Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV25737, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV25737 Hearing Date: April 18, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
WESTERN FUNDING, INC., Plaintiff, v. ELLAS AUTO OUTLET INCORPORATED, et
al., Defendants. |
Case No:
24STCV25737 Hearing Date: April 18, 2025 Calendar Number: 17 |
Plaintiff Western Funding, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) seeks default
judgment against Defendants Ellas Auto Outlet Incorporated dba Ellas Auto
Outlet Inc ADBA Ellas Auto Outlet (“Ellas”) and Alyas Abady aka Alyas O Abady
(“Abady”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiff requests:
(1) money judgment in the amount of $43,127.70, consisting
of:
(a) damages in the amount of $36,718.00;
(b) prejudgment interest in the
amount of $4,382.62;
(c) costs in the amount of $535.54;
and
(d) attorney’s fees in the amount
of $1,491.54.
The Court tentatively grants the request for default
judgment with one change. The statutory 10 percent rate yields $2434.45 in
interest. The Court is prepared to award this amount in interest. If Plaintiff
wants to seek the 18 percent rate, the Court requests that Plaintiff explain
the basis for it.
On February 27, 2021, Plaintiff and Ellas entered into a
Master Dealer Agreement (the “Agreement”) wherein Plaintiff agreed to purchase
retail installment sales contracts for the financing of motor vehicles being
sold to Ellas’s customers. (Complaint, Ex. 1; see also Williams Decl. ¶ 4, Ex.
1.) Abady executed a personal guaranty of the Agreement. (Complaint, Ex. 2; see
also Williams Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2.)
Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff purchased contracts
from Ellas with a total outstanding sum of $36,718.00 after applying credits. (Williams
Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that the debt was due as of January 6,
2024 and has not been paid.
Plaintiff filed this action on October 3, 2024, raising
claims for (1) open book account; (2) account stated; (3) reasonable value; (4)
breach of contract (against Ellas); and (5) breach of guaranty (against Abady).
Default was entered against Defendants on January 22, 2025.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 585 permits entry of a
judgment after a Defendant has failed to timely answer after being properly
served. A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Form
CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and:
(1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons;
(2) A dismissal of
all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or
an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of
grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7));
(3) A declaration
of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100)
(CRC 3.1800(a)(5));
(4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1));
(5) Admissible
evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief
requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362);
(6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3));
(7) A memorandum of
costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4));
(8) A request for
attorney’s fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC
3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were
calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214. Where a request for attorney fees is based on
a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule
3.207); and
(9) A proposed form
of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6));
(10) Where an
application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay
money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC
3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the
original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the
copy instead (Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
1118, 1124);
(11) Where the
plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve
a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code
Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)).
(California Rules of Court, rule
3.1800.)
Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are
allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are “filing, motion, and jury
fees.”
A party who defaults only admits facts that are well-pleaded
in the complaint or cross-complaint. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the
requested relief.
According
to a proof of service filed on January 6, 2025, the Complaint and Summons,
inter alia, were mailed to Abady at 11771 Gatlemont Court, Woodford, Virginia
22192. The documents were mailed on November 1, 2024. Service was thus complete
on November 11, 2024, which is 10 days after mailing. (Code Civ. Proc., §
415.40.)
According
to a proof of service filed on January 6, 2025, the Complaint and Summons,
inter alia, were mailed to Ellas’s agent for service, Alyas Abady, at 6241
Jefferson Davis Highway, Woodford, Virginia 22580. The documents were mailed on
November 1, 2024. Rafael Munoz declares that the U.S. Post Office returned an
inaccurate return receipt that lacked a date of when the Defendant signed to
confirm receipt of service. (Munoz Decl. re Service, ¶ 4.) The Post Office’s
website indicates that delivery was completed on November 7, 2024. (Munoz Decl.
re Service, ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) The Court accepts these submission as proof of service
by mail.
The Doe defendants were dismissed from the action on April
10, 2025, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff has filed a form CIV-100 seeking default judgment.
Jakob S. Weitz avers to Defendant’s non-military status.
Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in the
Declaration of Daylene Williams. Plaintiff adequately pleads its causes of
action in the Complaint.
“Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of
a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.” (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, “a statement of damages cannot be relied
upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal
injury or wrongful death.” (Ibid.) “In all other cases, when recovering
damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages
specified in the complaint.” (Ibid.) Moreover, a plaintiff must submit admissible
evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief
requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.)
Plaintiff purchased contracts with a total outstanding sum
of $36,718.00 after applying credits. (Williams Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff provides
a Default Schedule which Daylene Williams declares accurately reflects the
current status of Defendants’ account. (Williams Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3.)
The
Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately evidenced its damages.
“(a) A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or
capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is
vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover
interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or
by the act of the creditor from paying the debt. This section is applicable to
recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any
county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public
agency, or any political subdivision of the state.
(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive
damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim was
unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry
of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier
than the date the action was filed.”
(Civ. Code, § 3287.)
“(a) Any legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract
remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before, until the contract is
superseded by a verdict or other new obligation.
(b) If a contract entered into after
January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation
shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach.”
(Civ. Code, § 3289.)
The Complaint requests interest on the unpaid loan amount. (Complaint
at 6:7-14.)
The amount of principal damages is certain because it is
laid out in the Default Schedule; pre-judgment interest is therefore
permissible here.
Jakob S. Weitz provides the interest computations his
declaration regarding interest. (Jun Decl. for Accrued Interest ¶ 3.) Plaintiff
computes interest at an 18 percent rate rather than the statutory 10 percent
rate. Plaintiff requests $4,382.62 in interest.
The statutory 10 percent rate yields $2434.45 in interest.
The Court is prepared to award this amount in interest. If Plaintiff wants to
seek the 18 percent rate, the Court requests that Plaintiff explain the basis
for it.
Plaintiff includes a memorandum of costs in the submitted
Form CIV-100. Jakob S. Weitz declares that Plaintiff expended $535.54 in costs.
Plaintiff
requests $1,491.54 in attorney’s fees.
This is an action on a contract. Because the judgment is
between $10,000.01 and $500,000, the maximum recovery of attorney’s fees is
equal to $690 plus 3% of the excess over $10,000. (Local Rule 3.214.)
The maximum attorney fee under the schedule is $1,564.57
(accounting for the adjusted interest). Plaintiff’s request is within this
amount.
Plaintiff
has submitted a proposed form of judgment.
California
Rule of Court 3.1806 states that “unless otherwise ordered” judgment upon a
written obligation to pay money requires a clerk’s note across the face of the
writing that there has been a judgment. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted the
original documents. The Court does not discern any practical need for such a
clerk’s note on the written obligation in the current case and therefore orders
that it need not be included. If this causes any issues for any party or
non-party, they are authorized to bring the matter to the Court’s
attention.
Plaintiff does not need to submit a statement of damages
because this is not a personal injury or wrongful death case.