Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV26428, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV26428 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
TERELLE SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, ST. MARY MEDICAL
CENTER, Defendant. |
Case No:
24STCV26428 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Calendar Number: 5 |
Defendants Dignity Health (“Dignity”) and St. Mary Medical
Center (“St. Mary”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (Dignity and St. Mary were
named as one single defendant, but demur as two separate defendants) demur to
the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Terelle Scott (“Plaintiff”). Defendants
separately move to strike portions of the Complaint relating to Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall amend within 20 days.
The Court DENIES the motion to strike as MOOT.
This is a battery case. The following facts are taken from
the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the
purposes of the demurrer.
Plaintiff was a patient at Defendants’ medical center.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants and their security personnel negligently
failed to inform Plaintiff of the presence of visitors who had come to see him.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, assailants were allowed to approach
Plaintiff and batter him in the head, causing injuries. Plaintiff appears to
allege that Defendants took part in this battery.
Plaintiff filed this action on October 10, 2024, raising
claims for (1) battery; (2) assault; (3) false imprisonment; (4) negligence;
and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
On March 24, 2025, Defendants filed this demurrer and motion
to strike. Plaintiff filed an opposition to each. Defendants filed a reply in
support of each.
“The essential elements of a cause of action for battery
are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with
the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the
touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4)
a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the
touching.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212
Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)
Plaintiff alleges no facts showing how Defendants acted to
batter Plaintiff. It appears that Plaintiff is alleging that other assailants
who entered the health facility battered him. In any event, the Complaint is
too factually sparse to support a battery claim.
Plaintiff generally argues in his opposition that Defendants
rely on an unsigned paper and extrinsic matters in the demurrer. It is not
clear what Plaintiff is referring to.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to
amend.
“The essential elements of a cause of action for assault
are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or
threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff
reasonably believed [he or] she was about to be touched in a harmful or
offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was
about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s
conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.” (So
v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)
This claim solely relies on the same incorporated facts as
the battery claim, and therefore suffers from the same deficiencies.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to
amend.
“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are:
(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful
privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” (Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants struck and grabbed
Plaintiff and thus confined him through force or threat of force. It is again
not clear what exactly Plaintiff is alleging happened. It is not clear who
attacked Plaintiff or where he was confined, nor is it clear what factual role
Defendants had in these events.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to
amend.
In order to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must
allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach
of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to inform him of
visitors that had come to see him, allowing assailants to approach and batter
Plaintiff without security intervention. This claim is the most factually clear
of Plaintiff’s claims, but is still primarily conclusory. Plaintiff must allege
facts showing the existence of a duty to warn or protect him, breach of that
duty, and causation. These facts may be ultimate facts, but they must be more
than legal conclusions.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to
amend.
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson
v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.) “Whether
a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of
law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may
differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact,
outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)
As with the rest of Plaintiff’s claims, it is not clear what
conduct is alleged giving rise to this claim. In his opposition, Plaintiff
makes references to a surgery and argues that Defendants had a duty to disclose
facts material to Plaintiff’s surgery. No surgery or other operation is alleged
in the Complaint. No type of medical malpractice is alleged in the Complaint.
It is not clear what Plaintiff is referring to.
The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to
amend.
The Court denies the motion to strike as moot.