Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: BC624838, Date: 2024-12-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC624838    Hearing Date: December 19, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown (“Plaintiff”) moved for an award of attorney’s fees against Defendant The Regents of the University of California (the “Regents”).  She sought a lodestar attorney’s fee amount of $6,052,050 and a multiplier of 2 for a total of $12,104,100 in fees.

On November 5, 2024 the Court issued an order approving a subset of the requested $6,052,050.  The Court identified which charges it did not find reasonable and required various reductions. The Court ordered the parties to meet and confer about the mathematical calculation of the fees in light of the reductions ordered by the Court and to file additional briefing on the propriety of a multiplier.

The parties have agreed that the correct calculation of the fees the Court found reasonable is $3,926,753.75. The parties have also filed additional briefing on the subject of a multiplier.

For the reasons explained in this order, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier.  Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff a total of $3,926,753.75 in attorney’s fees.

The lodestar amount of attorney fees “may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)  “[A]pplication of a lodestar multiplier is discretionary; that is, it is based on the exercise of the court’s discretion after consideration of the relevant factors in a particular case.”  (Nichols v. City of Taft  (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240.)

The Court has considered all relevant factors and determines that no lodestar multiplier is appropriate in this case. The Court explains some of its reasoning below.

Plaintiff argues that this was an extraordinarily difficult case and that it was the skill of Plaintiff’s counsel that in large part led to the successful result. The Court disagrees with this view of the litigation.  Plaintiff’s counsel did a good job at trial.  So did counsel for the Regents. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, did not pull a rabbit out of a hat by prevailing at trial, as Plaintiff’s argument implies. As with many hard fought cases, there were some facts that were problematic for Plaintiff but many facts that strongly supported her claim. The legal issues in the case were not particularly novel. Moreover, Plaintiff did not prevail on many of the claims she originally asserted.

In addition, in the first trial Plaintiff’s counsel did not exercise their skill as attorneys in a manner that protected the record such that the judgment could be affirmed on appeal. While the Court of Appeal overturned the judgment in part based on comments by the prior trial judge during jury selection, the Court of Appeal also reversed because of Plaintiff’s successful efforts in the first trial to admit inadmissible evidence. While this was aggressive lawyering, it did not demonstrate extraordinary skill in a manner that served anyone’s interest in the long run.  Failure to protect the record during the first trial was part of the reason that a second trial was necessary, causing everyone to expend millions of additional dollars in attorney’s fees. These facts do not favor awarding a multiplier on the fee award.

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel overcame challenges it faced in part by putting shoulder to the grindstone and spending a large amount of hours on this case. While the Court has reduced the attorney’s fees allowed, it has still granted fees for hundreds of hours of meetings between lead counsel and Plaintiff, and for many hours for a third chair to attend the trial. Thus, Plaintiff’s work to overcome challenges is already reflected in the lodestar calculation. (See Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at p. 1138 [factors may not justify multiplier “to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar”].)

The Court has considered that the judgment may have some positive but non-measurable effect benefitting employees, that Plaintiff’s counsel took the case on a contingent basis, and that the lawyers working on the case could not work on other cases at the same time. In the context of this case, the Court does not believe these facts justify a multiplier.  (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at p.1138 [“Of course, the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors . . .”].)  Not every contingency case requires a multiplier. Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm routinely handles multiple cases at the same time.  In the totality of the circumstances, the Court does not view a multiplier as appropriate in this case.

The Court has also considered applying a more modest multiplier to account for fees for hours spent years ago.  The Court has similarly considered the request by the Regents for a negative multiplier. After considering all the factors, including those set forth above, the Court does not apply any positive or negative multiplier.

Accordingly, the amount of the attorney’s award remains $3,926,753.75.