Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 19STLC06644, Date: 2022-09-15 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STLC06644 Hearing Date: September 15, 2022 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
John W. Yeater
RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Armando Poeta
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
(CCP § 473.5)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant John W. Yeater’s Motion
to Vacate Default Judgment is DENIED.
SERVICE:
[
] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule
3.1300) YES
[
] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) NO[1]
[
] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c,
1005(b)) YES
OPPOSITION: Filed on September 1,
2022. [X]
Late [ ] None
REPLY: Filed on September
6, 2022. [ ]
Late [ ] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On July 17, 2019, Plaintiff Armando
Poeta (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendants
Andrea J. Kristy dba South Bay Handyman Services (“South Bay”), Andrea J.
Kristy, an individual (“Kristy”), and John W. Yeater (“Yeater”), (collectively
“Defendants”) for 1) breach of contract, 2) fraud and intentional
misrepresentation, 3) violation of State Contractors’ License Laws, and 4)
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The action arose out of an alleged contract between Plaintiff,
homeowner, and Defendant South Bay Handyman Services, owned by Defendant
Kristy, for electrical work to be completed by Defendant Yeater at Plaintiff’s
home. (See Compl.)
On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff
filed an Application to serve Defendants by Publication. The Application contains a Declaration of Due
Diligence from registered process server Thomas Maxim showing several attempts
to serve Defendants. (12-31-19
Application pp. 2-3.) The Declaration
also notes that the Complaint and other documents were left with Defendant
Yeater’s mother who “stated she would give documents to her son.” (Ibid.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s Applications on
January 29, 2020, and on March 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed Proof of Service by
Publication. (1-29-20 Orders; 3-13-20
Proof of Publication.)
On May 3, 2021, at the request of
Plaintiff, the Court entered default against Defendants South Bay, Kristy, and
Yeater. (5-3-21 Request.) Subsequently, on May 12, 2021, Default
Judgment was entered against all Defendants for $24,080.32. (5-12-21 Judgment by Default.)
On December 6, 2021, Defendant
Kristy, in propria persona, filed a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and/or
Default Judgment. On April 25, 2022, the
Court granted Defendant Kristy’s Motion and vacated default and default
judgment entered against Defendant Kristy and deemed Defendant Kristy’s
proposed answer filed. (4-25-22 Minute
Order.)
On July 19, 2022, Defendant Yeater
filed the instant Motion to Vacate Default Judgment (the “Motion”). On September 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed an
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion and on September 6, 2022, Defendant Yeater
filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition.
II.
Legal
Standard
Courts may set aside a default or default judgment due to
lack of actual notice. Code of Civil
Procedure § 473.5 states:
“(a) When service of a summons has not resulted in actual
notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default
judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve
and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and
for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed
within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two
years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days
after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default
judgment has been entered.
(b) A notice of motion to set aside a default or default
judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for
making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, and it
shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the party’s lack
of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file
with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be
filed in the action.
(c) Upon a finding by the court that the motion was made
within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her lack of
actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or
default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend
the action.”
Additionally, “[a] summons is the process by which a court
acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action. The form of a summons is prescribed by law,
and this form must be substantially observed.
[Citation.] Service of a
substantially defective summons does not confer jurisdiction over a party
[citation] and will not support a default judgment. [Citation.]”
(MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984)
153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.) “Thus, a
default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons
in the manner prescribed by statute is void.’ [Citation.]” (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 852, 858.) The trial court
may set aside any void judgment or order at any time. (Code Civ. Proc., §
473(d).)
Relief from default
judgment is also available pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b). Discretionary relief is available under the
statute as “the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or
his or her legal representative from judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code of
Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) Alternatively,
mandatory relief is available when “accompanied by an attorney’s sworn
affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect.” (Ibid.) Under this statute, an application for discretionary or mandatory relief
must be made no more than six months after entry of the judgment, dismissal,
order, or other proceeding from which relief is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); English v. IKON Business Solutions
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.)
III.
Discussion
Defendant seeks to set aside default and default judgment
on the basis that “Service of Summons did not result in actual notice (CCP §
473.5). (Mot. pp. 1-2.) Defendant argues that he “first became aware
of this lawsuit while visiting his mother on Thanksgiving in year 2020” and,
thus, missed “the opportunity to participate and defend against Plaintiff’s
allegations.” (Mot. p. 6; Yeater Decl.
¶¶ 1-2.) Defendant also states that he
was not avoiding service and could not address the lawsuit because he was going
through a challenging time in his life due to having a baby and being
homeless. (Mot. p. 6; Yeater Decl. ¶ 3.) Furthermore, Defendant states that he
attended hearings of Co-Defendant Kristy’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment,
assuming that these hearings were “relevant to the entire case and included
Defendant Yeater as well.” (Mot p. 6.) Defendant has attached a copy of a
“Preliminary Answer” to the Complaint.
(Yeater Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.)
Defendant seeks trial on the merits and an opportunity to fight against claims
he alleges are “dishonestly fabricated by the Plaintiff.” (Mot. p. 7.)
Plaintiff has filed a late Opposition to the Motion;
however, given that Defendant Yeater has submitted a Reply to the Opposition,
the Court, in its discretion, considers the arguments in Plaintiff’s
Opposition. Plaintiff argues that Defendant
has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that he did not receive actual
notice of the Complaint and instead, “admits in his Motion and accompanying
declaration that he did have notice of the Complaint several months before
default and default judgment were entered in this case.” (Oppos. p. 1.) Plaintiff states on August 17, 2019, a
registered process server served Defendant Yeater through substituted service
by leaving the Complaint and other documents with Defendant Yeater’s
mother. (Mot. p. 3; Poeta Decl. ¶¶ 2-3,
Ex. A.) Plaintiff also served Defendant
Yeater by Publication on March 13, 2020.
(Poeta Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. C.) Defendant
Yeater admits that he learned about the lawsuit on Thanksgiving Day in 2020 and
default and default judgment were entered against him on May 3, 2021, and May
12, 2021, respectively. (Mot. p.
3.) Defendant “made no effort between
November 26, 2020[2]
(Thanksgiving Day), and May 3, 2021, to contact Plaintiff or his counsel, or
make any appearance in the case while the lawsuit remained pending.” (Ibid.; Poeta Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendant also did not demonstrate any other
viable grounds for relief from default or default judgment, such as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or inexcusable neglect.
(Mot. pp. 7-8.) The circumstances
in Defendant’s life are not sufficient reasons to “explain why, for five
months, after learning of the lawsuit pending against him, he simply failed to
do anything.” (Ibid. at pp. 2, 5-6.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that forcing him to
“start over solely due to Defendant’s incompetence and inexcusable delay would
be grossly prejudicial.” (Ibid.
at p. 8.)
In his Reply, Defendant argues that Defendant Kristy’s
Motion to Vacate Default and/or Default Judgment was granted “on the basis that
the judge felt our defense has merit.”
(Reply p. 1.) Defendant Yeater goes
on to make several arguments regarding substantive matters in the case. (See Reply.) Regarding the instant Motion, Defendant
Yeater states the following:
I will not insult the court with
excuses, instead I ask for consideration in the fact that people aren’t perfect,
and life’s challenges effect people in different ways. I would have liked to
hire an attorney and fight the case, but that’s not always possible. With the
pregnancy and birth of my son, it simply was not an option and I apologize for
not responding sooner. The complexity of the legal system is intimidating and
difficult to navigate for a person like myself. Because the case is restarting
anyway, there is no additional time delays or cost to the Plaintiff, allowing
me to participate.
(Ibid. at p. 2.)
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the Notice of
Motion indicates that the Motion will be heard on August 16, 2022. (Mot. p. 1.)
There is no indication that Plaintiff was informed that the hearing was
continued to September 15, 2022. Furthermore,
Defendant Yeater has not provided Proof of Service that his Reply to
Plaintiff’s Opposition was served on Plaintiff.
Nonetheless,
the Court will rule on Yeater’s Motion.
Yeater’s
Motion is based only on Code of Civil Procedure § 473.5, as he seeks to set
aside the default for lack of actual notice.
Thus, the Court only analyzes whether he has met the requirements of §
473.5.
First,
Defendant Yeater argues that he was not served with the Complaint and other
documents and was not aware of the lawsuit until Thanksgiving of year
2020. (Mot. p. 6; Yeater Decl. ¶¶
1-2.) Plaintiff has filed Proof of
Service demonstrating that a registered process server served Defendant by
substituted service by leaving the documents with Defendant’s mother and by also
by publication. (12-31-19 Application
for Publication for John; 3-13-20 Proof of Publication.) “Evidence Code section 647 provides that a
registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption
affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the
declaration. [Citation.]” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390; Evid. Code § 647.) Here, Plaintiff has established this
presumption. However, Defendant has now
provided any proof to overcome this presumption or to show that he was not
present in California when Plaintiff served him by publication in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal.
Second, even if Defendant Yeater’s
contention that he was not served until Thanksgiving of year 2020 is true, he
learned about the lawsuit several months prior to the date default and default
judgment were entered, May 3 and May 12, 2021, respectively. (5-3-21 Request for Entry of Default; 5-12-21
Judgment by Default.) Code of Civil
Procedure § 473.5(a) states that “[t]he notice of motion shall be served and
filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i)
two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180
days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or
default judgment has been entered.”
Here, Defendant learned about the Complaint prior to the entry of
default and default judgment and did not file any responsive pleadings, thus,
Plaintiff was entitled to request default and default judgment. (California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(g) (“If
a responsive pleading is not served within the time limits specified in this
rule and no extension of time has been granted, the plaintiff must file a
request for entry of default within 10 days after the time for service has
elapsed.”))
Defendant states that he attended hearings of Co-Defendant Kristy’s
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment, assuming that these hearings were “relevant
to the entire case and included Defendant Yeater as well.” (Mot p. 6.) However, there is no indication that Defendant
Kristy is licensed to practice law and may represent the interests of Defendant
Yeater. Since the passage of the State
Bar Act in 1927, persons may represent their own interests in legal
proceedings, but may not represent the interests of another unless they are
active members of the State Bar. [Citation.]” (Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 618, 621.)
Finally,
Defendant states that his failure to act on the lawsuit was due to challenging
circumstances in his life. (Mot. p. 6; Yeater Decl. ¶ 3.) However, Defendant’s Motion is brought
solely on the basis that he was not properly served, thus, the Court may not
consider these circumstances, unless Defendant argues that the basis of his
failure to act is “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code of Civil Procedure § 473.) Even then, the Court may not find Defendant
Yeater’s arguments sufficient to meet the requirements of § 473 to vacate
default and default judgment.
The Court also notes that Defendant
Kristy’s Motion to Vacate Default and/or Default Judgment was not granted “on the basis that the judge felt [her] defense has
merit,” as Defendant states in his Reply.
(Reply p. 1.) In granting
Defendant Kristy’s Motion, the Court found that “Defendant Kristy has shown
that she entitled to relief under Section 473.5” and did not analyze the
underlying merits of the case. (4-25-22
Minute Order, p. 5.)
IV.
Conclusion
& Order
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant John W.
Yeater’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment is DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.
[1] Proof of
Service, filed on August 2, 2022, demonstrates that documents were mailed to
Plaintiff’s attorney at 1424 Carson Street, Ste 500, Torrance, CA 90503. The correct address for Plaintiff’s attorney
(prior to the Substitution of Attorney on August 24, 2022) was 3424 Carson
Street, Suite 500, Torrance CA 90503.
However, on September 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the
Motion, indicating that he has had an opportunity to review the Motion and file
an Opposition.
[2]
Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice that the date of Thanksgiving
Day 2020 fell on November 26, 2020. The
Court grants Plaintiff’s request and takes judicial notice of this date.