Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV26123, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV26123 Hearing Date: May 8, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
MELISSA MICHIE, Plaintiff, v. RIOPHARM USA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
24STCV26123 Hearing Date: May 8, 2025 Calendar Number: 10 |
Defendants Riopharm USA, Inc. (“Riopharm”) and Tammy Nguyen
(“Nguyen”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the third claim for gender
harassment in the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Melissa Michie (“Plaintiff”).
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer.
This is an employment case.
Plaintiff lived at an apartment building owned and managed
by Defendants. At the time, the building did not have an assigned manager.
Because Plaintiff had experience in management, she would coordinate with
Defendant’s corporate office in order to ensure that security, maintenance,
cleaning, and upkeep responsibilities, which had been neglected, were carried
out.
On October 13, 2021, Nguyen sent an email to Plaintiff
thanking her for her help running the apartment complex. Nguyen told Plaintiff
about a job opening for a building manager at another apartment complex owned
by Riopharm and asked Plaintiff to send her resume.
Plaintiff thereafter submitted her resume to Defendants.
On October 18, 2021, Nguyen told Plaintiff that Nguyen’s
boss had told Nguyen to let Plaintiff know that Plaintiff’s resume was
impressive, but that he would keep the resume in the file for the future.
Nguyen told Plaintiff that Defendants would contact Plaintiff if they needed a
female manager, but that Nguyen’s boss was looking for a male manager who could
do general repair too.
Plaintiff filed this action on October 8, 2024, raising
claims for (1) discrimination on the basis of gender; (2) discrimination on the
basis of gender – refusal to hire; (3) harassment on the basis of gender; and
(4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
On March 7, 2025, Defendants demurred to the Complaint.
Plaintiff filed an opposition. Defendants did not file a reply.
To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work
environment, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a
protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on [plaintiff’s] protected status; (4) the harassment
unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff’s] work performance by creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are
liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital
Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.)
“[T]he adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on
whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, ‘the plaintiff need
not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the
harassment.’ It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the
discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so
altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’ ” (Harris
v. Forklift Sys. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 25, conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.; see
Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (a) [endorsing this language as reflective of
California law].) A single incident of harassment may be enough to constitute a
hostile work environment if it “unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s
work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.” (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (b).)¿The court shall use the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether there exists a hostile work
environment. (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)¿
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for harassment because she was
never employed by Defendants.
“It
is an unlawful employment practice …. (j)(1) [f]or an employer … because of …
sex, gender, gender identity, [or] gender expression … to harass an employee, an
applicant, an unpaid intern or volunteer, or a person providing
services pursuant to a contract.” (Gov. Code, § 12940 [emphasis added].)
Plaintiff
applied for a job at Riopharm and was therefore an applicant. Because Plaintiff
provided services for free in helping manage the building where she lived, it
is likely that Plaintiff was also a volunteer.
Thus,
the fact that Defendants did not employ Plaintiff is not a basis to sustain the
demurrer.
The
Court overrules the demurrer.