Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 25STCV01793, Date: 2025-04-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01793    Hearing Date: April 29, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant John Santoro (“Santoro”) moves to strike the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Gilmer Karim Pozo (“Plaintiff”) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16.

Defendants Peter Jameson Veiguela (“Veiguela”) and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity”) (collectively with Veiguela, the “Fidelity Parties”) separately move to strike the Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16. Fidelity contends that it was incorrectly sued as Fidelity National Law Group and as Fidelity National Title Insurance Company d/b/a Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of California.

The Court GRANTS Santoro’s anti-SLAPP motion.  The Court awards Sontoro $8,592 in attorney’s fees, payable by Plaintiff to Santoro within 60 days of this order.

The Court GRANTS the Fidelity Parties’ anti-SLAPP motion.

Background

This case arises out of a dispute over the real property located at 28328 Ware Street, Murietta, California (the “Property”).

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the Santoro Judgment was procured by fraud committed by the Santoros and their attorney, Defendant Veiguela, as well as various witnesses. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely reported him to Riverside and Los Angeles county law enforcement for fraud and other crimes, resulting in Plaintiff’s arrest and multiple criminal complaints being brought against him.

Background Regarding the Property

In April 2013, Defendant John Santoro and his wife Marina Santoro (collectively, the “Santoros”) purchased the Property. (Santoro Request for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), Ex. A (“April 18, 2013 Deed”).) They were introduced to the Property by Plaintiff, who Santoro contends acted as the Santoros’ agent in the transaction.

In 2019, the Santoros transferred title to the Property into their trust. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. B (“March 15, 2019 Deed”).)

On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff recorded a grant deed (the “April 15 Deed”) that purportedly transferred title to the Property from the Santoros’ trust to Plaintiff. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. C (“April 15, 2019 Deed”).) The April 15 Deed was subsequently adjudged to be null and void in Santoro v. Pozo, et al., Case No. MCC1900741 (the “Santoro Case”). (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H (“Santoro Judgment”) ¶ 3.) The Santoros deny signing the April 15 Deed and deny that they intended to transfer the Property to Plaintiff.

On May 14, 2019, Plaintiff recorded a Short Form Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents (the “Rodriguez Deed”) on May 14, 2019, claiming that Jaime Rodriguez had lent him $100,000.00 and that Plaintiff had pledged the Property as security. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff would later judicially admit that Rodriguez never loaned him this money. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 15 at pp. 4, 16 [PDF p. 183].)

The Santoro Case

On June 21, 2019, the Santoros filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the County of Riverside against Plaintiff, Santoro v. Pozo, et al., Case No. MCC1900741 (the “Santoro Case”). (Santoro RFJN, Ex. E.) Defendant Veiguela represented the Santoros as their attorney through their title insurance company, Fidelity.

Plaintiff filed a verified First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) as part of the Santoro Case. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. F [the FACC].) The FACC alleged that the Santoros had purchased the Property, but that the parties agreed that Plaintiff would rent the Property for the Santoros and have an option to purchase it for $250,000.00 within three years. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. F ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleged that the Santoros executed the April 15 Deed as security for this agreement. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. F ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleged that he had recorded the April 15 Deed after learning that the Santoros would not perform on the alleged agreement. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. F ¶ 22.)

As part of a settlement with the Santoros, Rodriguez executed a Deed of Full Reconveyance, recorded on November 15, 2019 (the “Rodriguez Reconveyance”), confirming that no sums were owed under the Rodriguez Deed.

During the Santoro Case, the Santoros served Plaintiff with Requests for Admissions. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 15.) On March 4, 2021, the Riverside Superior Court ordered that Plaintiff was deemed to have admitted the truth of all of these requests for Admission, including that the Santoros had never signed the April 15 Deed; that Plaintiff had forged the Santoros’ signatures on the April 15 Deed; that Ericka Seanz, the purported notary on the deed, did not in fact notarize either of the Santoros’ purported signatures on the deed; that Plaintiff never made loan, property insurance, homeowners’ association, or property tax payments on the Property; that Plaintiff had no ownership right in the Property; that Plaintiff was illegally in possession of the Property; and that Rodriguez never loaned $100,000.00 to Plaintiff as described in the Rodriguez Deed of Trust. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 15 at pp. 1-5, 16 [PDF p. 183].)

On March 9, 2022, the Riverside Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Santoros. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H.)

On March 10, 2022, the Riverside Superior Court entered judgment (the “Santoro Judgment”) in the Santoro Case. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H.) The Santoro Judgment quieted title to the Property in favor of John P. Santoro and Marina G. Santoro, as Trustees of the J & M Santoro Trust and decreed that the Santoros, as trustees, are the fee simple owners of the Property. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H ¶¶ 2-3.) The judgment further decreed that the Grant Deed recorded on April 15, 2019 as Instrument No. 2019-0126090 in the Official Records of the Riverside County Recorder (the “Void Deed”), in which the Santoros purportedly transferred fee simple title of the Property to Plaintiff, is void and canceled. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H ¶ 3.) The judgment provided that Plaintiff would take nothing on his cross-complaint. (Santoro RFJN, Ex. H ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff filed several unsuccessful appeals of the Santoros Judgment. (Santoros RFJN, Ex. D [register of actions in the Santoro Case]; Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 9 [December 29, 2022 remittitur].)

The Riverside Criminal Case

In 2019, the Santoros reported Plaintiff to Riverside County law enforcement. (Veiguela Decl. ¶ 5.)

On May 20, 2021, prosecutors filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff in the Riverside Superior Court, People v. Pozo Case No. RIF2019210, raising multiple counts of recording a forged instrument, identity theft, and fraud/embezzlement (the “Riverside Criminal Case”). (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 11 at pp. 1-3.)

During the investigation, Veiguela exchanged communications with Investigator White and Deputy District Attorney David Allen in which he provided them information on the status of the Santoro Action and Veiguela’s own investigation into Plaintiff in connection with his representation of the Santoros. (Veiguela Decl. ¶¶ 8-11.) Plaintiff alleges that Veiguela knowingly provided false information in order to cause the institution of the criminal case against Plaintiff.

Neither the Santoros nor Veiguela provided any testimony in the case. (Veiguela Decl. ¶ 10.)

On April 18, 2023, the Riverside Criminal Case was dismissed as to Plaintiff on the oral motion of Deputy District Attorney David Allen. (Fidelity RFJN Ex. 12 at p. 2.)

The Los Angeles Criminal Case

In September 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by Los Angeles county law enforcement in an apparently unrelated matter. (Complaint ¶ 48.)

On May 20, 2021, Los Angeles county prosecutors filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff in the Los Angeles Superior Court, People v. Martinez, et al., Case No. BA516625 (the “Los Angeles Criminal Case”). (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 13.) The charges included unlawfully procuring and offering false and forged grant deeds which were not related to the Santoro Case. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 13.)

On December 27, 2023, the People announced that they were unable to proceed, and the court dismissed Counts 002 and 003 for lack of a speedy trial. (Fidelity RFJN, Ex. 14.)

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on January 23, 2025, raising claims for (1) malicious prosecution; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (6) intentional interference with economic relations.

Plaintiff’s allegations in this case differ from Plaintiff’s allegations in the Santoro Case. Plaintiff alleges that John Santoro (and apparently not his wife, Marina Santoro) purchased the property on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Complaint ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that John Santoro and Gilbert Finley (who no one contends was an owner of the Property) executed a notarized grant deed to Plaintiff in April 2014. (Complaint ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that this is the deed that became the focus of the later civil and criminal cases that are at issue in this case (Complaint ¶ 20), so the deed referred to appears to be the April 15 Deed. Plaintiff now alleges that he misplaced the April 15 Deed and recorded it after he found it on April 15, 2019. (Complaint ¶ 20.)

In pertinent part, Plaintiff alleges in this case that Defendants knowingly made false statements in the Santoro Case and to Riverside and Los Angeles law enforcement that Plaintiff had forged the April 15 Deed, that Plaintiff was not the lawful owner of the Property, and that Rodriguez and Plaintiff had never entered a loan agreement. Plaintiff alleges a number of harms resulting from this alleged conduct, including his arrests by Riverside and Los Angeles law enforcement and the institution of the two criminal actions against him.

Santoro filed his anti-SLAPP motion on March 26, 2025. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Santoro’s motion.

The Fidelity Parties filed their anti-SLAPP motion on April 1, 2025.

On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Fidelity Parties’ motion.

On April 21, 2025, Santoro filed a response to Plaintiff’s opposition to the Fidelity Parties’ motion. Santoro concurrently filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted with the opposition.

On April 22, 2025, the Fidelity Parties filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to the Fidelity motion. The Fidelity Parties concurrently filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted with the opposition.

Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Santoro and the Fidelity Parties’ requests for judicial notice and takes notice of the submitted public records.

Evidentiary Objections

Santoro and the Fidelity Parties both submit objections to Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his opposition.

The Court sustains the following of the Fidelity Parties’ objections: 1 (hearsay); 2 (hearsay); 3 (lay opinion); 4 (hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, foundation); 5 (lack of personal knowledge and speculation as to “knowingly false statements); 6 (lack of foundation, speculation and unsupported lay opinion as to why the Riverside Criminal Case was dismissed); 7 (lack of personal knowledge, foundation); 8 (speculation and lay opinion as to why the Los Angeles Criminal Case was dismissed); 9 (lack of personal knowledge); 10 (speculation as to what Veiguela knew).

The Court sustains the following of Santoro’s objections: 1 (argument, fact established against Plaintiff in the Santoro Case); 2 (hearsay); 3 (hearsay); 4 (argument); 5 (hearsay); 6 (foundation, speculation); 7 (lack of foundation and personal knowledge as to knowing falsity of Veiguela’s statements to law enforcement); 8 (lack of foundation and personal knowledge as to why the Riverside Criminal Case was dismissed); 9 (hearsay, foundation, lack of personal knowledge); 10 (lack of foundation and personal knowledge as to why the Los Angeles Criminal Case was dismissed); 11 (foundation); 12 (lack of foundation and personal knowledge as to knowing falsity of Veiguela’s statements); 13 (argument).

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16 requires courts to strike causes of action arising from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of free speech or petition unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

In assessing a defendant’s Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16 special motion to strike, the court must engage in a two-step process. (Shekhter v. Financial Indem. Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 150.) First, the court must decide whether the defendant has met the threshold burden of showing that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s constitutional rights of free speech or petition for redress of grievances. (Ibid.) This burden may be met by showing the act which forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action was an act that falls within one of the four categories of conduct set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). 

Once a defendant has met its initial burden and established that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a “probability” of success on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b); Equilon Enters. LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.)

Discussion

Protected Activity

To determine the gravamen of an alleged SLAPP, courts look to the factual basis for liability. (Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1190, as modified on denial of reh'g (July 26, 2011) disapproved of on other grounds by Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376.)

            The anti-SLAPP statute applies to a “cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The statute defines such acts to include the following:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,

(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,

(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or

(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. 

(Code Civ. Proc., §425.16, subd. (e).) 

The Anti-SLAPP statute protects statements and writings made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) “The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation....” (Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281.) “It is beyond question that the initiation and prosecution of [... a lawsuit is] protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1017-1018).

“A cause of action arising from defendant's litigation activity may appropriately be the subject of a section 425.16 special motion to strike. Any act includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” (Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 154 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted; cleaned up].) All communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.)

Thus, both Santoro’s conduct and the Fidelity Parties’ conduct in the Santoro Action are protected activity.

Furthermore, the police reports are also protected.

“[T]he filing of the complaint [before a regulatory body] qualifie[s] at least as a statement before an official proceeding” because “the purpose of the complaint was to solicit an … investigation.” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1009.)  The anti-SLAPP statute expressly covers not only a “written” statement before an official proceeding regulatory body but also “any . . . oral statement. . . made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”  (Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)  Moreover, communications preparatory to an official proceeding fall under the anti-SLAPP statute.  (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld (2002) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784.)

The alleged complaints that Santoro and Veiguela made to law enforcement fall within this protection.

Plaintiff argues that knowingly false police reports are not protected activity. But Plaintiff’s authority in support of this contention does not go to whether such statements are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute – rather, they discuss whether knowingly false police reports are protected by the litigation privilege, which goes to the probability of success stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The Court concludes that the wrongful conduct alleged against Santoro and the Fidelity parties in the Complaint constitutes protected activity. The Court therefore proceeds to analyze the probability of success of Plaintiff’s claims.

Probability of Success

Once a defendant has met its initial burden and established that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a “probability” of success on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b).) “[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 548.)

A plaintiff need only show “a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability[.]” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5.) “In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of the complaint, but must produce evidence that would be admissible at trial. [Citation.] Thus, declarations may not be based upon “information and belief” [citation] and documents submitted without the proper foundation are not to be considered. [Citation.] The court considers the pleadings and evidence submitted by both sides, but does not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, the court's responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law. [Citation.] The trial court merely determines whether a prima facie showing has been made that would warrant the claim going forward.” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.)

Litigation Privilege

California law does not permit liability for filing lawsuits, except in the case of malicious prosecution. (See Civ. Code, § 47.) However, the litigation privilege does not extend to actions for malicious prosecution. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1242.)

“[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)[.]” (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784.) “The “official proceeding” privilege has been interpreted broadly to protect communications to or from governmental officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.” (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 155.)

There is, however, an exception. “This subdivision does not make privileged any communication between a person and a law enforcement agency in which the person makes a false report that another person has committed, or is in the act of committing, a criminal act or is engaged in an activity requiring law enforcement intervention, knowing that the report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(5), emphasis added.)

Because all of the conduct at issue arises was in connection with either the Santoro case or the complaints made to law enforcement which allegedly led to the criminal cases, the conduct falls within the litigation privilege unless there is an applicable exception. The two potential exceptions to the litigation privilege here are (1) for Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, if Plaintiff can show a minimum level of triability; and (2) for all of Plaintiff’s claims as to the police reports only, if Plaintiff can show that Defendants acted knowing that the reports were false or with reckless disregard to the reports’ truth or falsity. The Court proceeds to analyze each of these exceptions.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

“A plaintiff must plead and prove three elements to establish the tort of malicious prosecution: a lawsuit (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” (Nunez v. Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 872, quotation marks omitted.) “[T]he termination must reflect on the plaintiff’s innocence of the alleged wrongful conduct.” (Garcia v. Rosenberg (2019) 42 Cal. App. 5th 1050, 1058.)

“An action is deemed to have been pursued without probable cause if it was not legally tenable when viewed in an objective manner as of the time the action was initiated or while it was being prosecuted.” (Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402.) “While an attorney is entitled to rely on information from his or her client for purposes of assessing a claim’s legal tenability, ‘[a]n exception to this rule exists where the attorney is on notice of specific factual mistakes in the client’s version of events.’ ” (Olivares, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at 355 [quoting Morrison v. Rudolph (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 506, 512–513].) 

“The malice element goes to the defendant’s subjective intent in initiating or continuing the prior action. It is not limited to actual hostility or ill will and may be present when proceedings are instituted or maintained primarily for an improper purpose.” (Olivares, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 343, 356.) “Evidence tending to show that an attorney did not subjectively believe the action was tenable is relevant to¿whether an action was instituted or maintained with malice.” (Ibid, citing Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 881.) 

The burden is on Plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of each of the elements with admissible evidence. (Matson v. Dvorak, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 548.) Plaintiff has not shown knowledge of falsity with admissible evidence. The sole evidence that Plaintiff submits with his opposition is Plaintiff’s own declaration. But Plaintiff’s declaration in support of knowledge of falsity are each objectionable on the various bases of hearsay, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, and speculation. Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge that any of the moving defendants knew that they were making false statements – Plaintiff at most states that they had access to evidence which Plaintiff contends would have exonerated him. 

Moreover, Plaintiff makes this assertion in a conclusory manner that does not provide an evidentiary basis to demonstrate what this exonerating evidence supposedly was and how he learned that the moving defendants had access to it. In short, that evidence has not been submitted in the record. The evidence that is in the record demonstrates that Santoro and Veiguela did have probable cause to report to the police that Plaintiff had forged the April 15 Deed. First, Plaintiff judicially admitted that he had forged the Santoros’ signatures on the deed. This admission led to summary judgment against Plaintiff, and invalidating the April 15 Deed, in the Santoro Case. This fact alone is adequate to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that the Santoros or the Fidelity Parties did not have probable cause for believing that the April 15 Deed was forged. Second, there remains the Santoros’ own direct experience involving the deeds that formed the basis for their belief that the April 15 Deed was forged – a belief which Plaintiff’s shifting stories about the April 15 Deed’s history and exactly about how he allegedly came into ownership of the Property appears to vindicate.

Plaintiff does not appear to raise a malicious prosecution claim as to the prosecution of the Santoro Action. Insofar as he does, the Court finds that there is no probability of success because Plaintiff did not obtain a favorable termination in that action.

Allegedly False Police Reports

As discussed above, the moving defendants had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had forged the April 15 Deed. Plaintiff has not produced admissible evidence showing knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to truth or falsity. Furthermore, the evidence that is in the record creates a showing that the reports that the April 15 Deed was in fact forged.

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a minimum probability of success on his claims.

Attorney’s Fees

Santoro seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,592.  He is entitled to these fees.  (Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (c).) 

The Fidelity Parties also argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees, but state that they will make a motion seeking such fees in the future. Accordingly, the Court does not rule on the attorney’s fees request at the present time.