Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV26283, Date: 2025-05-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV26283    Hearing Date: May 27, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Downtown LA Law Group LLP (“Downtown”) moves for leave to intervene in the instant action.

The Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. 

Background

            On October 9, 2024, Petitioner Law Offices of Ramin R. Younessi, a Professional Law Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed an action for declaratory relief against Respondent Chanda Kellogg (“Respondent”) and Does 1 through 20.  Petitioner seeks to establish entitlement to a lien, in the amount of $125,652.69, in connection with legal representation in an earlier matter. 

Petitioner alleges that it provided legal services to Respondent in a wrongful termination lawsuit against her former employer between July 1, 2018, and November 3, 2021.  Respondent replaced Downtown, which was the prior counsel for Respondent in that wrongful termination lawsuit. The lawsuit settled on May 26, 2023.  Petitioner seeks the reasonable value of its services, as well as reimbursement of any advanced costs.

            On April 17, 2025, Downtown filed this Motion for Leave to Intervene (“Motion”).  Petitioner filed an Opposition on May 13, 2025.  No reply has been filed.

            On May 20, 2025, default was entered against Respondent Kellogg.

Legal Standard

            “A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application.  The petition shall include a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention rests.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (c).)

“The court shall… permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied:

A.    A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene.

B.     The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”

(Id. at § 387, subd. (d)(1).)  Additionally, a nonparty may intervene if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.¿  (Id. at § 387, subd. (d)(2).)

            The nonparty is deemed an intervenor by “(1) [j]oining a plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, (2) [u]niting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff, [or] (3) [d]emanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant.”  (Id. at § 387, subd. (b).)

“The trial court has the discretion to allow intervention where the proper procedures are followed, provided: (1) the intervenor has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation, (2) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the case, and (3) the reasons for intervention outweigh opposition by the existing parties.”¿  (Hinton v. Beck (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382-83.)  “A person has a direct interest justifying intervention in litigation where the judgment in the action of itself adds or detracts from his legal rights without reference to rights and duties not involved in the litigation.”¿ (Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 543, 549.)

Discussion

            Downtown moves for leave to intervene in this action on the grounds that it has an interest in the matter and is so situated that the disposition of the instant action may impair or impede its ability to protect that interest, and that interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.  (Motion, p. 1.)  Downtown argues that it has an attorney’s fees interest in the funds against which Petitioner is asserting a lien.  (Id. at p. 2.)  Even if judgment is obtained against Respondent, the relative interests of Petitioner and Downtown will not be adjudicated without Downtown’s intervention.  (Id. at pp. 2-3.)

            Petitioner opposes the Motion on the following grounds.  First, Downtown has not complied with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 387.  Downtown is not attempting to intervene by joining the Petitioner in its claim, as it has collected its own attorney’s fees, or uniting with Respondent in resisting the claim for declaratory relief.  (Opposition, p. 3.)  Furthermore, it is not asserting any arguments as to why it may have a claim adverse to either Petitioner or Respondent.  (Id. at p. 3.)  Second, Downtown has failed to file a copy of the proposed complaint or answer, as required by section 387.  (Id. at p. 4.)  Third, the Motion fails to explain how the instant action may impair or impede Downtown’s ability to protect its interest.  (Id. at pp. 4-5.)  Downtown is in possession of the funds in question, held in a client trust account, and thus, it is “adequately situated to protect its own interest in the funds it controls.”  (Ibid.)  The Motion does not specify any other reasons why this interest may be impaired or impeded.  (Ibid.)  Fourth, Downtown has failed to comply with the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1112, as the Motion is accompanied by a very brief memorandum of points and authorities that does not cite to any evidence and merely recites some of the applicable law.

            The Court agrees with the opposition.  The Motion is deficient for various reasons.  The brief memorandum of points and authorities does not present sufficient reasons to demonstrate that Downtown is entitled to intervene in the instant action.  Downtown merely recites parts of section 387 without presenting any factual evidence or reasoning for the relief sought.  Moreover, Downtown has not filed a proposed complaint or answer in intervention, as required by section 387.

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion without prejudice.