Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 25STCV01997, Date: 2025-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01997    Hearing Date: April 8, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) demurs to the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Machelle R. Arrington Sam A. Arrington (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). GM separately moves to strike the checked box for “punitive damages” in the civil case cover sheet (Plaintiffs do not raise a claim for punitive damages in their Complaint.)

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to this claim. The Court GRANTS leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amendments may include the addition of state law warranty claims. If Plaintiff intends for the First Amended Complaint filed on April 1, 2025 to be the operative complaint, the Court will order that First Amended Complaint to be deemed filed.

The Court GRANTS GM’s motion to strike the checked ‘punitive damages’ box on the civil case cover sheet.

Background

This is a consumer vehicle warranty case.

Plaintiff brought this action on January 24, 2025, raising claims for (1) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (d); (2) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (b); (3) violation of Civil Code, section 1793.2, subd. (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.

On February 26, 2025,

Discussion

State Law Claims

GM argues that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs concede this point and state that they will voluntarily dismiss the first, second, third, and fourth claims. (Opposition 2:5-9.)

Fifth Claim – Breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

“The Magnuson–Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson–Moss), 15 U.S.C. sections 2301 et seq., authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson–Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule. [Citation.]” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832–833.) “Accordingly, … failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitute[s] a failure to state a claim under Magnuson–Moss.” (Ibid.)

“The [Song–Beverly] Act regulates warranty terms, imposes service and repair obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who make express warranties, requires disclosure of specified information in express warranties, and broadens a buyer's remedies to include costs, attorney's fees, and civil penalties. [Citations.] It supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.]” (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 213.)

Thus, a plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for violation of the Song-Beverly Act does not necessarily prevent Plaintiff from raising a Magnuson-Moss claim if the plaintiff can raise an alternate state law warranty claim. (See, e.g., Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928-929 [directing trial court to permit a motion for leave to amend to assert non-Song Beverly Act express warranty claims and Magnuson-Moss claim despite unavailability of Song-Beverly Act claims].) Plaintiffs request leave to amend to assert a breach of warranty claim under the UCC. The Court agrees that such an amendment would be appropriate in this context.

GM argues that granting leave to amend in this manner would strip it of its ability to oppose a noticed motion for leave to amend. However, leave to amend is routinely granted when ruling on a demurrer where the defects in the pleading could be cured by amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 348; Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., supra, 70 Cal.2dat p. 245). This method also supports judicial economy by allowing the Court to determine whether amendment is warranted in the process of one noticed motion, rather than two.

GM’s only substantive objection is that Plaintiffs made a strategic decision to pursue only Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss claims, and must now be stuck with that decision. But this is not a true source of prejudice for GM – this case has been proceeding for less than three months, and trial has not even been set yet. GM will not be meaningfully impacted by the delay in asserting a UCC claim.

The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim. The Court grants leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amendments may include the addition of state law warranty claims. If Plaintiff intends for the First Amended Complaint filed on April 1, 2025 to be the operative complaint, the Court will order that First Amended Complaint to be deemed filed.

Motion to Strike

This motion to strike is unusual in that Plaintiffs do not actually attempt to raise a claim for punitive damages. Rather, Plaintiffs checked the ‘punitive damages’ box on the civil case cover sheet. The Court grants GM’s motion to strike the checked ‘punitive damages’ box on the civil case cover sheet.