Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 25STCP00849, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCP00849 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
PAMELA LOVE CONSULTING LLC, Plaintiffs, v. ALEX AND ANI LLC, Defendant. |
Case No:
25STCP00849 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Calendar Number: 4 |
Petitioner Pamela Love Consulting LLC (“Petitioner”) moves
for an order confirming the December 23, 2024 Final Partial Award and the
Interim Final Award (together, the “Awards”) and entering judgment as to
Respondent Alex and Ani LLC (“Respondent”).
The Court tentatively GRANTS the petition. The Court requests argument, however, about (a)
whether the FAA in fact preempts any California case law about which
arbitration awards are subject to review under the FAA; and (b) the effect on this case of the discussion of
the Hightower case by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
1125, 1146-1147 and Lonky v. Patel (51 Cal.App.5th 831, 844-845.)
This petition for confirmation arises out of a contract
dispute.
Petitioner Pamela Love LLC is a personal services company of
the jewelry designer Pamela Love and is based in Santa Monica, California.
Respondent Alex and Ani LLC is a Rhode Island LLC, based in Cranston, Rhode
Island. Respondent is a jewelry business.
In August 2023, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a
Consulting Agreement (the “Agreement”). (Fox Decl. ¶ 2; Petition, Attachment
8(c).) The Agreement required Petitioner to provide jewelry design and other
creative services to Respondent.
The Agreement contains an arbitration clause requiring that
disputes be arbitrated in front of JAMS in Los Angeles. (Petition, Attachment
8(c), § 15.)
Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to pay Petitioner
consulting fees owed under the Agreement and indicated that it would not pay
royalties on the sale of jewelry designed by Petitioner owed under the
Agreement.
The parties initiated arbitration in front of the Hon.
Katherine Chilton (Ret.) (the “Arbitrator”), who was appointed under JAMS’s
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures in the arbitration captioned Pamela
Love Consulting LLC v. Alex and Ani LLC, JAMS Ref No. 5425002192 (the
“Arbitration”).
The Arbitrator issued the Awards on December 23, 2024. (Fox
Decl. ¶ 1; Petition, Attachment 4(b) (“Awards”).) The Arbitrator found that it
was undisputed that Petitioner had not been paid for a ten-month period. (Awards
at p. 10.) The Arbitrator found that Respondent did not put forward a
good-faith defense to liability.
In the Awards, the Arbitrator ordered Respondent to provide
certain royalty reports to Respondent as required by Section 16 of the
Agreement within 30 days; to provide Respondent with access to its books and
records as required by Section 16 of the Agreement within 30 days; and to post
security in the amount of $220,333.40 within 20 days. (Awards at pp. 13-14.)
The Awards were electronically served on all parties via JAMS’s electronic
filing system. (Fox Decl. ¶ 6.)
To date, Respondent has not complied with the Awards. (Fox
Decl. ¶ 7.)
Petitioner filed this petition on March 5, 2025.
Also on March 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed an action in New York
state court against several other parties (but not Respondent), alleging that
they had been the recipients of fraudulent transfers from Respondent in order
to render Respondent judgment-proof.
On March 27, 2025, Petitioner filed this motion to confirm
the Award.
On April 7, 2025, Respondent filed a response to the
petition.
On April 8, 2025, Respondent filed an opposition to this
motion.
On April 15, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply.
“Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made
may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. The petition
shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as
respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1285.) Venue is proper in any court having jurisdiction in the county
where the arbitration was held. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1292.2.)
If a petition to confirm an arbitration award is duly served
and filed, the court must confirm the award as made, unless the court corrects
or vacates the award pursuant to a response to the petition or a petition to
correct or vacate the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286; Valsan Partners
Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
809, 818 [no authority to alter terms of award absent petition to
correct].) “If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in
conformity therewith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.)
“A petition under this chapter shall:
(a) Set forth the
substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate unless the
petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement.
(b) Set forth the names of the
arbitrators.
(c) Set forth or
have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators,
if any.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.4.)
The petition must be served no earlier than 10 days, but no
later than 4 years, after service of the award on the petitioner. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1288, 1288.4.) The petition, written notice of the time and
place of the hearing on the petition, and any other papers upon which the
petition is based must be served in the manner provided in the arbitration
agreement for service of such petition and notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1290.4(a).)
“[A]n arbitrator's decision is not ordinarily reviewable for
error by either the trial or appellate courts[.]” (Moncharsh v. Heily &
Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 13.) “[J]udicial review of private arbitration
awards [is limited] to those cases in which there exists a statutory ground to
vacate or correct the award.” (Id. at pp. 27-28.) These grounds are set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1286.2 and 1286.6. (Id. at p.
13.) A court may not
vacate or correct an award unless a petition or response requesting that the
award be vacated or corrected has been duly served and filed. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1286.4, 1286.8.)
Petitioner has timely filed its petition for confirmation.
Petitioner has provided a copy of the arbitration agreement,
the Awards, and the name of the Arbitrator. Respondent has appeared in this
action and therefore has notice.
Petitioner has therefore carried its initial burden.
Respondent argues that the Awards are unenforceable because
they are not final awards.
In FAA-covered arbitration cases, “[t]emporary equitable
relief in arbitration may be essential to preserve assets or enforce
performance which, if not preserved or enforced, may render a final award
meaningless. However, if temporary equitable relief is to have any meaning, the
relief must be enforceable at the time it is granted, not after an arbitrator's
final decision on the merits.” (Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio
Reinsurance Corp. (9th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 1019, 1022–1023.) Although Respondent
contends that the CAA provides differently, the FAA preempts the CAA where
their substantive provisions conflict. (Swissmex-Rapid S.A. de C.V. v. SP
Sys., LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 539.)
The Arbitrator expressly considered whether the Awards
should be immediately enforceable by courts and determined that they should be.
(Awards at pp. 12-13.) The Arbitrator considered federal case law indicating
that courts typically do not enforce arbitral awards unless they are final.
(Awards at pp. 12-13; see, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American
Arbitration Ass'n (9th Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 248, 251.) The Arbitrator
therefore determined that the awards would be final awards so that they could
be immediately confirmed by courts. (Awards at pp. 12-14.)
Respondent relies on Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 1052 to argue that the arbitration award is preliminary and cannot
be enforced. Kirk is
distinguishable for several reasons.
First, Kirk proceeded on the basis that the arbitration was not
subject to the FAA. (Id. at p.
1064.) This arbitration is and, as
noted, the FAA preempts inconsistent provisions of the CAA. Second, even applying California law only,
the result would be the same. Kirk was
a case where the arbitrator did not purport to make the injunctive relief
final. The arbitrator here did, and did
so specifically to make the relief effective.
Under the CAA, such an award may be enforced under the principle that
“arbitral finality . . . does not preclude the arbitrator from making a final
disposition of a submitted matter in more than one award.” (Hightower v. Superior Court (2001) 86
Cal.App.4th 1415, 1433 (emphasis in original).)
The Arbitrator could not have more clearly stated her
intention that the Awards be final and enforceable. The substance of the Awards
indicates the reason for this – they are intended to give Petitioner
information about the allegedly missing royalty payments so that Petitioner may
attempt to collect on any eventual judgment for the royalty payments.
The Court therefore determines that the Awards are final and
enforceable.
Respondent argues that venue is not proper in Los Angeles
because the states of Rhode Island and New York have greater interests in this
litigation.
The Court disagrees. Venue is proper in a court having
jurisdiction in the county where the arbitration is being held. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1292.2.) Here, the Agreement provides that arbitration would occur in
Los Angeles, California. The Arbitration is, in fact, ongoing in Los Angeles,
California. Venue is therefore proper in this court.
Respondent argues that, if consideration of the Awards in
this court is proper, the Award should be vacated.
“A response requesting that an award be vacated or that an
award be corrected shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after the
date of service” on the respondent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1288.2.) Where a
petition to confirm an award is filed, the applicable deadline to seek vacatur
is the shorter of 100 days from service of the award or 10 days from service of
the petition. (Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC, (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1100,
1110-1111.) Although this general rule stands, Darby has been
disapproved to the extent that it characterizes this deadline as jurisdictional
in the fundamental sense. (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023) 14
Cal.5th 932, 952, fn. 3.)
Here, Respondent was served with the Awards on December 23,
2024. (Fox Decl. ¶ 6.) The 100-day deadline to file a response seeking vacatur
was April 2, 2025. Respondent did not file its response until April 7, 2025,
and filed its opposition on the following day. The Court therefore does not
consider the request for vacatur.
Respondent requests that the Court stay the Arbitration on
the basis that Petitioner filed an action in New York state court seeking to
invalidate certain property transfers from Respondent to other entities on the
grounds that those transfers were made to evade potential judgments in the
Arbitration.
First, Respondent has not properly noticed this request for
a stay as required by Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1005, et seq.
Second, even if the request were properly noticed, the Court
would deny it. The fraudulent transfer action seeks to invalidate transfers by
Respondent as against Petitioner. It would not give rise to a double recovery
alongside this arbitration; it would merely enable Petitioner to seek any
eventual monetary judgment out of the transfers to the defendants in the New
York action. Further, the actions would not involve the same facts – this
arbitration involves the underlying issue of liability on the contract; the
fraudulent transfer action involves subsequent actions by Respondent and the
transferees. There is thus not a great risk of conflicting rulings. Finally,
the fraudulent transfer action appears to be for the purpose of ensuring that
any eventual judgment in the Arbitration can actually be effectuated – thus,
staying either one and allowing the other to proceed would carry a greater risk
of stymying Petitioner’s claims in both.
Because Petitioner has satisfied the requirements for confirmation and Respondent has not provided a valid objection, the Court grants the petition for confirmation of the Awards.