Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 25STCV00062, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00062    Hearing Date: April 15, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Humanitas Holdings, Inc. (“Humanitas”) moves to strike the demand for punitive damages and related allegations from the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Salvador Calderon (“Plaintiff”).

The Court GRANTS the motion to strike WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  Plaintiff has 20 days to amend.

Background

This is an employment case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint.

Defendant Humanitas is a staffing agency. Plaintiff began his employment with Humanitas in January 2021. Plaintiff was assigned to work at Defendant CalPack Foods (“CalPack”) from approximately November 2021 to August 10, 2022.

On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff suffered a back injury at work and sought medical attention. On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff returned to work and provided his direct supervisor, Jonathan Rivas with a doctor’s note describing his injury as a slipped disc in his back. The doctor’s note contained work restrictions. Rivas told Plaintiff to return once he had fully recovered and had a doctor’s note which cleared him of all work restrictions.

On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff reported back to CalPack with a note lifting his work restrictions.

On December 1, 2022, an employee of Humanitas informed Plaintiff that his position at CalPack was no longer available, but gave him the option to accept a different placement for less pay, which Plaintiff accepted.

On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff was informed that there was no more work for him and was terminated by Humanitas.

Plaintiff filed this action on January 2, 2025, raising claims for (1) discrimination under FEHA; (2) retaliation under FEHA; (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodations; (5) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process; (6) denial of and discrimination based upon the use of sick leave; (7) wrongful termination in violation of FEHA; and (8) declaratory judgment.

Humanitas filed this motion to strike on March 6, 2025. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Humanitas filed a reply.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Discussion

Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

“An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

            Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of malice, oppression, and fraud are entirely conclusory. The allegations are simple boilerplate language that does not contain supporting facts to show why malice, oppression, or fraud are present.

            Plaintiff argues that, in the context of a discrimination case such as this one, some conduct is inherently oppressive and malicious, citing Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 618. But Fisher is distinguishable – this is a disability discrimination case, whereas Fisher was a sexual harassment case. The court there explained that “sexual harassment is often inherently oppressive and malicious.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 618 [emphasis added].) The Court drew on reasoning from the California Fair Employment and Housing Counsel that “ ‘[s]exual harassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work environment and deprives its victim of her statutory right to work in a place free of discrimination, when the sexually harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt her emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect her ability to perform her job as usual, or otherwise interferes with and undermines her personal sense of well-being.” (Id. at p. 608.) The Court concluded that “under certain circumstances, the creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual harassment can violate FEHA irrespective of whether the complainant suffers tangible job detriment.” (Ibid.) These are not the circumstances alleged here.

            The Court grants the motion to strike with leave to amend.