Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: BC656002, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC656002    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

 

DEPARTMENT 72

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY LLC, et al.,

 

                                  Plaintiffs,

 

         v.

 

 

REBECCA RICKLEY, et al.,

 

                                  Defendants.

 

 Case No:  BC656002

 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  August 8, 2024

 Calendar Number:  5

 

 

 

Plaintiffs Thrifty Oil Co. (“Thrifty”) and Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC (“Tesoro”) move for the appointment of a receiver to carry into effect the judgment entered in this matter on March 4, 2022.

 

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice.

 

Background

 

This is a land use case relating to Plaintiffs’ right to an easement to repair the sewer line that services their property.

 

On December 9, 2021, the Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants Rebecca Rickley and Natasha Roit (collectively, “Defendants”) from interfering with Plaintiffs’ right to access, enter, pass, and repass over and along the sewer easement on Defendants’ property as reasonably necessary to locate, inspect, and repair or replace the sewer line in the easement and perform all related activities. The Court granted this injunction on the basis that Plaintiffs had prevailed on their claims for quiet title to a recorded easement and equitable easement. The December 9, 2021 order denied Plaintiffs’ application for a receiver without prejudice.

 

On April 5, 2022, the Court entered judgment in this matter. The judgment reiterated the permanent injunction originally issued in the December 9, 2021 order.

 

On March 25, 2024, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in this matter. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), Ex. B.)

 

Plaintiffs filed this motion on June 28, 2024. Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiffs filed a reply.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice and takes notice of the requested materials as public records.

 

Legal Standard

       

“A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge of that court, in the following cases: [….]

 

(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into effect.”

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 564, subd. (b).)

 

            “Trial courts have wide and broad discretion in appointment or receivers to take over the operation of a business.” (Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman, Inc. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 95, 99.) “[S]ection 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the appointment of a receiver on the application of . . . any party whose right or interest in [a] property or funds is probable and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured.” (Snidow v. Hill (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 702, 704.)

 

“[T]he appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy to be employed only in exceptional circumstances.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 744.) “[R]eceivers are often legal luxuries, frequently representing an extravagant cost to a losing litigant. When it appears that no reasonably certain benefit will result to one litigant, and a distinct disadvantage will result to another, courts should weigh carefully the propriety of appointing a receiver.” (Ibid.) A receiver will not be appointed if another adequate remedy exists to protect the interest of the party requesting a receiver. (McNeil v. Graner (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 371, 373.) “In law and motion practice, factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.Ap.4th 216, 224.)

 

Discussion

 

The Court’s previous denial of Plaintiffs’ receivership motion was without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ renewed application for a receivership is therefore procedurally proper.

 

In denying Plaintiffs’ previous request for a receivership, the Court recognized that Defendants had previously interfered with Plaintiffs’ easement rights, e.g. by removing portions of the sewer pipe and installing stairs over the easement, including after this litigation was initiated. However, the Court found that the permanent injunction was adequate to protect Plaintiffs’ rights.

 

            The additional facts that have developed since then do not appear to support a receivership. During the pendency of the appeal, Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ contractor’s request for access by asking why it was necessary to proceed with the work while the appeal was still pending, and the injunction was stayed. (Covington Decl., Ex. 9.) When pressed further, Defendants did not respond substantively. (Covington Decl., ¶¶ 10-13.) These events occurred during the pendency of the appeal in this case, while the judgment was stayed. They therefore do not show the type of extreme circumstances necessary to justify a receivership.

 

            Nor does Defendants’ other behavior. On April 1, 2024, Defendants responded to an email from Plaintiffs’ successor in interest regarding the proposed plans and listed a number of corrections that they wanted to make to the plans. (Rogers Decl., Ex. 2.) Plaintiff’s successor in interest replied “[t]hank you for your quick response. Most of your changes seem easily addressed. I am checking feasibility on a couple and will update the plans once we are certain we can implement.” (Roit Decl., Ex. B.) Defendants’ behavior was far from incorrigible.

 

            Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have sued other construction contractors in the past for work that spilled over onto Defendants’ property. Whether or not this is true, it is not necessarily indicative of Defendants’ future conduct, particularly considering that here, there is an established injunction, and Defendants have generally shown a willingness to comply with the injunction.

 

            Plaintiffs argue that the Court previously denied the receivership due to the then-pending appeal, and should therefore grant a receivership now that the appeal is resolved. That was not the basis for the Court’s ruling. The Court denied the receivership because the permanent injunction was adequate to protect Plaintiffs’ rights. This remains the case.

 

            The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ application for receivership.  If Plaintiffs experience problems with the enforcement of the injunction they may renew this motion and bring the relevant facts to the Court’s attention.