Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV31145, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV31145    Hearing Date: April 17, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Sierra Health Foundation (“Sierra”) and Sierra Health Foundation Center for Health Program Management (“CHPM”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for an order compelling Plaintiff Emily Chaphalkar (“Plaintiff”) to arbitrate her claims against Defendants and staying this action pending arbitration.

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend her Complaint.

The Court GRANTS the motion for leave to amend.  Plaintiff shall file the amended complaint within the next 5 days.

With respect to the motion to compel arbitration, the Court requests argument on the following question:  Are the allegations in the amended complaint a “sexual harassment dispute” within the meaning of the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA)? 

Background

This is an employment case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint.

Plaintiff has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, chronic migraines high blood pressure, hypertension, and Irritable Bowel Syndrome (“IBS”).

On June 1, 2022, Defendants hired Plaintiff as the Managing Director of Compliance & Contracts.

In August 2022, Plaintiff began suffering from stress and anxiety and notified several corporate officers and managing agents. Plaintiff notified Defendants’ Human Resources Department that she was suffering from depression and anxiety and that it was impacting her ability to perform her job duties. Plaintiff continued to notify Defendant about her worsening conditions throughout her employment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants never offered accommodation.

In January 2023, Plaintiff began to raise concerns to Defendants’ corporate officers, directors, and managing agents about what she believed to be lack of compliance with governing law regarding the operation of nonprofit organizations. Plaintiff alleges that her concerns were dismissed.

In May 2023, Defendants allegedly began unjustifiably reprimanding Plaintiff.

On September 15, 2023, Plaintiff’s primary care provider (“PCP”) instructed her to be placed off work for several days due to her medical conditions. Plaintiff informed one of Defendant’s managing agents on the same day that she was instructed to take time off work. That same day, Plaintiff was issued a warning memo from HR which allegedly falsely characterized Plaintiff’s interactions with her colleagues and listed numerous alleged complaints about Plaintiff that occurred eight months prior. Plaintiff alleges that she was never informed of the alleged complaints at a prior time.

Plaintiff’s PCP subsequently placed her on work restrictions in the form of intermittent leave from September 18, 2023 through March 18, 2024. On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff requested such intermittent leave from Defendant.

On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff returned to work and met with the HR Director. Plaintiff informed Defendants that she was undergoing treatment for depression, anxiety, and chronic migraines. Plaintiff requested accommodations for her disabilities.

On November 29, 2024, Plaintiff emailed the HR Director a request for intermittent medical leave, beginning retroactively on November 6, 2023 through May 5, 2024.

On December 14, 2023, while Plaintiff was on medical leave, Defendants informed Plaintiff that she was being terminated during a Zoom meeting with the HR Director and with one of Defendants’ managing agents.

Plaintiff filed this action on November 25, 2024, raising claims for (1) disability discrimination; (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (5) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process; (6) violation of California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (7) retaliation in violation of CFRA; (8) declaratory judgment; (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (10) retaliation in violation of Labor Code, section 1102.5.

On March 17, 2025, Defendants moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend. Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Leave to Amend

A complainant may obtain leave from the trial court to amend their pleading beyond the number of amendments allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 472 (a) by filing a noticed motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324.) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier.¿(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 (b).)

“Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) In the absence of a showing of prejudice from the opposing side, the trial court ordinarily lacks discretion to deny a motion to amend a pleading. (Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.)

Arbitration

 Under both the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)

The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)

“A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “With respect to the moving party's burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court. Once such a document is presented to the court, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to compel, who may present any challenges to the enforcement of the agreement and evidence in support of those challenges.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160 [internal citations omitted].)      

Leave to Amend

New Allegations

Plaintiff seeks to add causes of action for (1) sex-gender discrimination in violation of FEHA; and (2) sex-gender harassment in violation of FEHA against additional individual Defendant Chet P. Hewitt (“Hewitt”) and the corporate entities. Plaintiff seeks to conform the discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination claims to include these protected characteristics.

The allegations Plaintiff seeks to add primarily pertain to Hewitt. In October 2022, Hewitt allegedly coached Plaintiff that she needed to be mindful of her tone in the workplace, which Plaintiff contends occurred because Plaintiff, as a woman, asserted authority in the workplace. In February or March of 2023, Plaintiff was recommended for a committee placement, but Hewitt rejected the recommendation, allegedly because Plaintiff was a woman who, at times, vocalized her disagreement with him. Furthermore, in April or May of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt removed Plaintiff from the supervision of the CFO, a woman, and placed Plaintiff under his own supervision in order to stop the two women from carrying out their fiduciary obligations. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt had a tendency to assert his dominance against women such as Plaintiff who questioned his decisions or authority. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt subjected Plaintiff, the CFO, and other women to bullying, humiliation, degradation, and condescension. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt did not treat male employees in this manner. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unjustifiably reprimanded her with a warning memo accusing her of insubordination for taking actions without Hewitt’s approval. Plaintiff alleges that similar actions taken by male employees, without prior approval, were regarding by Hewitt as taking initiative, and not as insubordination.

Harassment

To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [plaintiff’s] protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff’s] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.) 

“[T]he adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance. To show such interference, ‘the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment.’ It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job.’ ” (Harris v. Forklift Sys. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 25, conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.; see Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (a) [endorsing this language as reflective of California law].) A single incident of harassment may be enough to constitute a hostile work environment if it “unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (b).)¿The court shall use the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there exists a hostile work environment. (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)¿

Plaintiff has adequately alleged unwelcome harassment that made it more difficult to do her job. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt would bully, humiliate, and degrade Plaintiff and other women when they asserted authority or contradicted him. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt coached her for using improper tone on the basis of her gender when Plaintiff asserted authority. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt did not treat male employees in this manner. Further, these actions, as alleged, would support an inference that they were taken for the particular purpose of interfering with Plaintiff’s job as a compliance officer, as Plaintiff has alleged broad actions by Hewitt to prevent Plaintiff and the CFO from properly ensuring compliance with nonprofit law.

Discrimination

To establish a claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must show “that (1) [the plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) [the plaintiff] was qualified for the position [they] sought or was performing competently in the position [they] held, (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

Plaintiff has alleged in the proposed FAC that she was subjected to discipline for actions which were praised in her male coworkers. Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt, who allegedly had a pattern of bullying female coworkers, transferred her from under the female CFO to under Hewitt in order to stop Plaintiff from working effectively with the CFO. Plaintiff has thus alleged at least two adverse actions that a reasonable fact finder could determine were based on her gender.

Timeliness

Plaintiff filed this action on November 25, 2024. In February, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel met with client Beatrix Koev (“Koev”), a client of the firm and a former colleague of Plaintiff. (Panosian Decl. ¶ 4.) After speaking to Koev and filing a complaint on Koev’s behalf, Plaintiff’s counsel learned of alleged facts that both Koev and Plaintiff had experienced hostile work environment sexual harassment while working for Defendant. (Panosian Decl. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff timely sought leave to amend less than four months after filing this action. Although Defendants contend that this was an unreasonable delay, the Court disagrees. This case is in its infancy and Defendants have not conducted any discovery. The prejudice to Defendants of amendment at this stage is thus minimal.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff asserts the new claims in bad faith to avoid arbitration under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault Act (“EFAA”). But Defendant provides no evidence of bad faith other than the four-month delay, nor does Defendant provide authority indicating that mere delay is sufficient basis to prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims that they are otherwise legally entitled to assert.

            The Court therefore grants the motion for leave to amend.

Arbitration

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault Act (“EFAA”) states as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute … no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C., § 402, subd. (a).) 

“An issue as to whether this chapter applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator … irrespective of whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator.” (9 U.S.C., § 402, subd. (b).)

The Court has granted leave to amend.  However, neither party has specifically pointed the Court to law that claims of harassment of the sort at issue here are (or are not) claims for “sexual harassment” within the meaning of the EFAA.  Defendant does not appear to dispute that it is, but does not squarely address the issue.  The Court therefore requests argument on the subject to ensure that it is properly enforcing the EFAA.