Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: BC684588, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC684588 Hearing Date: February 4, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
TATIANA SOLOMON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. 404 N MAPLE DR LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
BC684588 Hearing Date: February 4, 2025 Calendar Number: 5 |
Plaintiff Tatiana Solomon (“Plaintiff”) moves for
reconsideration of the Court’s rulings at the December 6, 2024 Final Status
Conference, including its rulings on the motions in limine brought by Defendants
404 N. Maple Dr., LLC (“404 Maple”), Standard Management Company (“Standard
Management”), and Samuel Freshman (“Freshman”), individually and as trustee of
the S and A Freshman Trust, U/T/A 6/28/89 (the “Trust”) (collectively,
“Defendants”).
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
This is a landlord-tenant case.
Plaintiff lived at 404 N. Maple Drive, Unit 302 (the
“Property”) for roughly nine years. Plaintiff alleges that the Property
suffered a number of issues including mold growth, asbestos exposure, and
inadequate flooring and soundproofing, which went unremedied by management.
The Property was owned by Defendant 404 N. Maple Dr., LLC
(“404 Maple”) and Defendant Standard Management Company (“Standard Management”)
managed the Property as the agent of 404 Maple. (Solomon Decl., Ex. D at pp. 1,
3, 7, 8.)
Plaintiff filed this action on November 28, 2017 against
Defendants 404 Maple, Standard Management Company, and Samuel Freshman
(“Freshman”), individually and as trustee of the S and A Freshman Trust, U/T/A
6/28/89 (the “Trust”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The operative complaint is
now the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which raised claims for (1)
negligence, (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) fraud; (4) breach
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (5) nuisance; (6) breach of contract; (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (8) violation of Business &
Professions Code, section 17200, et seq.; and (9) constructive eviction.
The Court previously granted summary judgment in this case
as to all named Defendants. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of appeal affirmed in
part and reversed as to Plaintiff’s claims for (1) negligence; (2) breach of
the warranty of habitability; (4) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment;
(5) nuisance; and (9) constructive eviction. These claims are the only
remaining causes of action in this case.
On December 4, 2024, Defendants filed five motions in
limine.
On December 6, 2024, the Court held a Final Status
Conference. The Court heard and granted the first and fifth motions in limine,
and deferred ruling on the second, third, and fourth motions until trial.
On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte objection
to the Court’s rulings on the motions in limine at the Final Status Conference.
On December 19, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte
objection.
On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for
reconsideration. Defendants filed an opposition and Plaintiffs filed a reply.
The Court grants Freshman’s requests for judicial notice.
When an application for an
order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part,
or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the
order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of
entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or
law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to
reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)
A party who originally made
an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted
conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order
upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be
shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge,
what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts,
circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with
this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or
set aside on ex parte motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).)
For renewed motion purposes,
a moving party must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory
explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. (See California
Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 30, 46-48
(Virga) [affirming trial court order denying what amounted to a renewed
motion for attorney fees “in the absence of a sufficient explanation why
appellants did not rely on the federal statute [new law] in their original
motion”].)
A renewed motion can only be
brought by the party whose original motion was denied in whole or in part, has
no time limit for filing, and need not be considered by the same judge who
denied the original motion. (Deauville Restaurant, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.) However, statutory or jurisdictional
deadlines attached to the underlying motions remain applicable. (See, e.g., Kunysz
v. Sandler (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543 [motion to renew an anti-SLAPP
motion, brought nine months after the first amended complaint was filed, was
untimely because it was outside the 60-day statutory period for filing an
anti-SLAPP motion].)
The Court has statutory
authority to reconsider final orders and interim orders based on a change in
law. (Civ. Proc., § 1008, subds. (c), (e).)
Further, California courts
have a broader constitutional authority that goes beyond Code of Civil
Procedure section 1008 to reconsider interim orders that are erroneous. (Brown,
Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233,
1248 [courts have constitutional authority to reconsider interim orders]; Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108 [“If a court believes one of
its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error
no matter how it came to acquire that belief”].)
A
motion for reconsideration must be made within 10 days of the initial order.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) The time is extended by two days if
service is completed by electronic means (Code civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd.
(a)(3)(B)) or by five days if service is completed by mail. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1013, subd. (a).)
Here,
the underlying order was issued on December 6, 2024. Plaintiff did not file
this motion until December 30, 2024. The motion for reconsideration is
therefore not timely. The fact that Plaintiff filed an ex parte objection to
the motion in limine rulings on December 19, 2024 does not change this analysis
because Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the underlying rulings, and not the
ruling denying the ex parte objection.
While the motion is untimely, the Court has also looked at
the substance of the arguments made by Plaintiff. They do not appear to have merit.
The
Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The Court will discuss various case
management issues at the hearing on this motion, including the employment
status of Jane Hope.