Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 24STCV34370, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV34370    Hearing Date: May 8, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Keurig Dr Pepper Inc. (“Keurig”); Dr Pepper Snapple Group (“Snapple”); Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. (“Seven Up”) (collectively, “Dr. Pepper”); Kristopher Lemons (“Lemons”); and Amy Jia Song (“Song”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for an order transferring venue in this action to the Orange County Superior Court.

The Court DENIES the motion. 

The Court DENIES the request for sanctions made by Plaintiff David Mooney (“Plaintiff”).

Background

This is an employment case.

Plaintiff began working for Dr. Pepper in approximately February of 1978, at the age of 21, as a Commercial Truck Driver. In June 1981, Plaintiff transitioned to a job as a seasonal driver for the Seven Up Bottling Companies of Southern California. Plaintiff was laid off in October of 1982 and rehired in March of 1983 by Seven Up Bottling Companies as a Commercial Truck Driver.

As a driver, Plaintiff was responsible for delivering and unloading Defendants’ products to various store locations across California. (Mooney Decl. ¶ 3.) While Plaintiff’s shifts started in Defendants’ facility in Orange County, the plurality of these deliveries were located in Los Angeles County and San Bernadino County. (Mooney Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Plaintiff’s delivery routes expanded throughout various cities in Los Angeles County, including, but not limited to: La Verne, San Dimas, Pomona, West Covina, Covina, Baldwin Park, La Mirada, La Habra Heights, Whittier, Norwalk, Downey, La Puente, Hacienda Heights, Cerritos, Claremont, Diamond Bar, City of Industry, and Santa Fe Springs – all of which were in Los Angeles County. (Complaint ¶ 9.) For approximately 10 years, Plaintiff, alongside one other coworker, was responsible for delivering to all of the catering houses across Los Angeles. (Mooney Decl. ¶ 5.) At the time of his termination, Plaintiff’s shifts took him to Los Angeles approximately three to five times a week, sometimes requiring him to spend all day in Los Angeles County. (Mooney Decl. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered two workplace injuries. The first injury occurred on July 21, 2021. Plaintiff took time off after the first injury. The second injury occurred October 14, 2021, after Plaintiff returned to work. After the second injury, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied his request for FMLA and CFRA leave.

On December 27, 2022, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Defendants allegedly stated that Plaintiff was being terminated because his absence for medical leave extended for 365 calendar days and he was not able to return to work.

Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2024, raising claims for (1) disability discrimination; (2) age discrimination; (3) retaliation under FEHA; (4) disability harassment; (5) age harassment; (6) failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (7) failure to engage in the interactive process; (8) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (9) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (10) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (12) retaliation for taking CFRA leave; and (13) interference with CFRA leave.

On March 18, 2025, Defendants moved to transfer venue. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply.

Legal Standard

The Court may change the place of trial when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 397, subd. (a).)

“Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).)

“If [a] transfer is sought solely, or is ordered, because the action or proceeding was

 commenced in a court other than that designated as proper by this title, those costs and fees, including any expenses and attorney’s fees awarded to the defendant pursuant to Section 396b, shall be paid by the plaintiff before the transfer is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 399, subd. (a).)

Discussion

Merits

            A FEHA action “may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.” (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3).)

            “The wide choice of venue afforded plaintiffs by the FEHA venue statute effectuates enforcement of that law by permitting venue in a county which plaintiffs deem the most appropriate and convenient. The Legislature clearly intended the FEHA venue provisions to apply not only to FEHA actions, but also to related claims pled under alternative theories but based on the same set of facts.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 487.)

            Plaintiff argues that venue is proper in Los Angeles County because his work regularly occurred in Los Angeles County.

            Defendants argue that venue is proper in Orange County because “[Plaintiff] began and ended each day at [Keurig’s] Orange County facility, worked under a supervisor in Orange County, was supported by HR in Orange County, was part of the Orange County union, and more.” (Reply at 6:19-22.)

            Plaintiff appears to have spent a great deal of time working in Los Angeles County for Defendants. While Defendants characterize this as “past jaunts into Los Angeles County” (Reply at 7:5), the evidence paints a different picture. The plurality of Plaintiff’s deliveries were in Los Angeles County and San Bernadino County – not Orange County. Plaintiff made deliveries to Los Angeles County two to three days a week and sometimes spent all day there. Plaintiff, along with one other coworker, serviced all catering locations in Los Angeles County for Defendants for roughly 10 years.

            Defendants argue that, because the statute states that a FEHA action may be brought in “the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked”, rather than “any county in which the aggrieved person would have worked”, there must only be one eligible county for that venue basis, and that. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3).) Defendant argues that the county in question is the county where the employee starts and ends their shifts. The Court will not read this limitation into the statute, because it does not comport with logic or with FEHA’s policy of affording plaintiffs a “wide choice of venue”. (Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 487.) By way of example, an employee who moved between company locations in different counties and had to clock in at locations on different days would immediately bend Defendants’ interpretation to the point of snapping. Defendants cite no authority stating that the legislature intended to impose this limitation, or that the county in question should be selected in the manner that Defendants propose.

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s interpretation would explode the category of proper venues, allowing Plaintiff to file in any county that he traveled to for work. The Court disagrees. Here, Plaintiff filed in Los Angeles County, one of the two counties (along with San Bernadino County, but not Orange County) where the plurality of his work occurred. While it is possible that a remote county in northern California may be improper venue, that is not at issue here.

            Defendants argue that evidence of where Plaintiff previously worked is irrelevant because the statute identifies the county where the employee “would have worked”, and thus only looks to the future. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) But the locations where Plaintiff routinely worked leading up to his termination are strong evidence of where he would have continued to work had he not been terminated. And Defendants introduce no evidence showing that Plaintiff’s routes would have been moved out of Los Angeles County had he not been terminated.

            Because Plaintiff would have worked in Los Angeles County had he not been terminated, venue in Los Angeles County is proper.

Sanctions

“In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party's papers, or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b).)

Plaintiff requests sanctions of $3,850.00 in attorney’s fees and costs against Defendants’ counsel.

The Court does not exercise its discretion to grant sanctions. The parties had reasonable discussions about stipulating to a change of venue which almost resulted in an agreement to move the case to Orange County.  Moreover, while the Court did not agree with Defendants’ arguments, they are reasonable and good faith arguments. Sanctions are not appropriate.