Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV34265, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV34265    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Academy LA, LLC (“Defendant”) demurs to the first and fourth claims, as well as the claim for punitive damages, in the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Louie Castro-Garcia (“Plaintiff”). Defendant additionally moves to strike portions of the Complaint related to Plaintiff’s demand for punitive and exemplary damages.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer.

The Court GRANTS the motion to strike WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  Plaintiff may amend with facts to support the punitive damages claim within 20 days. 

Background

This is a battery case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer.

On January 14, 2023, Plaintiff was a patron at Defendant’s establishment. Plaintiff alleges that the Doe defendants in this action owned, operated, provided security services to, or were employed by Defendant. Following a conversation with the Doe defendants, Plaintiff was escorted outside and was unable to return inside to gather his personal belongings.

Plaintiff asked to reenter the property in order to obtain his belongings and to communicate with his friends, who were still inside, to obtain a safe ride home.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants then engaged in acts which included forcefully throwing Plaintiff to the ground. This caused multiple injuries to Plaintiff’s nose, neck, and back, which required medical attention.

Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2024, raising claims for (1) assault and battery; (2) negligence; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).

On April 7, 2025, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

Demurrer

Assault and Battery – First Claim

“The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)

“The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed [he or] she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite intent with respect to this claim.

“Under respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of his employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 617.) 

For the purposes of respondeat superior, an act is within the scope of employment, and therefore imputable onto the employer, if the employment predictably creates the risk that employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought. (Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85, 107, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 26, 2022), review denied (July 13, 2022).) As an alternative, an employer may be liable for an intentional tort where the employer ratifies the originally unauthorized tort. (Id. at 109.) The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification. (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 169 [internal citation omitted].  

 
            “A willful, malicious, and even criminal act may fall within the scope of employment, but only if the act has a causal nexus to the employee’s work.” (M.P. v. City of Sacramento (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 121, 129 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) The act must therefore be “foreseeable” in the sense that “in the context of the particular enterprise, an employee's tortious conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business.” (Ibid. [internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted].) Conversely, an act falls outside of the scope of employment when it occurs outside of the work environment and occurs for strictly personal reasons rather than as a result of a work-related dispute. (M.P. v. City of Sacramento (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 121, 133-134.) 

In Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 652, the court imposed respondeat superior liability where one employee threw a hammer at another during an argument. (Id. at pp. 654, 657.) The court explained that “[n]ot only did the altercation leading to the injury arise solely over the performance of [the tortfeasor’s] duties, but his entire association with plaintiff arose out of his employment on the building under construction. He had never seen plaintiff before the day preceding the accident and had never conversed with him before the dispute […]. He testified in addition that he was not angry with plaintiff before the dispute; that he had no personal grudge against him; and that he threw the hammer immediately, without “winding up,” on seeing [the inciting incident].” (Id. at p, 657.) The court therefore found that respondeat superior liability was appropriate. 

Other courts have ruled similarly since Carr. (Flores v. AutoZone West, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 373, 380 [disagreements between employees leading to physical acts of aggression in retail store subject to respondeat superior]; Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85, 108 [sexual exploitation of psychiatric patients was a foreseeable hazard].) 

In Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d. 202, the California Supreme Court held that when a police officer on duty misuses his official authority by raping a woman who he has detained, the public entity that employs him can be held vicariously liable. (Id. at p. 221.) The Court explained that “[i]n view of the considerable power and authority that police officers possess, it is neither startling nor unexpected that on occasion an officer will misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive conduct. The precise circumstances of the assault need not be anticipated …. the risk of such tortious conduct is broadly incidental to the enterprise of law enforcement, and thus liability for such acts may appropriately be imposed on the employing public entity.” (Id. at 217-218.) 

            Here, Plaintiff alleges that security personnel removed him from Defendant’s establishment and then threw him to the ground. Plaintiff has adequately alleged the underlying battery. And such conduct has a causal nexus to security work and falls within the foreseeable hazards associated with hiring security personnel. Respondeat superior is thus appropriate.

            The Court therefore overrules the demurer to this claim.

IIED – Fourth Claim

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

As discussed above, the Doe defendants’ conduct falls within the ambit of respondeat superior. Plaintiff has adequately alleged the underlying tort of IIED as well. Plaintiff alleges that the Doe defendants threw him to the ground and caused him serious injuries. Such conduct exceeds the bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community, and is therefore extreme and outrageous.

The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.

Exemplary Damages

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages.

A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.)

The court overrules this portion of the demurrer.

Motion to Strike

Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner advanced knowledge of unfitness and ratification, but does not allege any facts showing either of those theories. The Court therefore grants the motion to strike with leave to amend.  To the extent that Plaintiff does not have the facts with which to support the claim for punitive damages, this order is without prejudice to Plaintiff to seek leave to amend after discovery, even if Plaintiff does not now amend within 20 days.