Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV25813, Date: 2025-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV25813    Hearing Date: April 23, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Tetiana Krupovych (“Plaintiff”) seeks default judgment against Defendants Natalya Velikach (“Velikach”) and Monika Norashkharyan (“Nor”shkharyan”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

Plaintiff requests:

(1) money judgment in the amount of $84,701.00, consisting of:

(a) damages in the amount of $79,493.32;

(b) prejudgment interest in the amount of $4,264.87; and

(c) costs in the amount of $942.81.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for default judgment.

Background

This is a fraud case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defrauded her into relinquishing $89,500.00 from 2022 through 2023 by presenting her with false investment opportunities. Although the primary actor appears to have been Velikach, Plaintiff alleges that Norashkharyan is liable under a theory of conspiracy because the two Defendants engaged in a common plan to defraud Plaintiff and convert her assets.

On December 28, 2022, Velikach told Plaintiff that Velikach had a contact who was associated with the City of Los Angeles Housing Department (“LAHD”), which whom Velikach, Velikach’s family, and Velikach’s friends had already invested large sums of money. This contact later turned out to be Norashkharyan. Velikach told Plaintiff that the contact was highly credible and trustworthy.

Velikach told Plaintiff that the contact could secure a small number of luxury cars from a purported luxury car lotter administered by LAHD. Velikach stated that she had already invested in the program and insisted that Plaintiff invest as well. Velikach stated that Plaintiff would have to make an up-front investment of $20,000.00 to invest in the car lotter. On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff paid $20,000.00 to Velikach. Velikach told Plaintiff that she had remitted the money to her contact.

On January 5, 2023, Velikach told Plaintiff that one more car had become available through the luxury car program and requested an additional $20,000.00 from Plaintiff to obtain the additional car. On January 12, 2023, Plaintiff gave Velikach the additional $20,000.00.

On January 28, 2023, Velikach told Plaintiff that Velikach had the last car available through the lottery system and requested that Plaintiff provide her with an additional $8,000.00 to secure the opportunity. Plaintiff agreed to provide the additional $8,000.00. Plaitniff declares that Velikach asked that Plaintiff deliver the money directly to Norashkharyan and that Plaintiff did so (see Krupovych Decl. ¶ 12); however, this fact is only stated in Plaintiff’s declaration, and is not alleged in the Complaint. The Court therefore cannot treat this fact as admitted on default judgment.

On February 5, 2023, Velikach asked Plaintiff for $8,000.00 to participate in a purported rental assistance lottery whereby Plaintiff was to receive a heavily subsidized luxury apartment in Los Angeles, California. On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff provided Velikach with $8,000.00 to participate in the rental lottery.

On February 10, 2023, Velikach told Plaintiff about a new purported rental lottery with the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”). Velikach told Plaintiff that $100,000.00 was required to participate in the lottery. Plaintiff told Velikach that she did not have the means to participate. Velikach suggested that Plaintiff pay $35,000.00 and stated that Velikach and Velikach’s daughter would provide the remaining money. Velikach stated that, upon receiving the property from the purported lottery, the property would be sold and the proceeds would be divided three ways between Velikach, her daughter, and Plaintiff. Plaintiff borrowed $35,000.00 from an acquaintance, Vladlen Frolov, and gave the $35,000.00 to Velikach.

On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff received an email from “info@thehacla.org” about the alleged opportunity. The email address was from a different domain than HACLA’s website, hacla.org.

On March 6, 2023, Plaintiff told Velikach that she was becoming concerned with the lottery programs due to the fact that Plaintiff had not received any return in connection with the programs. Velikach told Plaintiff that the lottery programs were prone to moving forward slowly because they were being run by the government.

On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff asked Velikach if there had been any word from Norashkharyan. Velikach stated that the luxury cars from the lottery would be distributed on April 7, 2023.

Plaintiff continued to ask Velikach for information on the lotteries over the next several months. Velikach and Norashkharyan repeatedly stated that the lotteries had been delayed and that Plaintiff would receive information soon.

On May 4, 2023, Plaintiff told Velikach that she needed her money returned and that the purported lotteries appeared to be a scam.

On July 15, 2023, Plaintiff asked Velikach to relay to Norashkharyan that Plaintiff wanted Norashkharyan to return Plaintiff’s money. Velikach told Plaintiff that she had relayed the message and that Norashkharyan would call Plaintiff the next day.s

On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff and her daughter-in-law met with Norashkharyan at Norashkharyan’s house and asked about having Plaintiff’s money returned. Norashkharyan stated that the money would be returned soon, and that the car lottery had been delayed due to bad weather. Norashkharyan told Plaintiff that the car lottery was moving forward.

Between August 2023 and August 2024, Plaintiff communicated with both Velikach and Norashkharyan on a weekly and sometimes daily basis asking that the money to be returned. Whenever Plaintiff requested her money back, Norashkharyan would suddenly allegedly end up in the hospital or become unreachable due to her poor health.

Plaintiff alleges that the purported housing and luxury car lotteries never existed. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew that the programs did not exist and told her about the purported opportunities with the intent to induce her reliance.

In total, Plaintiff alleges that she gave $89,500.00 to Defendants. Plaintiff declares that she has now been repaid some of the money that she relinquished. (Krupovych Decl. ¶ 38.)

Plaintiff filed this action on December 6, 2024, raising claims for (1) fraud; (2) breach of contract; (3) money had and received; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) conversion; and (6) promissory estoppel.

Default was entered against Velikach on November 26, 2024.

Default was entered against Norashkharyan on January 22, 2025.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure, section 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant has failed to timely answer after being properly served. A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and:

(1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons;

(2) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7));

(3) A declaration of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100) (CRC 3.1800(a)(5));

(4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1));

(5) Admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362);

(6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3));

(7) A memorandum of costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4));

(8) A request for attorney’s fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC 3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214.  Where a request for attorney fees is based on a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule 3.207); and

(9) A proposed form of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6));

(10) Where an application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC 3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the copy instead (Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124);

(11) Where the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)).

(California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)

Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are “filing, motion, and jury fees.”

A party who defaults only admits facts that are well-pleaded in the complaint or cross-complaint. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the requested relief.

Discussion

Service of the Complaint and Summons

            According to the proof of service filed on October 16, 2024, Velikach was served on October 13, 2024 at her home at 5146 1/2 De Longpre Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90027 via substituted service on Christina Doe, a co-tenant.

            According to the proof of service filed on December 12, 2024, Norashkharyan was served on December 7, 2024 at her home at 6659 Greenbush Ave Van Nuys, California 91401 via substituted service on Kirakos Tosunyan, a co-tenant.

Dismissal of Other Parties

The Doe defendants were dismissed from the action on April 9, 2025, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.

Form CIV-100

Plaintiff has filed a form CIV-100 seeking default judgment.

Non-Military Status

Joshua Kluewer avers to Defendants’ non-military status.

Summary of the Case

Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in her Summary of the Case and her Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Default Judgment. Plaintiff adequately pleads her causes of action in the Complaint.

Evidence of Damages

“Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.”  (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, “a statement of damages cannot be relied upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal injury or wrongful death.” (Ibid.) “In all other cases, when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages specified in the complaint.” (Ibid.) Moreover, a plaintiff must submit admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.)

Plaintiff declares that she paid to Defendants the amounts alleged in the Complaint, which total $89,500.00. (Krupovych Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8, 12, 16, 17.)

            Plaintiff declares that she has received a total of $19,000.00 in repayments associated with this matter. (Krupovych Decl. ¶ 38.)

            As discussed below, Plaintiff’s attorney provides the interest computations. Because the repayments were made to Plaintiff while interest was accruing, portions of the payments were attributable to interest, leaving $79,493.32 in principal as of April 7, 2025. (Kluewer Decl. ¶ 4.)

            Plaintiff has adequately evidenced her damages.

Prejudgment Interest

“(a) A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.

(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.”

(Civ. Code, § 3287.)

“Since there is no relevant legislative act specifying a rate of prejudgment interest for a fraud claim, the constitutional 7 percent rate applies[.]” (Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 434.)

Plaintiff demands interest in the Complaint. (Complaint at 9:5-24.) The amount of principal damages is certain because it is the amount of money that Plaintiff gave to Defendants. Pre-judgment interest is therefore permissible here.

Plaintiff’s counsel provides a declaration of the interest accrual at a 7 percent rate, accounting for the payments made to Plaintiff. (Kluewer Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares that there remains $4,264.87 in interest. (Kluewer Decl. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff has adequately shown her interest.

Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements

Plaintiff includes a memorandum of costs in the submitted Form CIV-100. Joshua Kluewer avers that Plaintiff expended $942.81 in costs.

Attorney’s Fees

            Plaintiff does not seek attorney’s fees.

Proposed Form of Judgment

            Plaintiff has not submitted a proposed form of judgment.

Submission of the Written Agreement

            Plaintiff does not seek recovery based on a written agreement.

Statement of Damages

Plaintiff does not need to submit a statement of damages because this is not a personal injury or wrongful death case.