Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV30996, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV30996    Hearing Date: April 7, 2025    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

 

DEPARTMENT 72

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

FRENCH FABRIC, INC.,

 

                                  Plaintiff,

 

         v.

 

 

VA VA VOOM,

 

                                  Defendant.

 

 Case No:  24STCV30996

 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  April 7, 2025

 Calendar Number:  8

 

 

 

Plaintiff French Fabric, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) seeks default judgment against Defendant Va Va Voom (“Defendant”).

 

Plaintiff requests:

 

(1) money judgment in the amount of $, consisting of:

 

(a)   general damages in the amount of $196,811.80;

 

(b)  special damages in the amount of $39,000.00;

 

(c) prejudgment interest in the amount of $51,062.24; and

 

(d) costs in the amount of $540.00.

 

The Court grants default judgment as requested. However, if Plaintiff wishes to seek attorney’s fees, it must do so on default judgment, and not afterwards.

 

Background

 

This is a contract case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, except where otherwise noted.

 

In 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an ongoing contractual relationship whereby Defendant regularly bought textile products from Plaintiff. Plaintiff periodically issued invoices and statements for owed amounts to Defendant.

 

Defendant failed to make a significant number of payments on the owed amounts. Additionally, Defendant issued 26 checks payable to Plaintiff which were returned by Defendant’s financial institution due to insufficient funds. Plaintiff demanded the amounts owed on the invoices. Plaintiff additionally made a written demand on Defendant for payment of the amounts in the bounced checks. Plaintiff alleges that these amounts remain unpaid.

 

Plaintiff filed this action on November 25, 2024, raising claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) open book account; (3) account stated; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) money due on dishonored checks under Civil Code, sections 1719 and 3302; and (6) fraud.

 

Default was entered against Defendant on January 29, 2025.

 

Legal Standard

 

Code of Civil Procedure, section 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant has failed to timely answer after being properly served. A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and:

 

(1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons;

(2) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7));

(3) A declaration of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100) (CRC 3.1800(a)(5));

(4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1));

(5) Admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362);

(6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3));

(7) A memorandum of costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4));

(8) A request for attorney’s fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC 3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214.  Where a request for attorney fees is based on a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule 3.207); and

(9) A proposed form of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6));

(10) Where an application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC 3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the copy instead (Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124);

(11) Where the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)).

 

 

(California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)

 

Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are “filing, motion, and jury fees.”

 

A party who defaults only admits facts that are well-pleaded in the complaint or cross-complaint. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the requested relief.

             

 

Discussion

 

Service of the Complaint and Summons

 

            According to the proof of service filed on January 21, 2025, Defendant’s agenet for service of process, Judith Martinez, was served on November 29, 2024 at 741 East 12th Street, Los Angeles, California 90015 via substitute service on an employee authorized to accept documents.

 

 

Dismissal of Other Parties

 

The Doe defendants were dismissed from the action on March 12, 2025, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.

 

 

Form CIV-100

 

Plaintiff has filed a form CIV-100 seeking default judgment.

 

 

Non-Military Status

 

Sassan Masserat avers to Defendant’s non-military status.

 

 

Summary of the Case

 

Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in the Declaration of Gavriel Sfaee.

 

Plaintiff adequately pleads its causes of action in the Complaint, with the exception of the fraud claim.

 

“The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

 

The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) “[Fraud’s] particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ [Citation.]” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.) “Less specificity is required when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.” (Wald v. TruSpeed Motorcars, LLC (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 378, 394 [quotation marks omitted].)

 

To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged the ‘where, when, and to whom’ of the fraud in question, nor has it alleged the persons making the representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.

 

 

Evidence of Damages

 

“Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.”  (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, “a statement of damages cannot be relied upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal injury or wrongful death.” (Ibid.) “In all other cases, when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages specified in the complaint.” (Ibid.) Moreover, a plaintiff must submit admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.)

 

Plaintiff’s CFO Gavriel Sfaee declares that Defendant owes Plaintiff an outstanding amount of $196,811.80 and provides a compendium of the statements that Plaintiff issued to Defendant. (Sfaee Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately evidenced its principal damages.

 

Sfaee declares that Plaintiff issued 26 checks payable to Plaintiff which were returned for insufficient funds and attaches a compendium of the checks. (Sfaee Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.)

 

            Civil Code, section 1719 provides for the recovery of treble damages of $100 to $1,500 per check returned for insufficient funds. (Civ. Code, § 1719, subd. (a)(2).) The recipient of the check must first make a written demand for payment of the amount of the check and service charges and provide the defendant with at least 30 days to pay the amount of the check, the amount of the service charges, and the cost to mail the demand. (Civ. Code, § 1719, subd. (a)(2).)

 

            Plaintiff seeks the maximum penalty of $1,500 per returned check, in the total amount of $39,000. The Court awards this amount.

 

Because Plaintiff does not seek punitive damages on default judgment, and only seeks to recover the actual damages plus the penalties under its claim for bounced checks, it does not appear that the failure of the fraud claim affects Plaintiff’s damages. The Court is thus prepared to enter default judgment in the amount requested.

 

 

Prejudgment Interest

 

The Complaint requests interest on the general damages. (Complaint at 10:22-26.) The amount of principal damages is certain because it is laid out in the Agreement and Statement of Account; pre-judgment interest is therefore permissible here.

 

Plaintiff’s counsel Sassan Masserat provides Plaintiff’s interest calculations, demonstrating that Plaintiff is entitled to $51,062.24 in interest. (Masserat Decl. ¶ 7, fn. 2.)

 

 

Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements

 

Plaintiff includes a memorandum of costs in the submitted Form CIV-100, averring that it expended $507.79 in costs.

 

 

Attorney’s Fees

 

            Plaintiff does not seek attorney’s fees in its application for default judgment. However, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that “[t]he Statements and Invoices attached to the Complaint provide for recovery of legal fees incurred in litigation or collection efforts, such fees will be sought after issuance of judgment.” (Masserat Decl. ¶ 7, fn. 1.)

 

            If Plaintiff intends to seek attorney’s fees on default judgment, it must do so in its application for default judgment. Local Rule 3.214 provides for the default schedule for attorney’s fees on default judgment. The Court is prepared to grant the judgment as requested in the Form CIV-100, or is willing to continue the hearing so that Plaintiff may resubmit its Form CIV-100 to request attorney’s fees consistent with Local Rule 3.214.

 

 

Proposed Form of Judgment

 

            Plaintiff has submitted a proposed form of judgment.

 

 

Submission of the Written Agreement

 

            California Rule of Court 3.1806 states that “unless otherwise ordered” judgment upon a written obligation to pay money requires a clerk’s note across the face of the writing that there has been a judgment. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted the original documents. The Court does not discern any practical need for such a clerk’s note on the written obligation in the current case and therefore orders that it need not be included. If this causes any issues for any party or non-party, they are authorized to bring the matter to the Court’s attention. 

 

 

Statement of Damages

 

Plaintiff does not need to submit a statement of damages because this is not a personal injury or wrongful death case.