Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV31983, Date: 2025-05-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV31983    Hearing Date: May 13, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Oriane Livingston (“Livingston”) moves to seal her declaration and certain exhibits. Plaintiff Galib Datta (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.

The Court orders Livingston to meet and confer with Plaintiff in good faith in order to determine whether Plaintiff’s stipulated protective order would resolve Livingston’s concerns. Within 30 days of the issuance of this order, Livingston and Plaintiff’s counsel shall meet and confer by telephone for either 1 hour or the amount of time it takes to reach an agreement between the parties, whichever is less.

 The Court continues this motion, and Plaintiff’s related motion for a protective order currently calendared for May 20, 2025, to June 17, 2022 at 8:30 a.m..

Background

This is a legal malpractice and breach of contract case.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Margarette Marr (“Marr”); Maggie Marr Legal, P.C. (“Marr Legal”); and Livingston (collectively, the “Attorney Defendants”) represented him in a secured transaction and failed to perfect Plaintiff’s security, resulting in loss to Plaintiff when the counterparty entered bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Andrew Chung (“Chung”) helped facilitated the transaction.

Plaintiff alleges that he and Livingston entered a contract whereby the two of them would produce a movie. Plaintiff alleges that Livingston breached the contract by failing to complete certain required actions, including hiring certain personnel for the production.

Livingston alleges in her cross-complaint that Plaintiff breached the contract by refusing to negotiate her compensation under the contract and by sabotaging the project.

Plaintiff filed this action on December 4, 2024, raising claims for (1) professional negligence (against the Attorney Defendants”); (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) negligent misrepresentation (against Chung); (4) declaratory relief (against Livingston); and (5) breach of contract (against Livingston).

On April 1, 2025, Livingston answered and filed a cross-complaint, raising claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) fraud; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (6) declaratory relief; and (7) injunctive relief.

On April 24, 2025, Livingston filed this motion to seal. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Livingston filed a reply.

Legal Standard

“The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish:

(1)  There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;

       (2)  The overriding interest supports sealing the record;

(3)  A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;

       (4)  The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and

       (5)  No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.”

(California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)

            “An order sealing the record must:

                   (A)  Specifically state the facts that support the findings; and

(B)  Direct the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of each document or page must be included in the public file.”

(California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(e)(1).)

“(1)  If the court grants an order sealing a record and if the sealed record is in paper format, the clerk must substitute on the envelope or container for the label required by (d)(2) a label prominently stating “SEALED BY ORDER OF THE COURT ON (DATE),” and must replace the cover sheet required by (d)(3) with a filed-endorsed copy of the court's order. If the sealed record is in electronic form, the clerk must file the court's order, maintain the record ordered sealed in a secure manner, and clearly identify the record as sealed by court order on a specified date.

(2)  The order must state whether-in addition to the sealed records-the order itself, the register of actions, any other court records, or any other records relating to the case are to be sealed.

(3)  The order must state whether any person other than the court is authorized to inspect the sealed record.

(4)  Unless the sealing order provides otherwise, it prohibits the parties from disclosing the contents of any materials that have been sealed in anything that is subsequently publicly filed.”

(California Rules of Court, rule 2.551(e).)

Discussion

There are a number of issues with the motion to seal. The Court discusses them below.

Timeliness

A motion to seal a record must be served on all parties that have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(2).) “Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

Livingston filed this motion on April 24, 2025, to be heard on May 13, 2025. The motion was filed less than 16 court days before the hearing and is therefore not timely.

Provision of Public Redacted Version

“Unless the court orders otherwise, any party that already has access to the records to be placed under seal must be served with a complete, unredacted version of all papers as well as a redacted version. Other parties must be served with only the public redacted version.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(2).)

            The party seeking to seal records must provide, in the sealing motion itself, “a specific enumeration of the facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them.” (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.)

Here, Livingston did not serve Plaintiff with redacted copies of the records that she seeks to seal. Livingston stated in her initial notice of lodging that Exhibits A, B, G, and E, which she seeks to seal, have been lodged with the Court under seal and have not been served. Livingston filed an amended notice of lodging which includes placeholders for the exhibits – with the entirety of the exhibits themselves redacted.

This is insufficient. Plaintiff must be able to understand the general nature of what is being withheld in order to be able to litigate the motion to seal. Livingston need not disclose the facts that she contends are confidential, but must at least leave the non-sensitive portions of the exhibits unredacted.

Merits of the Motion

            The moving party must show an overriding interest that supports sealing the records in question. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)

Livingston’s motion does not explain the overriding interest that she believes supports sealing. Livingston states that the motion is an attempt to protect her safety, identity, and livelihood, without further elaboration in the motion. (Motion at p. 2.)

The materials which Livingston seeks to seal include a declaration by Livingston, as well as several exhibits. These items, particularly Plaintiff’s declaration, cover an extremely broad array of topics. For many of these topics, it is not clear why the subject matter is legally relevant to the outcome of this litigation. Plaintiff’s motion does not differentiate between the many facts included in her declaration and exhibits, and because Plaintiff redacts their entirety, the contents of the redactions provide little indication of the reasoning either.

            For some of the facts and papers Livingston submits, there appears to be a valid overriding interest that could support sealing. However, without the proper procedure being followed (and without Plaintiff raising any direct arguments about them), the Court is not prepared to grant the motion on this basis.

Further, for most of the most arguably sensitive information, it is not clear why that information needs to be introduced into this litigation at all. The most sensitive information largely does not pertain to Livingston’s interactions with Plaintiff, but rather Livingston’s prior interactions with unrelated parties who are not a part of this litigation. The reasons for Livingston to bring that information into this case in the first place are not clear.

This is also true more broadly – the vast majority of the facts in Livingston’s declaration appear to have no connection to this litigation, and rather relate to events from Livingston’s childhood and the history of her career. Without making any determination on whether the facts that Livingston submits are legally relevant to any claim or defense in this action, the Court notes that, if the facts do not affect the outcome of a claim or defense, Livingston’s best remedy may simply be not to disclose them.

            Plaintiff has proposed a stipulated protective order that may resolve some or all of Plaintiff’s concerns. (Richards Decl., Ex. A.) The proposed stipulated protective order provides several levels of confidentiality that a designating party can apply to any documents or testimony that they have a good faith basis to believe are entitled to confidential treatment under applicable law.

The Court orders Livingston to meet and confer with Plaintiff in good faith in order to determine whether Plaintiff’s stipulated protective order would resolve Livingston’s concerns. While Livingston has stated she does not wish to conduct real time meet and confers with Plaintiff’s counsel, she must do so on this highly technical  and easily-resolved issue of the sealing of documents.

Within 30 days of the issuance of this order, Livingston and Plaintiff’s counsel shall meet and confer by telephone for either 1 hour or the amount of time it takes to reach an agreement between the parties, whichever is less. The Court continues this motion, and Plaintiff’s related motion for a protective order, so that the parties can meet and confer.