judicial notice that on November 13, 2024, Defendants filed an unlawful detainer action against Anderson in related case Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24CMUD01850 (the “Unlawful Detainer Case”), seeking possession of the Property.

On December 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Legal Standard

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial; and (2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283.) “Substantively, before a court may issue a nonstatutory injunction as a provisional remedy for breach of contract, it must appear that monetary relief would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of damages.” (Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110.)

A court’s determination is guided by a “mix” of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Ibid.)

The court must consider both factors. The two factors are a sliding scale – the stronger the showing of probability of prevailing, the lesser showing is required for irreparable harm. (Butt v. California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678; The Right Side Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336 (reversing denial of preliminary injunction based solely on balancing of hardships without considering probability of prevailing). The plaintiff must make some showing of each factor. (Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459.) A court may not issue a preliminary injunction if the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail on the merits even if a strong showing of irreparable harm has been made. (Butt v. California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 677-78.)

Discussion

            Plaintiffs contend that Anderson is currently disabled as a result of her stroke and other medical conditions and will therefore suffer great prejudice if she is evicted from the Property. Plaintiffs contend that Anderson’s declaration demonstrates a reasonable probability of success on the merits.

            Defendants contend that Anderson validly conveyed the property to them, and that Plaintiffs will therefore lose on the merits. Defendants contend that Deborah has suffered and continues to suffer substantial hardship from being unable to move into the Property. Defendants contend that Anderson has fully recovered from her stroke, which they contend occurred in 2021. Defendants contend that Anderson is not incapacitated in any way.

            Defendants request that an undertaking be posted to protect Deborah from past and future harm in the amount of $18,000.00. Defendants base this figure on the declared monthly payments of $750.00 made by Deborah for approximately 24 months.

            Here, there is a pending eviction action to remove Anderson, and possibly others, from the Property. Deborah also declares that she has been homeless since November 2023 as a result of the transaction and Jackson’s alleged threats. There is potential for prejudice to either party in the event of an incorrect ruling.

            At the hearing, the Court will discuss the issues raised at the start of this order.